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SS2S
Von dem, was der Mensch sein sollte, wissen auch die 
Besten nichts Zuverlassiges. Von dem, was er ist, kann 
man aus jedem etwas lernen.
As to what man should be, even the wisest know little of 
certainty. As to what he is, it is from the behaviour of 
everybody that he learns.
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg
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A b stract
The concept of preference is used in the social sciences to explain 
and predict behaviour. This thesis investigates the conditions the 
preference concept has to satisfy in order to operate as explanans. 
First, it defends the naturalistic position that preferences are causes 
of behaviour. More specifically, it is argued that preferences are pro­
gramming properties that are themselves not causally efficacious, 
but causally relevant in that they realise efficacious properties. Fur­
ther, the argument that the allegedly intentional nature of prefer­
ences poses a problem to such a causal relevance is rejected. Sec­
ond, methodologies of preference attribution are discussed. The 
methodology of introspection in its current form is rejected, as well 
as the Radical Behaviourists’ proposal to avoid mental properties 
altogether. Instead, it is argued that preferences are theoretical con­
cepts. Third, a framework is provided that connects preferences over 
prospects of different degrees of abstraction. Such a framework al­
lows to attribute specific preferences on the basis of observed actions 
and derive from these specific preferences more abstract preferences 
which are employed in the explanation and prediction of behaviour. 
Fourth, this thesis develops a model of preference change. It is 
specified under which conditions the inconsistency of an agent’s be­
haviour with the preferences previously assigned to her should be 
interpreted as a preference change. The model then takes those be­
havioural observations and predicts how the preferences must have 
been changed in order to retain consistency. Principles guiding such 
a change are specified and operationalised, and the ensuing model 
is compared to existing ones.
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Introduction
The concept of preference enjoys widespread use in the social sci­
ences. It is found in most disciplines of microeconomics, in particular 
consumer choice theory and welfare economics, in decision theory, 
game theory, and rational choice theory; the notion as well appears 
in the empirical methods of sociology and in some anthropological 
investigations. Preference is one of the central notions of the social 
sciences.
Despite this widespread usage in the sciences, it is subject to 
conceptual controversy. The lack of conceptual clarity is detectable 
in textbooks and lectures, in research seminars and in professional 
publications alike. In this thesis, I wish to discuss four areas where 
I find confusion and disagreement prevalent. First, there are on­
tological issues like the causal relevance of preferences and their 
relation to neurophysiological or physical properties. Second, there 
are methodological questions about the attribution of preferences to 
agents; whether introspection can or must be used, whether prefer­
ences can be derived from behaviour and whether the constraints 
imposed on them make any theory employing the preference notion 
a normative discipline. Third, once preferences are attributed by 
a specific method, the issue arises how different types of preference 
are interrelated. Preferences might be between different concrete 
options the agent faces, or between highly abstract aspects. Which 
sorts of restrictions and consistency requirements hold between these 
different preference types is a very controversial issue. Fourth, there 
is the issue of preference dynamics. Preferences are attributed to 
an agent at a particular point in time. To employ them at later 
times to explain or predict the agent’s actions requires an assump­
tion about the preferences’ behaviour over time. These four issues 
will be discussed in the following four chapters.
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In chapter one, I develop and defend a naturalistic notion of 
mental properties that are identified by their causal role in bring­
ing about behaviour. I argue firstly that facts can be the relata of 
a causal relation and that hence the realization of a mental prop­
erty can be such a relation between facts. Further, I presented a 
concept of mental properties as internal factors interacting with ex­
ternal factors in the production of behaviour. The question then 
arises how mental properties can be causes at all. I argue that they 
are not causally efficacious, but causally relevant in that they re­
alise efficacious properties. By defending this position, I reject both 
type-reductionism and epiphenomenalism, while maintaining a nat­
uralistic understanding of mental properties.
One of the most fundamental anti-naturalistic attacks on such a 
position is the claim that mental properties are intentional proper­
ties, and that their semantic content makes them different in kind 
from physical properties. If this attack was valid, then the social 
sciences would face fundamentally distinct objects and had to em­
ploy fundamentally distinct methods. I defend the naturalistic po­
sition by drawing an analogy between measurement in physics and 
measuring mental properties, and by showing how the propositional 
content of mental properties arises in their measurement, without 
any significance for their ontological status. What this chapter es­
tablishes is that the explanandum of the social sciences i.e. human 
behaviour and, derived from that, the emergence and persistence 
of social institutions -  is the effect of the explanans -  i.e. mental 
properties of the agent.
In chapter two, I discuss how the explanans as the cause of the 
explanandum is identified -  that is, how mental properties are at­
tributed to agents. I argue that a methodology that identifies mental 
properties as causes of behaviour through a methodology of constant 
conjunctions is not sufficient for the social sciences. In particular, 
I will criticise introspection as a methodology in this direction as 
insufficient. Further, I will caution against a whole|om g; rejection 
of mental properties as explanans, as scientific behaviourists did in 
response to the shortcomings of introspective psychology.
Instead, I will argue that social science methodology has to at­
tribute mental properties as theoretical terms. Frank Ramsey’s and 
David Lewis’ discussion of how theoretical terms acquire meaning
will serve as a basis here. However, in contrast to Lewis’ account, 
I will caution against the employment of ‘folk psychological plat­
itudes’ to fill such a theory with content. In its place, I suggest 
to adopt a particular theory only as a conjecture. This raises the 
problem how to select any candidate from the infinite set of possi­
ble conjectures. Contrary to some claims, I will dispute any apriori 
arguments, and admit that mental properties are epistemically in­
determinate.
In chapter three, I discuss how different types of preference are 
interrelated. Preferences can be between different concrete options 
the agent faces (which I call worlds), and between highly abstract 
aspects (which I call prospects). Preferences over worlds, I will ar­
gue, are the only ones that can be derived from observed behaviour; 
but preferences over prospects are necessary for the explanation and 
prediction of behaviour. If the outcomes over which preferences are 
defined are too specific, then the theory is empty -  one cannot ex­
plain any situations with it that are not exact repetitions of past 
choices. Thus a principle of equivalence is needed that connects 
preferences over worlds with preferences over prospects. I will pro­
vide such a principle that is based on a model of causal beliefs, 
and that I think is acceptable on the basis of very weak plausibility 
considerations.
The fourth chapter offers a model of preference change. It is 
constructed following the general structure of models of epistemic 
change. It distinguishes between the externally caused direct change 
of a single preference, and the collateral change that the system has 
to undergo in order to accommodate the direct change and remain 
consistent. The satisfaction of these two principles of accommoda­
tion and consistency still allow for a multitude of possible results, 
which need to be narrowed down by additional principles. The two 
further principles discussed here are that of conservatism and of en­
trenchment. Three preference change operators are constructed that 
satisfy some important properties.
The concept of preferences discussed in this thesis is specifically 
geared to its function in the explanation and prediction of behaviour. 
It is this function for which preferences are most relevant in the
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social sciences. But preferences are used for other purposes as well 
-  in models of practical reasoning, and in theories of individual 
and collective welfare. I have deliberately restricted myself to not 
include these functions in one and the same theory of preference. 
To the contrary: the general conviction I express in this thesis is 
that past attempts at a unified theory of preference have led to 
many of the confusions still prevalent in the social sciences; and 
that therefore we should not strive for one theory of preference, but 
for many theories of preference, conditional on their functions. This 
thesis, then, strives to provide an account of preferences in their 
explanatory and predictive function.
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Chapter 1
M ental Properties
1.1 Introduction
In a paper that ‘opened the eyes of so many of us’,1 Donald David­
son argued that action explanations require not only reasons but 
also causes. The reasons for an action are the mental properties at­
tributed to an agent through a successful rationalization. To yield 
an explanation, such a rationalization must first of all be true -  
the agent must indeed hold those reasons -  and secondly, the ac­
tion must appear reasonable in the light of the reasons attributed. 
Those are plausible conditions, but the question is whether they are 
sufficient for explanation -  a question Davidson clearly denies:
Something essential has clearly been left out, for a per­
son can have a reason for an action, and perform the ac­
tion, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. 
Central to the relation between a reason and an action it 
explains is the idea that the agent performed the action 
because he had the reason. Of course we can include this 
idea too in justification; but then the notion of justifica­
tion becomes as dark as the notion of reason until we can 
account for the force of that ‘because’. (Davidson 1963,
9)
Let’s imagine Hans who is visiting his grandmother. Hans is 
generally not a very altruistic chap, and we know that what he
1 Isaac Levi introducing the author in a symposium on Arthur Danto’s work NYC 
XX.09.2002
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loves most about his grandmother is her money. So, in general, 
Hans’ occasional visits to his grandmother were explained (both by 
him, if he chose to be honest, and by those who knew him) by his 
desire to win her favour and hence be placed prominently in her will. 
But on one earlier occasion, Hans had reported that to his own 
surprise - he went solely out of fondness for the old lady.
Now, how do we explain Hans’ current visit? Why did he go 
this time? It could be out of greed, or out of love, or both but 
rationalization cannot tell us which of the three it was. All of them 
are plausible -  Hans has affection both for his grandmother and for 
her money - and both times the action is reasonable in the light of 
the reasons given. But it might nevertheless be the case that Hans 
acted out of one reason only, and hence rationalization cannot be 
a sufficient condition for action explanation. What is needed is an 
account of how reasons have a causal effect, and how these reasons 
which are also causes provide a sufficient, explanation of action. This 
is what this chapter tries to do.
However, this chapter will not follow Davidson’s argument in ask­
ing how reasons can also be causes. Davidson’s approach is to take 
mental properties primarily as reasons, which are by their nature 
under-determined by physical properties, and which by their nature 
have to be identified by interpretation. This leads to a fundamen­
tal inconsistency with his objective of making reasons also causes 
(Antony 1989).
Instead, in this chapter I will develop a notion of mental prop­
erties that does not rely much on the notion of reason. Mental 
properties - beliefs and desires -  are identified by the causal role 
they play in the production of behaviour, and they have this role 
because they pick out a physical property by which they are realised. 
I then argue why they can be realised by physical properties despite 
the fact that these mental properties are usually depicted as having 
semantic content. Given this, I argue that mental properties are 
causally relevant for action relevant in the sense that they pick 
out the causes of behaviour. And that should be sufficient for ex­
planation: we learn something about the causal history of an action 
if we are provided with a mental property of the agent.
( v s I o
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1.2 The C oncept of C ausation
Mental properties in this chapter will be defined in terms of causal 
roles. Thus, their instantiation (or at least the instantiation of 
a property that they realise) will feature as the relata of causa­
tion. This requires a specific understanding of causation -  namely, 
whether the relata of causation are events or facts. Events are par­
ticulars like persons or things. They can be described as individuals 
instantiating certain properties, but no description will ever fully 
exhaust them; they have a ‘secret life’ (Steward 1997) beyond any 
description. Facts, on the other hand, function as truth-makers of 
propositions or sentences. They are as Ramsey puts it, ‘existential 
propositions, asserting the existence of an event of a certain sort’ 
(Ramsey 1927). Facts report the instantiation of properties, but 
they do not themselves instantiate properties. They are different 
from events, because they are not particulars. So even though the 
event ‘the death of Caesar’ might be close to the fact ‘that Caesar 
died’, it is easy to distinguish the two by ascribing them a fur­
ther property and checking for their identity: while ‘Caesar’s death’ 
might have been bloody, treacherous or a deed of dedication to re­
publicanism, and still remain the same event, the fact ‘that Caesar 
died’ can have none of these properties, and the fact ‘that Caesar 
dies bloodily’ is a different fact altogether.
Thus the distinction between facts and events assumes impor­
tance for the identification of mental properties in terms of their 
characteristic causal role. As it will become clear in this chapter, 
any specific mental property will function as a necessary element of 
a jointly sufficient but non-necessary cause. To have a craving for 
sweets, e.g., is part of sufficient cause of eating the chocolate bar 
in front of you -  other ingredients of that sufficient cause will be 
the belief that chocolate is sweet, that the brown object in front 
of you is chocolate, as well as the absence of commitments to a 
low-calorie diet or to asceticism. It will not be, however, the only 
sufficient cause of eating the chocolate -  a desire to take it away 
from your siblings, and the appropriate beliefs, would be another. 
Understanding causes in this Millian way provides the explanation 
of action on the basis of mental properties with an enormous flexi­
bility. Mental properties are attributed holistically, as I will discuss 
in chapter 2. But once attributed, they can be individuated, and
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then different combinations of these ascribed properties will render 
different explanations or predictions.
For this understanding of mental causation, nevertheless, causa- 
tion must be of facts. If causation were between events, the cause 
oFairactTori would be one and only one event each time -  a partic­
ular that instantiated various properties. The non-analysability of 
events then would therefore prevent the possibility of a combinato­
rial framework of mental properties to sufficient causes of actions, 
and thus would greatly reduce the explanatory power of the whole 
project.
There has been considerable opposition to the position that cau­
sation must be of facts. The most widely cited one is Davidson’s 
employment of the famous ‘slingshot argument’, originally designed 
to show that there cannot be more than one fact, to the question of 
the relata of causation. Davidson’s argument that causation cannot 
be between facts proceeds with three assumptions: (a) that the con­
nective ‘causes’ in the sentence ‘C causes E’, where C and E are facts, 
cannot be truth-functional. If ‘- causes •’ were truth-functional, then 
the substitution of a relatum by another one with the same truth- 
value would preserve the truth of the sentence. For example, let ‘the 
streets are wet today because it rained’ be a true sentence. Further, 
it is true that whenever it rains in London, then individual trans­
port increases by 20%. Thus, if ‘- causes •’ was truth-functional, ‘it 
rained1 would be substitutable by ‘individual transport increased by 
20%’ salva veritate. But this would yield the sentence ‘the streets 
are wet today because individual transport increased by 20%’, which 
might well be wrong. Thus ‘- causes •’ is not truth-functional.
However, it is plausible to assume that (b) a logically equivalent 
sentence can be substituted for a sentence flanking the ‘because’ 
salva veritate. Logical equivalence of two sentences means that they 
have the same truth-value in all models. For example, we can use the 
substitution ‘the streets are wet because the heavens opened’ salva 
veritate as long as ‘the heavens opened’ is true in every instance in 
which it rains and vice versa. Last, it seems plausible that (c) the 
truth of a sentence ‘a cause b’ is preserved under substitution of 
coextensive singular terms. In Davidson’s own words:
If Smith’s death was caused by the fall from the ladder
and Smith was the first man to land on the moon, then
11
the fall from the ladder was the cause of the death of the 
first man to land on the moon. (Davidson 1967, 152)
The slingshot argument itself goes as follows. If causation is 
between facts, then the sentential relatum C  in ‘C causes £ ” is log­
ically equivalent to the sentence ‘all x such that x =  x are identical 
to all x such that x =  x and C  (formally: all x : {x =  x) =  all 
x : (x =  x A C)),  as it retains its truth value in all and only those 
cases where C  is true. Then, according to (b), C  in lC  causes E ‘ 
can be substituted by this logically equivalent sentence such that:
[all x : (x =  x) =  all x : (x =  x A C)\ causes E
But according to assumption (c), we can now replace the singular 
term ‘all £ : (x =  x A C )’ with the singular term ‘all x : (x =  
x A X ) \  because they refer to the same objects: those objects which 
are identical to themselves. Neither C  nor X  are quantificationally 
bound by x and can thus freely exchanged in the term without 
changing the reference. Thus our sentence can be changed to
[all x : (x =  x) =  all x : {x =  x A X)] causes E
But then by assumption (b) it follows from the above sentence 
that ’X  causes E \  Any sentence that has (contingently) the same 
truth value as C  can by this method replace C  in ‘C causes E \  
Thus it seems that the ‘causes’ in lC  causes E 1 after all is truth- 
functional, which contradicts assumption (a). Given the correctness 
of all three assumptions, Davidson sees as the only solution to this 
paradox to conclude that causation cannot be between facts.
As Mellor (1987) has demonstrated, we do not have to accept 
the conclusion, as the assumptions can be shown to be wrong. Mel­
lor focuses on Davidson’s assumption (c), and points out a group 
of cases, where the substitution of one singular term by another 
co-extensive one does falsify a causal statement.2 This group con­
sists of facts that state a contingent identity, as ‘the F =  the G’, 
where one of these singular terms is replaced by the other one, thus 
creating a necessary identity. Such a necessary identity then turns 
out to falsify the causal statement, as necessary facts cannot be ei­
ther causes or effects. For example, take the statement concerning 
a mountaineering accident involving more than one climber:
2Searle(1995) similarly criticises the slingshot argument as based on false presuppositions, 
but instead focuses on assumption (b)
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Don’s fall is the first fall because Don’s rope is the weakest 
rope
Given the truth of this statement, both ‘Don’s fall is the first 
fall’ and ‘Don’s rope is the weakest rope’ are true. Thus, ‘Don’s 
fall’ and ‘the first fall’ are co-extensive events, and ‘Don’s rope’ and 
‘the weakest rope’ refer to the same thing. Hence it follows from 
(c), that they can be substituted for each other, yielding, amongst 
others, the following results:
Don’s fall is Don’s fall because his rope is the weakest
Don’s fall is the first fall because his rope is his rope
But these causal statements are clearly false; which falsifies as­
sumption (c). Thus, Davidson’s slingshot argument is rejected: cau­
sation does not need to be fully truth-functional, when it appears be­
tween facts. Causation can therefore be between facts, and it should 
be, as Mellor further points out. While it seems possible that the 
sentential relata of ‘causes’ or ‘because’ often refer to events, they 
cannot always do so. Causes are often expressed as negative facts, 
as in: ‘he did not die, because he secured himself’. To translate 
such a sentence into an event requires the existence of a non-event, 
as ‘his survival’ (or ‘his non-death’, if you like), which would lead to 
an awkward ontology. In particular, non-events do not make true 
all sentences that should be related to them. While ‘He dies slowly’ 
and ‘He died instantly’ both imply ‘He died’, and hence are made 
true or false by the event of his death, nothing like that holds for 
non-events. ‘He did not die slowly’ and ‘He did not die instantly’ do 
not imply ‘He did not die’, hence they cannot be made true or false 
by the event of his non-death. It therefore seems preferable -  or 
even metaphysically mandatory -  to employ facts instead of events 
in causal statements.
Having established that causation is between facts, I can now 
discuss mental properties as composite causes of actions. Further, 
I can neglect arguments to the effect that mental properties (or 
their instantiation: mental states) cannot be the causes of behaviour 
because they are not events (for example, see Hornsby 1993). Even 
if there is a difference in kind between causation as between events 
and between facts (as Steward 1997 argues), facts (and thus mental 
states) can be causes of behaviour.
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1.3 Internal Factors and System  Behaviour
In this section I will present a concept of mental properties that 
bears similarities to Dretske’s (1988) account. The first step will be 
to specify what an internal factor of a system is, on the basis of a 
notion of a system and its behaviour, and then build the concept of 
mental property from there. I start with the claim that a system 
behaves when a factor internal to the system contributed to a change 
in some of its systemic properties.
Any collection of components that is perceived as producing a 
unified outcome of some sort is a system. A property is systemic 
if it is attributed to the whole system, not only to a part of it. 
For example, the position of her index finger is a property of an 
agent, not to her finger alone, as it specifies the position of the 
finger in relation to the agent’s physical appearance in its entirety; 
the liquid content in one of the finger’s cells, on the other hand, is a 
property usually attributed to the cell, not to the agent. Therefore, 
bending the index finger is a candidate for the agent’s behaviour, 
while osmosis on the cell’s wall is generally not. The attribution of 
properties to a system or to its parts of course leaves many borderline 
cases ambiguous internal organs, for example, can to some extent 
be said to have a life of their own -  but a crude distinction will 
suffice here.
A property internal to the system is considered an internal factor, 
if it contributes to a change in one or more of the system’s properties 
distinct from it. Systems of sufficient complexity behave if they 
exhibit property changes that are caused by at least one internal 
factor. Internal here means that the factor in question is the system 
or any part of it. Growing fingernails, sweating, losing hair or getting 
pregnant is therefore human behaviour, just as is writing a poem, 
speaking to one’s child or making love. Similarly, machines and 
plants do things: jets fly to Bangkok, vacuum cleaners pick up dust, 
and flowers bloom and shed their leaves. What are excluded are 
systemic property changes that are caused by external factors only. 
Having one’s hair ripped out, falling down the stairs or being flown 
to Bangkok thus does not fall under the category of behaviour.
The internal/external divide of course depends on the definition 
of the borders of a system and is therefore crude. For example, 
certain things happen inside of a system and yet are not internal
N.B,
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to it, like the aneurysm in a human brain or the electrode (with 
micro-battery attached) in a rat’s spine. Further, many systems 
are too primitive to really have any internal/external divide. For 
example, a feather describes a series of very complex movements in 
the wind, which are partly determined by its mass and shape. When 
we speak of its mass and its shape as its internal factors and thus of 
the feather’s behaviour, we don’t mean to say that the feather does 
anything. The internal/external divide in these cases just breaks 
down due to lack of complexity in the system:
There is no difference, as far as I can tell, between what 
happens to an electron in a magnetic field and what an 
electron does in a magnetic field. There definitely is a 
difference between what happens to an animal placed in 
water and what it does when placed in water. (Dretske 
1988, 11, his italics)
Albeit behaviour is characterised by at least one internal factor 
causing a systemic property change, the behaviour is not brought 
about solely by those internal factors. Internal factors are, as dis­
cussed above, individually necessary elements of a jointly sufficient 
but not necessary cause. In many cases, external factors are further 
elements of the joint cause. Two types of external factors can be 
distinguished. First, triggering factors cause behaviour by affecting 
internal factors which in turn bring about behaviour. Second, facil­
itating factors cause behaviour by accomplishing the causal efficacy 
of internal factors. An example for a triggering factor is the tap 
just below a person’s uppermost knee: it causes a complex chain of 
internal factor changes (neurons firing, muscles contracting) which 
then causes the person to jerk her leg. An example for a facilitat­
ing factor is the presence of air, allowing a person to speak. While 
in a vacuum, the speaker would perform a series of internal factor 
changes: vocal cord contractions, mouth movements, etc., without 
any speech resulting. Only the presence of air allows the transmis­
sion of sound waves and thus of speech.
Behaviour is thus an event characterised by a change of systemic 
properties caused by at least one internal factor. The description 
of behaviour varies with the degree to which external facilitating 
factors are included. At one extreme, behaviour can be described 
with internal factors only: as internal factors causing other internal
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factors to change. Provided the system is intact, such a description 
is always possible. For example, we can describe speech behaviour 
without invoking any facilitating factors like the presence of air: 
instead of describing the production of sound-waves, we can describe 
the vocal cord contractions, breathing rhythm, tongue movements 
and mouth positions that would produce speech under appropriate 
conditions.
However, descriptions of this sort are found in common parlance 
only for relatively simple kinds of behaviour: sweating, smiling or 
farting are examples. Most behaviour descriptions of everyday lan­
guage aim at a level that requires external facilitating factors for 
the behaviour’s realization. Like a Russian doll, the description of 
behaviour consists of many layers, according to the degree to which 
external facilitating factors are included. At the core is the descrip­
tion by purely internal factors; at the outside is a description that 
hardly seems to be behaviour of a single agent at all. This is illus­
trated in the following series of descriptions of the same behaviour: 
her neurons fired, her muscles contracted; her vocal strings vibrated, 
her mouth opened; she uttered a number of meaningful sounds in 
front of her; she declared war on the neighbours; she started the 
conflict; she unleashed a nuclear holocaust; she brought about the 
end of the human race.
Most behaviour descriptions lie between those extremes. They 
require the presence of some external facilitating factors, but at the 
same time try to ensure that at least one internal factor of the system 
is still a necessary element -  if it was not, the phenomenon could 
not be described as behaviour of that system.
External descriptions of behaviour (i.e. those that require exter­
nal facilitating factors) are broad and less precise than the small- 
scale internal descriptions, as they cover the many possible ways 
in which those external effects can be brought about by internal 
means. ‘She boarded a plane’, for example, does not specify in pre­
cisely what ways the passenger observed her environment, or how 
exactly she moved her legs. Instead, the external description covers 
all the internal factors which are appropriate for the external effect 
to be reached -  external behaviour descriptions therefore often have 
a teleological form.
The teleological description of behaviour carries the combined 
effect of internal and external factors beyond the boundaries of
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the system in question. Instead of describing the complex prop­
erty changes internal of the system, it describes the goal at which 
these changes are aimed. We don’t need to say that Fritz registered 
a static shadow on his retina of a particular size and a particular 
angle of aberration between his left and right retina, that he raised 
his stretched arm to the height of his eyes, and that he bent his 
finger -  we can say that Fritz shot Franz with a gun. The killing, of 
course, is contingent upon a number of external causes -  the object 
Frits holding in his hand being a pistol, the cartridge being live, no 
obstacle between Fritz and Franz, Franz’ position in relation to his 
shadow -  all of these external causal relation are assumed in the 
description.
The internal factors, however, often get associated with the goal 
of the behaviour, even if one or more of the external factors are 
not present. In this case people often say that she tried to speak, 
board the plane, etc. signifying that while the internal factors were 
active, the absence of some external facilitating factor prevented the 
realization of the action. (Absence of the right internal factors in 
relation to ‘trying’, ‘attempting’ is a more difficult notion which I 
will not discuss here).
We now have all the building blocks we need for mental proper­
ties. Human beings are usually able to identify what is human or 
animal behaviour or not -  the absence of external causes that could 
fully explain some human or animal locomotion lets them conclude 
that some internal factor must have contributed, and hence that 
they witness behaviour. The internal factor(s) at work then can be 
identified according to the specific behaviour that they help produc­
ing: they are identified by their causal role. But external factors also 
contribute -  hence internal factors are identified according to their 
causal role, conditional on certain external triggering and facilitating 
factors. The interrelations between internal factors, triggering and 
facilitating external factors and behaviour is illustrated in figure 1.1.
One can think of properties thus individuated as dispositions to 
behave.3
3I have said earlier that behaviour includes a very broad range of phenomena; many of 
which we would not usually include under actions. However, in the following, I will use be­
haviour loosely for those phenomena that we often categorize as actions. The attempt to 
distinguish actions from behaviour more general, by identifying the former as guided by in­
tentional attitudes, is not helpful, I think. The way I have discussed mental properties (whose 
intentional quality yet remains to be investigated) shows that we start with the identification
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System
B ehaviour
Internal factors Outcome
Triggering factors Facilitating factors
Figure 1.1: Causes of Behaviour
Each behaviour observation then leads to the attribution of a 
specific internal disposition that causes the observed behaviour in 
interaction with facilitating factors. However, complexities arise 
when under identical external factors, different behaviour is exhib­
ited at different times. Under these conditions, it is economical 
to compartmentalise internal factors further. Instead of ascribing 
one internal factor for each behaviour, a group of internal factors is 
identified as the individually insufficient but necessary elements of 
a jointly sufficient but non-necessary cluster of internal and exter­
nal facilitating factors.4 The individuation of these internal factors 
is guided by consideration of simplicity and comprehensiveness: as 
many kinds of behaviour should be covered with as few as possi­
ble internal factors. Additionally, the individuation is influenced by 
the number of triggering factors, and by the number of different be­
haviours under identical facilitating factors. A more comprehensive 
discussion of the individuation of internal factor, and in particular 
of the standard practice to distinguish desires and beliefs, will follow 
in chapter 2.
These remarks about individuation of internal factors could be 
read as a plea for a purely instrumental notion of internal factors. 
I disagree with such a reading. What is needed here is a notion
of behaviour and then identify the internal factors th a t cause it. However we do this, the bor­
der between action and non-action behaviour will remain fuzzy, with many phenomena falling 
in both categories. Instead of attem pting such a distinction, I will continue using ‘behaviour’ 
simpliciter and implicitly assume th a t we are talking about sufficiently complex behaviour 
th a t merits an explanation with reference to mental properties.
4The discussion of causal factors as INUS conditions goes back to Mackie (1980). However, 
I do not intend to employ the INUS concept as a reduction of causes, but rather as their 
representation.
18
of internal factors (as behavioural disposition) which are causally 
relevant for behaviour. This requirements puts certain constrains 
on internal factors that render them with ontological substance.
To speak of an object having a dispositional property en­
tails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or 
that it has some property which is responsible for the 
object manifesting certain behaviour in certain circum­
stances. (Armstrong 1968, 86)
This raises the question of how functional (dispositional) proper­
ties are realised, and the related issue of how the identification of 
functional properties can in any way provide a causal history that 
explains the agent’s behaviour. This is the topic of the next section.
1.4 M ental C ausation
Mental properties, as defined above, are distinct from physical prop­
erties, in the sense that they are not part of the terminology of 
physics. Nevertheless, mental properties are employed to individu­
ate the causes of behaviour -  hence mental properties, albeit distinct 
from physical properties, are claimed to witness physical effects. At 
the face of it, this distinction collides with the assumption that 
physics is complete; an assumption which claims that:
All physical events are determined, or have their chances 
determined, by prior physical events according to physical 
laws. (Papineau 1993, 16)
If this assumption were true, then all the causes of behaviour must be 
describable as physical properties. Under this conclusion, it seems 
wrong to claim that instantiations of mental properties cause be­
haviour; unless one also claims that mental properties are nothing 
but physical properties, or that behaviour suffers constant overde­
termination from two types of causes. The dilemma the naturalist 
philosopher of mind finds herself in is expressed by Moser:
Either the domain of the mental will be causally impotent.
. . or physical categories will not have a monopoly on 
causal explainers. (Moser 1994, 21)
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If one wants to remain within a naturalist position -  which assumes. 
that behaviour h as^  physical component, that physics js complete 
and that there M elioT ^utain^^FH ^eriJeterm ination -  then one 
cannot admit’Moser’s secohd’ldp f^dn. Instead, I will grasp the first 
horn of Moser’s dilemma.
To do so without falling either for epiphenomenalism or reduc- 
tionism, I have to argue that mental states can be causally relevant 
to behaviour without being causally efficacious, jmd that therefore 
mental properties can Be meaningfully differentiated from physical 
properties without becoming causal competitors. I will first argue 
for a claim that is already implicit in the functional definition of 
mental properties given above: that mental properties are super­
venient on physical properties. I will then limit that claim so that 
type reductionism of the mental to the physical is excluded; and last 
I will argue for a realization relation between the mental and the 
physical such that mental properties do come out as more than mere 
effects of physical properties, and thus reject an epiphenomenal con­
clusion. This, I hope, will suffice to see that mental properties can 
be considered causally relevant for behaviour.
According to the functionalist approach endorsed here, to have 
a mental property means having a physical property that typically 
occupies a particular causal role, given certain sensory inputs and 
other mental properties. The mentaljsupervenes on the physical 
in the sense that there cannot be a difference between the men- 
tal properties of a system without there being a difference between 
the^hysical properties of a system. As the functionalist account 
presupposes that the mental is realised through the physical, and 
this presupposition entails supervenience, the functionalist therefore 
presupposes supervenience.
The supervenience of the mental on the physical derives from two 
premises: the completeness of physics, and the so-called manifesta- 
bility of the mental.5 This latter premise assumes that if two systems 
are different in some mental property, there must be a possibility 
of this difference manifesting itself in some physical property inside 
of the systems.6 Roughly, mental differences must be in principle
5Compare McGinn 1982: 29; Papineau 1993, 18.
6This claim is stronger than Papineau’s, who allows for manifestation outside of the system. 
This is necessary for his account of the broad content of propositional attitudes. For my 
differing treatment of broad content, see section 3.
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detectable in physical terminology, while magical powers and super­
natural sensory abilities (divine revelation, telepathy) are excluded.
From completeness follows that identical physical causes yield 
identical physical effects; and from manifestation follows that men­
tal difference requires physical difference. Thus, completeness and 
manifestation together imply that physical identity prohibits men­
tal differences, and hence imply supervenience of the mental on the 
physical.
Supervenience, however, is too wide a notion to cope with men­
tal causation adequately. After all, both the epiphenomenalist and 
the reductionist approach to mental states are compatible with su­
pervenience of the mental. The epiphenomenalist on the one hand 
claims that the physical states which cause behaviour also cause the 
respective mental state, while this state itself does not cause any­
thing. As the mental state according to this view is an effect of 
the physical state (or at least of the collection of all physical states 
of the system) it can change only with its causes, and hence su­
pervenes on them. The reductionist on the other hand claims the 
identity between physical and mental properties (state types), which 
trivially implies supervenience. Hence in both views supervenience 
is satisfied, but mental states are causally irrelevant.
The reductionist argues for the identity of mental and physical 
properties. If a mental property M  is identical to a physical prop­
erty P,  it follows that for any instantiation of M  through an object 
o, the identical physical property is instantiated; i.e. from the iden­
tity of P  and M  follows M o <=$ Po. Such a biconditional then serves 
as a bridge law for a reduction of any theory involving property M  
to physics. But there is a problem. Motivations are ascribed to a 
range of living creatures, many of which do not share the same brain 
structure as humans. People say that horses want to flee fire; that 
dogs want to signal to their masters and that frogs want to still their 
hunger. If type identity held, however, for each different brain struc­
ture a different mental state would apply. Assuming that humans, 
horses and frogs differ in their brain structure, a horse’s desire to 
escape a fire would be a different mental property altogether than a 
human’s desire to do the same. Furthermore, fictional creatures like 
the ‘Terminator’ of recent Hollywood productions are made out of 
entirely different materials, but their environment treats them like
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fellow creatures and assigns similar mental properties to them as 
to humans. If one imagined being confronted with such creatures, 
whether constructed by humans, or arriving from a different time or 
planet, would it be wrong to attempt such attributions in the face of 
behaviour structurally similar to humans? At the least, it is not clear 
what purpose such a differentiation would serve but the upholding 
of type physicalism.7 Finally, beyond the differences in species or 
between terrestrial and extraterrestrial, it is not even clear that hu­
man beings instantiate their mental states in any uniform manner. 
So far, neurophysiology has identified little more than areas of the 
brain that show more activity when the agent is aroused, angered 
or concentrates on a given task. But whether identical physical pro­
cesses take place in the agent’s brain whenever the agent is in a 
specific mental state is by no means uncontroversial.
It therefore seems plausible to admit that mental states can be 
realised in a multitude of physical ways. According to this multiple 
realisability assumption, the relation between instantiations of M  
and P  are weaker than reductionists assume. All that has to hold is 
that any instantiation of a mental property necessitates a physical 
property: M o =$> 3Pi : PiO. The reductionists’ biconditional, on the 
other hand, does not hold for any Pi: and hence the identity between 
any Pi and M  must be false.
Papineau (1993, 38), however, doubts the credibility of multiple 
realisability. If functionally identified mental properties could be 
realised in different ways, he says, it would be incredible that they 
all led to the same behavioural output:
I am not accusing the functionalist picture of inconsis­
tency, but only of incredibility. The difficulty I am con­
cerned with arises when some mental state S, which me­
diates between physical input R  and physical output T, 
is realised by a range of different physical states Pi. The 
puzzle is: why do all the different P*s which result from 
R  all nevertheless yield the common effect T? Now, it is 
possible that every such Pi should just happen to yield T  
. . . .  However, if this were so, it would be the kind 
of coincidence that cries out for explanation. (Papineau 
1993, 35-36)
7Compare Putnam 1967; Fodor 1974.
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This argument seems puzzling -  after all, all the different P*s yield 
the same effect T  because they were individuated by their potential 
to yield T. All the Pis are simply of the same psychological type. 
That this unity does not establish the unity on the physical level -  
that a psychological type does not necessarily establish a physical 
type -  is exactly the point of autonomous mental property explana­
tion that I want to defend here.
Naturalism that rejects the possibility of multiple realisation 
Papineau-style begs the question of what constitutes mental proper­
ties. It presupposes without justification that it is the physical level 
that determines the unifying and distinguishing criteria for mental 
states -  in other words, it requires mental properties to be natural 
kinds. Only on this basis can people conclude that certain mental 
properties are only superficially similar, while being distinguished 
in their deep (physical) structure:
. . .  in spite of their superficial similarity when viewed 
top-down, human psychology and Martian psychology are 
independent of each other in causal/explanatory structure 
and sources of evidence and must be considered, to all 
intends and purposes, distinct sciences. (Kim 1998: 122)
The line of attack against this argument is to point out the se­
vere limitations of requiring mental properties to be natural kinds. 
Behaviour is an event of purely physical manifestation; however, the 
possibility of describing this event in merely physical terms, derived 
from this point is largely theoretical. When we want to explain why 
the agent reached out for the ice-cream, or why the car crash oc­
curred, we talk about events which themselves do not have the unity 
of natural kinds.
Someone equipped only with the vocabulary and explana­
tory resources of physics would not hit either on car crashes 
or on Teachings for ice-creams as types of physical event 
which required uniform physical explanations. And so 
once again, I am left wondering what the puzzle is sup­
posed to be. In so far as there is a question, it is a ques­
tion that cannot even be posed, let alone answered, unless 
we permit ourselves the resources of a richer vocabulary 
and explanatory scheme than mere physics is able to offer. 
(Steward 1996, 672)
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To require mental properties to be homogeneous from a physical per­
spective, as Papineau requires against functionalism, is to eliminate 
exactly those resources. The moral high ground of the naturalist 
then seems to stand against the possibility of social science. It is 
however not necessary to reject naturalism; rather, it suffices to re­
ject the ill-understood concept of natural kinds as a requirement for 
mental properties.
It is perfectly consistent to accept the Kripke-Putnam ac­
count of semantics of natural kind terms like ‘gold’ and 
‘water’ while rejecting such an account for mental terms.
The notion of a natural kind is not the most luminous 
of notions; but I do not think that we should be both­
ered if we are required to say that pains, like poisons and 
mousetraps, are not a natural kind, and lack a scientifi­
cally determinable essence. (Shoemaker 1984, 283)
To the contrary: that mental properties are not natural kinds, but 
supervene on physical properties, is the justification of the social 
sciences autonomy from the natural sciences while maintaining a 
naturalistic position.
A second reductionist response claims that even though mental 
properties might be multiply realised, it is nevertheless possible to 
reduce them to the disjunction of these physical properties. The 
reply of the anti-reductionists here is twofold: first, they doubt that 
such a disjunction can be considered a real property. This defense is 
rather weak, as it seems difficult to clarify what exactly a ‘real prop­
erty’ is. A second defense is more fruitful. It hinges on the principal 
openness of the above thought experiments. If mental properties 
are multiply realisable at all, i.e. if different physical properties can 
take on the causal role that specifies the mental property, then it 
is always possible that there are more realisers than we know so 
far. Under these conditions it is not possible to form a disjunction 
of physical properties which could serve as a reductive basis -  all 
that such a disjunction could do is to summarise the current state 
of scientific knowledge.
Thus, despite the fact that mental properties supervene on phys­
ical ones, it is impossible to establish a type identity between the 
mental and the physical -  reductionism of mental properties there­
fore fails.
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From mind-body supervenience, however, follows a minimal rela­
tion between mental and physical properties. Mental properties are 
not realised by the same physical property all the time; but each 
time a mental property is be realised, it must be realised by some 
physical fact (an instantiation of a physical property). Papineau 
formulates this realization relation as follows:
In order for a mental . . . type M  to be realised by 
an instance of some physical type P, M  needs to be a 
second-order property, the property of having some prop­
erty which satisfies certain requirements R. And then M  
will be realised by P  in some individual X  if and only 
if this instance of P  satisfies requirements R. In such a 
case we can say X  satisfies M  in virtue of satisfying P. 
(Papineau 1993, 25)
The desire to drink milk then is the secondary property of having a 
(possibly undetermined) physical property that under specific con­
ditions makes one drink white liquids out of suitably shaped con­
tainers. To identify this secondary property, one does not have to 
determine what physical properties are involved here; it is enough 
that there are some, and that they are the realisers of the causal 
role in question.
M
I
Figure 1.2: Epiphenomenalism vs. Token Identity
A realization relation of the described sort prevents both a pos­
sible overdetermination of behaviour, and it prohibits any epiphe- 
nomenal conclusion. It prevents over determination by chaining M  
to a causally efficacious physical event, thus excluding the possibility 
that M  and P  become causal competitors. It prohibits the epiphe- 
nomenal conclusion -  not the letter, but its spirit -  by admitting 
that a mental event is not causally efficacious as the epiphenome­
nalist claims, but nevertheless causally relevant in that it realises
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a causally efficacious event. The difference between the two inter­
pretations is illustrated in figure 1.2. While the epiphenomenalist 
claims that the mental property is nothing but a causal by-product 
of the causally efficacious physical property, the position defended 
here claims that the mental property is the category of a set of 
physical properties that all realize the behaviour in question. In 
thissense, the causally relevant property programs for causally effi­
cacious ones in the following sense:
A useful metaphor for describing the role of the property is 
to say that its realization programs for the appearance of 
the productive property and, under a certain description, 
for the event produced. The analogy is with a computer 
program which ensures that certain th ings will happen (. .
I", though all the work of producing those things goes on 
at^a lower, mechanical level. (Jackson and Pettit 1990a,
114)
Programming properties relevant for an effect, although not involved 
in the causal chain, provide a causal history of that effect. The 
epiphenomenalist claim that mental properties are causally inert 
thus stands undefeated; but the bearing this result has on the pos­
sibility of explanation of behaviour with recourse to those mental 
properties is greatly changed.
How is a particular psychological set causally relevant to 
an agent’s doing something . . . given that the action is 
produced (...) without leaving anything to be explained 
by a certain complex of neurophysiological states? The 
programme model suggests that the psychological set will 
be causally relevant so far as its realization in an agent of 
that kind makes it more probable than it would otherwise 
have been . . . that there will be a neurophysiological 
configuration present -  maybe this, maybe that -  that is 
sufficient to produce the required behaviour. (Pettit 2002,
181)
Mental properties program for the causes of behaviour, and they 
therefore can be employed in causal explanation of behaviour: By 
finding out about what the agent wanted, we learned something 
about the causal history of some events. Additionally, they are
globally speaking -  much better at this type of explanation than 
anything else so far available. They master multiple realisability, 
which hampers progress in neurophysiological explanations (and will 
possibly make it impossible in principle); they allow one to explain 
behaviour in the terminology in which it is described, and not in 
the overtly reductive terminology of physics. It therefore allows one 
to focus on the macrostructure of behaviour, instead of the causal 
(and thus physical) microstructure. Finally, mental events come 
equipped with an easy (if somewhat rough) epistemology, as I will 
discuss in chapter 2.
1.5 M ental C ontent
Mental properties are often presented as propositional attitudes. In 
particular, beliefs and desires, the mental properties which are most 
important for explanations in the social sciences, are considered to 
have propositional content: we say that the agent believed that it 
was raining and she desired that she stayed dry when we explain 
why she took the umbrella. This impression is supported by the 
formal treatment of mental properties: as the belief that p, bel(p), 
or the desire that q, des(q), or as the preference relation pPq  between 
propositions p , q.
Many philosophers therefore think of mental properties as rela­
tions between people and propositions: my belief that the sun is 
shining is a special kind of relation between me and the proposition 
‘The sun is shining’; your desire to stay at home on such a beautiful 1 
day like this is a relation between you and the proposition ‘I stay 
home on Mon, 1st of March 2004’. To claim that mental proper­
ties are propositional attitudes then becomes an ontological claim: 
namely that semantic content in the form of a proposition is part 
of the mental property. Colloquially, as mental properties are in­
ternal factors, it is claimed that propositions must be ‘in the head’. 
The claim that mental properties are relations between people and 
propositions is called the ‘Relational Thesis’.8
Whatever we think propositions to be exactly, they are seman­
tic content -  that is, they are what sentences of the same meaning 
express. But objects of such a sort do not have either location in
8For example in Fodor (1987).
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time or space: propositions are abstract objects. The Relation The­
sis therefore implies that mental states (as instantiations of mental 
properties) are very specific kinds of objects; in particular, that they 
are fundamentally different from physical states. This claim -  al­
beit of course not cast in terms of propositions -  can be found in the 
writings of the 19th century German philosopher and psychologist 
Franz Brentano.
Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the 
Scholastics . . . called the intentional (...) inexistence 
of an object, and what we might call (...) reference to 
a content, direction toward an object (...), or immanent 
objectivity. Every mental phenomena includes something 
as object within itself, although they do not all do so in 
the same way. In presentation something is presented, 
in judgment something affirmed or denied, in love loved, 
in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This inten­
tional in-existence is characteristic exclusively to mental 
phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything 
like that. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by 
saying that they are those phenomena which contain an 
object intentionally within themselves.’ (Brentano 1995, 
88-89)
Propositions the abstract objects Brentano calls content of di­
rection toward an object do not have any physical correlate. The 
Relational Thesis implies that mental properties are relations be­
tween persons and these abstract objects; hence there cannot be a 
physical or neurophysiological correlate of mental states either. As 
causation is between physical phenomena only, mental properties, 
understood as relations between people and propositions, cannot be 
causes of anything, and in particular not causes of actions.
This is a far-reaching result. If the social sciences deal with men­
tal properties, and the natural sciences with physical phenomena, 
then it follows from Brentano’s distinction that the social sciences 
and the natural sciences are fundamentally distinct in their objects. 
But if intentional properties are fundamentally different from physi­
cal properties, and cannot be causes, then nothing can be explained 
by referring to them. Thus it would follow that the natural and the 
social sciences have to be different in their methods as well. While
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the natural sciences explain, the social sciences have to adopt some 
other practice, maybe Verstehen, maybe something else. The char­
acterization of mental properties as intentional states contributes to 
the deep-reaching divide between Geistes- and Naturwissenschaften.
I think that the thus constructed divide between the social and 
the natural sciences on these grounds is unwarranted. I think that 
we can explain in the social sciences, and that this explanation refers 
to mental properties as the causes of behaviour.
There are two ways to defend such a naturalistic account of men­
tal properties. One can either expand the supervenience-base of the 
mental -  to include all ontological constituents of the representa­
tional content -  or one can argue that the individuation through 
the representational content is ontologically irrelevant. That is, one 
drops the assumption that mental properties have semantic content 
in any essential way and thus frees oneself from the burden to show 
how this semantic content could be reducible to physical events.
I think the attempt to extend the supervenience-base is not fruit­
ful. First, there is the question whether it can be done at all. Propo­
sitions are abstract objects. Thus it is not clear whether they have 
physical realisers at all; or if they do, then it is an open question 
what these physical realisers are. Second, if it can be done, then the 
result will be an extremely uneconomical ontology. To answer the 
qualms of the anti-naturalists, one had to point out what parts of 
the realisers of a mental property were the realisers of the semantic 
content, a rather dooming task it seems to me.
Instead, I will argue for a naturalistic account of mental proper­
ties by denying that intentional states are genuine relations between 
people and abstract objects. Any such argument against the onto­
logical relevance of propositional content has to show how mental 
properties acquire their semantic content -  which they undoubtedly 
have -  without being ontologically committed to them. The argu­
ment presented here relies on an analogy between the ascription of 
semantic content to mental properties and the ascription of num­
bers to physical objects in (numerical) measurement procedures.9 
To clarify this analogy, I will first rehearse some basics of the theory 
of measurement.
9This idea has been aired by a number of authors without proper elaboration, for example 
Churchland 1979, 100-107; Davidson 1989, 57; Field 1980, 114; Stalnaker 1984, 7. The only 
elaboration of this idea that I know of is found in Matthews 1994.
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1.5.1 M easurem ent Theory
Measurement theory explains why and how numbers can be em­
ployed to represent a property; more precisely, how a scale -  a 
mathematical structure consisting of a set of numbers and a trans­
formation rule -  can be meaningfully applied to a set of objects. A 
scale is an ordered triple (U, N , / )  with U being an empirical rela­
tional system, N  a full numerical relational system, and /  a function 
that maps U homomorphically onto a subsystem of N. An empirical 
relation system consists of a domain specification and one or more 
relations over that domain; for example, the set of all extended ob­
jects O which are ordered according to their weight Ry, forms an 
empirical relational system (O, Ryj); the set of extended objects or­
dered according to their weight and their density Rd forms another 
empirical relation (O, Rw, Rd)- A full numerical relational system  
consists of the set of all real numbers and one or more relations 
Si...Sn defined over it -  mathematical relations like, for example, 
equality or calculus operations. A subsystem of a relational system  
consists of a subset of the domain of the system with the same rela­
tions defined over it. We say that a numerical subsystem preserves 
properties and relations of an empirical system if the function /  
maps the elements of the empirical domain a, b, c . . .  G O onto the 
numerical domain N  in such a way that
aRib if and only if f {a)Sj f (b)
If /  satisfies this requirement, we speak of A" as a homomorphic 
image of U.  To prove that there is such a scale with a homomorphic 
mapping is to prove a representation theorem; its result is that the 
property or relation that was identified in the empirical relational 
system is indeed preserved in the numerical subsystem.
‘Measuring an object’ thus is a two-step procedure. First, the 
empirical structure of an object is identified: its weight, length or 
temperature. The empirical structure determines the dimension of 
measurement. For each dimension, the homomorphic image of the 
empirical structure allows the measurement of magnitude. The as­
signment of numbers to objects is thus only part of the measurement 
process. Numerical assignments across dimensions are obviously not 
comparable.
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Prom the existence of a homomorphic image of an empirical sys­
tem it does not necessarily follow that this numerical subsystem is 
the only possible representational space. To say that a stone has 
a weight of 11 pounds, attributes a property to the stone -  that of 
having a certain mass. But we can express exactly the same fact by 
saying that the stone weighs 5 kilogram, or 175.57 ounces. There 
is -  to some degree -  an arbitrary choice of unit in expressing the 
same fact about the object numerically. The theory of measurement 
discusses this peculiar relation between objects and their properties 
on the one hand, and numbers and their operations on the other.
When we express weight in kilos or pounds, we represent a fea­
ture of this property in a numerical space. Such a representation 
preserves a certain structure of that property (the ‘greater than’ 
relation, its additivity or substractability, for example), and makes 
it more convenient to handle. But there are many kinds of rep­
resentations that all preserve the same structural features of that 
property: pounds and kilos are just two examples from an infinite 
set of possible representations. We then say that in these cases 
the scales measuring this property are equivalent transformations of 
each other.
Where scales are equivalent transformations of each other, the 
empirical domain stays the same, but the mapping and the nu­
merical subdomain change: let ( U, N, f )  be the Celsius scale and 
(Uj N,  g) the Fahrenheit scale. Then g =  F  o / ,  that is, g can be 
generated through a transformation function F  from / .  We say 
that (£/, N,  f )  is unique up to transformation F , and thus categorise 
scales according to the kind of transformation function they allow. 
Absolute scales only allow identity transformation; ratio scales (e.g. 
weight, length) allow for transformation by a coefficient; interval 
scales (e.g. temperature) allow for positive linear transformations; 
ordinal scales allow for monotone transformations.
How is the uniqueness of a scale determined? If all elements of a 
scale are known, the type of scale can be proven:
To determine its uniqueness, we need to know the scale, 
which means we need to know both an empirical relation 
system and a full numerical relation system. From the 
knowledge of a scale, we can, at least theoretically, infer 
precisely what the uniqueness properties of the numerical 
assignments are. (Suppes and Zinnes 1967, 15)
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But the exact structure of the empirical system is not known a 
priori. Instead, the form of the empirical system is conjectured, 
measurement scales established on that basis and the results of the 
measurement employed in explanatory or predictive theories. Mea­
surement thus proceeds by trial-and-error: different measurement 
scales are applied to a system -  i.e. measurements are taken -  and 
the measurements are compared for consistency.
The numerical relational subsystems employed in such measure­
ment scales are not necessarily identical to subsets of the real num­
ber system. To prove that an empirical system is homomorphic to 
a numerical one does not mean that the empirical system is homo­
morphic to the real number system. A real number system contains 
amongst others the operations of addition and multiplication -  that 
is, three-place relations -  as well as the binary relation ‘less than’. 
Relations of empirical systems measured with a numerical system 
can be considerable weaker, in that they lack e.g. addition or multi­
plication. For example, the empirical system measured with Moh’s 
hardness scale does not contain any relation corresponding to the 
addition operation, but only the ‘less than’-relation. That a numeri­
cal relational system of a given scale is isomorphic to the real number 
system is therefore an additional result that is not necessarily born 
out in the representation theorem itself.
Hence there are many relations definable over the numerical do­
main, which do not have any correspondence to any property in 
the empirical system. Strictly speaking (as in the above paragraph) 
these properties or relations are therefore not part of the numeri­
cal system which is a homomorphic image of the empirical system 
in question. This does nevertheless not prohibit the application of 
those properties and relations to the numerical system, as long as 
these applications are meaningful:
This does not mean (...) that manipulations of the num­
bers in the domain of a given numerical system -  to infer 
facts about the elements in the domain of the correspond­
ing empirical system -  must involve only those relations in 
the given numerical system. Relations neither contained 
in a given numerical system nor having a direct correspon­
dence in the related empirical system may nevertheless be 
used. There are, of course, certain limitations imposed 
upon the manipulations of the numbers of a numerical
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system, but these limitations relate to certain criteria of 
meaning of individual sentences rather than to those rela­
tions contained in a numerical system. (Suppes and Zinnes 
1967, 8-9)
Thus we can employ all arithmetic operations on any numerical 
system in statements about the empirical system, independently of 
the question whether these correspond to any empirical operations, 
as long as the operations are meaningful. Suppes and Zinnes (1967,
64) give two examples of this:
(i) The ratio of the maximum temperature today (tn) to 
the maximum temperature yesterday (£n_i) is 1.1.
(ii) The ratio of the difference between today’s and yester­
day’s maximum temperature (tn and £n_i) to the differ­
ence between today’s and tomorrow’s maximum tempera­
ture (tn and tn+1 ) will be 0.95.
The truth of statement (i) depends crucially on which of the equiv­
alent scales are used for the measurement of tn and tn-i- Using
the Fahrenheit scale, with £n=110 and tn_i=100, the statement is
true; using the same temperatures measured in Celsius, £n=43.3 and 
tn_1=37.8, the ratio is 1.15, hence the statement is false.
The truth of statement (ii), on the other hand, is robust under all 
positive linear transformation from tn to tj, as can be easily shown:
tn ~  tn- 1 =  (at* +  0)  -  (£< _! +  P) =  t* -  t*n_x
tn -  tn+1 (at*n +  (3) -  (at*+l +  /3) t * -  t*n+1
The meaningfulness of a statement involving operation on the 
numerical system of a measurement scale thus depends on the form 
of its admissible transformations, not on the operations defined on 
the empirical system:
A numerical statement is meaningful if and only if its truth 
(or falsity) is constant under admissible scale transforma­
tions of any of its numerical assignments, that is, any of its 
numerical functions expressing the result of measurement. 
(Suppes and Zinnes 1967, 66)
Meaningfulness, besides representation and uniqueness, thus be­
comes a third criterion of any measurement scale.
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The measurement process takes the relations and properties of 
the empirical domain as given. In no way does the measurement 
explain these structures; nor does the measurement require that the 
measurer is acquainted with them. People measure temperature 
without understanding thermodynamics; in fact, the measurement 
of temperature, i.e. the construction of the Fahrenheit and Celsius 
scales antedated the advent of modern thermodynamics. The suc­
cessful application of measurement procedures to the contrary often 
tells us something about the structure of the phenomena measured
-  but we have to be careful what exactly we can import from the 
homomorphic numerical system back into the empirical system.
Measurement theory thus clarifies how the representation of spe­
cific properties of an empirical domain through numbers is justi­
fiable. It further clarifies that a successful measurement does not 
necessarily exhaust the empirical system, that many measurement 
scales are unique only up to admissible transformations in scale, 
that the representing numbers may have operations defined over 
them which are not found in the empirical domain, and that the 
properties represented need not be independently known to perform 
the measurement.
1.5.2 M easuring M ental Properties
Even in the early discussions of measurement theory, one finds con­
siderations that the fundamentals of the theory -  the idea of per­
severance of a system’s property when represented by another scale
- can be applied not only to numbers, but as well to ‘persons, at­
titude statements, or sounds’ (Suppes and Zinnes 1967, 7). In this 
section, I want to argue that the ascription of propositional attitudes 
is analogous to the ascription of numerical measures.
It first needs to be noted that this analogy is completely distinct 
from methodological consideration. How something is measured -  
i.e. what sort of practices are involved -  is not the question that 
measurement theory asks. This methodological question will be 
addressed in chapter 2. What is discussed here are the preconditions 
for the possibility of such measurement practices. It focuses on the 
logic of measurement, but it will provide crucial hints about the 
ontological nature of what is measured.
The first point of importance here is that numerically measurable
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properties, like length or temperature, are not intentional proper­
ties in any ontologically relevant sense, despite their formal appear­
ance. Properties represented in numerical measurement are pre­
served, without the numbers representing those properties having 
to be part of the property in any way.
. . . talk of how much things weigh is relational: it 
relates objects to numbers, and so to one another. But 
no one supposes the numbers are in any sense intrinsic 
to the objects that have weight, or are somehow ’’part” 
of them. What are basic are certain relations amongst 
objects; we conveniently keep track of these relations by 
assigning numbers to the objects and remembering how 
these relations among the objects are reflected in the num­
bers. (Davidson 1989, 59)
Formally, a statement of length of a particular object states a re­
lational predicate: the predicate that relates the object with the 
length indexical. However, nobody claims that physical proper­
ties are therefore intentional properties, in the sense that an object 
which has this property must in any way contain that number. Such 
a claim would be wholly absurd, as it would render all measurable 
properties of physical objects non-physical properties, as they would 
contain an abstract entity -  a number. If this was admitted against / 
all odds, properties like length, weight or temperature would not be 
causally relevant in the naturalistic position defended here.
Further, the existence of equivalent scales makes the idea of 
weight or length or temperature as a relation between a thing and a 
number entirely implausible. There just isn’t any one number that 
we could single out as the one the object is related to, and to relate 
them to infinitely many ones doesn’t make sense either. Instead we 
have to conclude that having a temperature of x  degrees is not a 
genuine relation between objects and numbers at all. Rather, tem­
perature is a property intrinsic to objects, and it is represented in 
numerical space.
Thus having a weight, length, temperature, etc. are not inten­
tional properties, although they are represented with the help of 
abstract objects, viz. numbers. The problem that seemingly be­
falls intentional properties, that they cannot be causes of anything, 
therefore does not apply to them. And of course it must not, as 
otherwise physics could not explain.
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Why now are attributions of propositional attitudes similar to 
numerical measurements? I want to discuss two aspects of this al­
leged analogy. First, in both cases a property is represented by 
abstract objects. Second, on both cases the numerical scales have 
equivalent transformations.
The property of weight can be specified as having a particular 
causal role: maybe the capacity to tip the balance of a scale, or to 
tire a man or a mule after some hours of travel, etc. This causal role 
is explicable -  in today’s physics -  as the atomic consistence of the 
object having this property, and the gravitational forces acting upon 
it. Nevertheless, we stick with the causal role most of the time: we 
say that the roll flattened the Tarmac because it had great weight; 
without any reference to atomic structures or gravitational forces. 
However, we often need to refine their causal role by specifying that 
it was heavier than something else -  in order to explain, say, that 
something tipped the balance -  or that it was so much heavier than 
something else -  for example to explain the occasion that one ob­
ject flew x feet further than another object. To express these more 
specific roles conveniently, we represent the property of weight in 
numerical space.
The same applies to mental properties relevant in the social sci- 
ences. Desires and beliefs are specified by their causal role between 
sensory input and_ behavioural output. Roughly speaking, beliefs 
are shaped by input conditional on other beliefs, and desires shape 
output conditional on other desires and beliefs. Neurophysiology 
just begins to give us an inkling how these causal roles are realised 
in physical terms; but for explanations of behaviour it is enough 
to cite those beliefs and desires without any reference to their un­
derlying realisers. Of course these causal roles usually need to be 
refined: beliefs by the conditions that make them true, and desires 
by the conditions that satisfy them. These conditions, expressed as 
propositions, then index the properties defined by their causal roles.
From this very simplistic analogy, one can already derive that 
physical and mental properties alike can be said to be represented 
by abstract objects. The story for mental properties, however, is 
slightly more complex than that. I already argued in section 1.3 that 
mental properties need to be compartmentalised, at least into beliefs 
and desires. Now, both desires and beliefs are further individualised 
by the propositions that specify their causal roles: by the truth
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conditions of beliefs and the satisfaction conditions of desires. Like 
particle movement in classical mechanics is represented by direction 
and magnitude, so does a proposition represent the ‘direction’ of the 
mental property. In both cases, nevertheless, it would be a mistake 
to think of the particle or the mental property as ‘containing’ the 
direction or the proposition.
A closer look at the proposition-dimension, however, reveals that 
propositions alone are not sufficient to represent the dimension of 
mental properties. Consequently, Matthews (1994) proposes a three- 
dimensional representation space for mental properties. Each point 
in this space is represented by the ordered triple (a*, (Sj,rk)), con­
sisting of an attitude type a*, and what he calls a designated propo­
sition (Sj , r*;), where rk is a Russelian proposition and Sj a sentence 
type, a token of which in a particular context serves to designate 
that Russelian proposition.
To use the ordered tuple will not yield a sufficiently rich
individualisation of mental properties. People often fail to iden­
tify facts like ‘Honiara is far from London’ with ‘The capital of the 
Solomon-Islands is far from London’; they therefore might believe 
the one without believing the other. Such failures of substitutivity 
show the need to individuate mental properties finer than proposi­
tions alone can do. Nevertheless, it is not possible to simply turn 
propositional attitudes into sentential attitudes. Sentences do not 
always specify a proposition uniquely: sentences with deictic terms, 
for example, specify a proposition contingent upon the specific con­
text in which this sentence is uttered. Thus the ordered tuple (a*, S j )  
will not be fine grained enough for the necessary individuation of 
mental properties either: my belief today that this glass is dirty is 
clearly distinct from my belief yesterday that this glass is dirty, but a 
sentential representation alone cannot distinguish them.10 Although 
neither propositions nor sentences alone suffice for the individuation 
of mental properties, the combination of the two will. Thus, mental 
properties are represented in a three dimensional space, with each 
point designated by the ordered triple (a», (sj, rk)).  Theories of men­
tal properties that are represented by propositions and sentences can 
be found, for example, in Davidson’s unified decision theory.n
10That sentences are too fine-grained, on the other hand, is not an argument against (a*, S j ) ,  
as this overt individuation can be tackled by finding the appropriate transformation function 
between equivalent scales.
n , A radical theory of decision must include a theory of interpretation and cannot presuppose
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But mental properties are not only distinguished in kind, accord­
ing to propositions and sentences. Like particle movement that con­
sists in a direction and a magnitude, mental property kinds consist 
in a propositional/sentential dimension and an intensity measure. 
I will not discuss the measurement of probability and desirability 
indices much in this thesis, but two things are worth mentioning 
here. First, it is now obvious that any such numerical magnitude 
should not be expected to be found ‘contained’ in the mental prop­
erty. Second, these numerical measures are based on the structure of 
mental property kinds and the propositional/sentential dimension; 
it would therefore be a mistake to identify mental properties with 
the numerical measure of ‘desirability’ or ‘utility’ alone.
Two objections against the interpretation of propositional con­
tent as a product of measuring mental properties need to be met. 
First, it hasHbeen argued that the logical inference relations over the 
propositional space are justified only if those relations are homo­
morphic images of relations over mental properties themselves; and 
that therefore mental properties must have a semantic component. 
Second, it has been argued that mental properties are genuine rela­
tions between people and propositions, because the propositions do 
not exhibit the same transformational properties as genuine scales 
do. I will argue against these claims in turn.
The propositions by which mental properties are represented are 
usually assumed to adhere to propositional logic. These logical in­
ference relations over the representational space, it is claimed, are 
relations that similarly exist over mental properties. They have to 
be, it is argued, for otherwise their validity over the representational 
space would be unwarranted. If this claim is correct -  that is, if there 
the homomorphism would cover this relation as well -  then we would 
be back at Brentano’s problem. Mental properties were measured 
with propositions and sentences because they themselves hold a se­
mantic content. Indeed, this line of argument has led some to the 
conclusion that there must be a ‘mental logic’ or ‘mental language’.
But as measurement theory makes clear, certain relations might 
be defined over the representational space, without them necessarily 
being found in the respective empirical^space. It is thus simply not 
a priori decidable whether one can read certain relations from the
it’ (Davidson 1974a, 147).
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representational system back into the empirical system. Instead, it 
is an empirical question:
The point to emphasise here is simply that it is unclear 
what empirical significance, if any, is to be attached to 
the fact that our representations of certain empirically re­
lated propositional attitudes stand in inferential relations 
to each other. (Matthews 1994, 141)
The claim that the success of representing mental properties is due 
to these properties having an intrinsic semantic component is war­
ranted as little as the claim that the numbers attributed in weight 
measurements are in any way part of the property of having mass, 
or length, or temperature. Brentano’s problem -  that mental prop­
erty had to be fundamentally distinct from physical properties due 
to their intentional content -  thus does not occur for this approach.
From a measurement-theoretic perspective, it would be 
very surprising indeed to discover that one could read back 
into the empirical system all the properties and relations 
of the representational system. (Matthews 1994, 138)
Instead of reading logical inference relations back into the empirical 
system, they are relations which only apply to the representation 
space. Whether they do apply, then, is a question of their meaning­
fulness, which in turn is determined by the transformation properties 
of the applicable scales.
The Relational Thesis that lies at the heart of Brentano’s prob­
lem claimed that mental properties are genuine relations between 
people and propositions. I rejected the Relational Thesis on the 
grounds that the relation is just a seeming one, like other seeming 
relations occurring in measurement, and that this appearance does 
not have any ontological significance. Some philosophers have ar­
gued that this argument is based on a pseudo-analogy. While it is 
correct to point out that some measurement do indeed not represent 
genuine relations, they claim, it is wrong to declare all predicates 
with indexicals as designating non-relational properties. The dif­
ference has to be drawn, so they claim, according the admissible 
transformations of the scales involved.
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Take being a son: each son is related to one particular 
father. But it makes no sense to say that token sons are 
‘indexed’ by some father or other, which one depending on 
the choice of a unit. Of course not: there is no analogue 
of a unit here. It is because being a son is a genuine 
relational property, while having a temperature isn’t, that 
unit-relativity is essential to the pseudo-relationality of 
temperature, and inapplicable to the real relationality of 
being a son. (Crane 1990, 228)
To the contrary, I will argue that admissible transformations are 
found in the sentential and the propositional dimensions of the rep­
resentational space. Transformations in the sentential dimension are 
admissible wherever substitutivity of sentences within attitude types 
implies identity of mental properties. This is of course ultimately a 
question of what determines the causal role -  many examples show 
that beyond a certain threshold, complexity in the way content is 
expressed might have a causal role. In the general case, people 
master the representational space and are able to identify differ­
ently expressed attitude contents. Similarly, transformations in the 
propositional dimension are admissible if causal roles stay constant 
over differences in propositional content. To illustrate this, I will em­
ploy a rather outlandish -  in a literal sense -  thought experiment: 
Putnam’s Twin World example.
Suppose another planet in the universe (called ‘Twin Earth’) that 
is exactly alike to earth but for one fact: on Twin Earth there 
is no water, that is, no H20 .  Instead an observably and causally 
indistinguishable substance X Y Z  runs in Twin Earth’s rivers, comes 
out of Twin Earthian’s taps, etc. As everything else on Twin Earth 
is the same as on earth, people speak Twin English, which is the 
same as our English except that they use ‘water’ to refer to X Y Z .  
Now an astronaut from earth lands on Twin earth, and she desires 
to drink water. She goes to the nearest river, drinks a few handfuls 
of X Y Z ,  and then tells a Twin Earthian next to her: ‘Hmmm, the 
water tastes really good’. The Twin Earthian agrees, and proceeds 
to drink X Y Z  himself.
Under the functional position defended here, the astronaut rea­
sonably presumes that the Twin Earthian has the same desire and 
the same belief as her: viz. they both want to drink water and they 
both believe that the water tastes really good. After all, she cannot
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tell any difference between the causal roles of her mental properties 
to his. But if an omniscient observer distinguished mental proper­
ties by their propositional content, the astronaut would have a belief 
and a desire -  about H20  -  different from the Twin Earthian, whose 
belief and desire are about X Y Z .
This distinction, however, seems wholly implausible to me. None 
of the actions of either the astronaut or the Twin Eartian are in any 
way affected by this distinction. It is empirically completely empty 
and should thus be discarded. Therefore, there are cases where dif- [ 
ferent propositions can index one and_the samajmental property. \  
The causal roles that mental properties play are not uniquely iden­
tified by their satisfaction conditions. Something like equivalent 
TransformatldnTThefeTore existTiverTEe representational space'"of 
propositions. The measurement-theoretic approach dissolves^dhis 
apparent problem by establishing a transformation rule between 
those scales that measure mental properties with the same causal 
roles: now, having a desire to drink H20  is equivalent to having a 
desire to drink X Y Z  in exactly the same fashion as one and the 
same object has a weight of one pound or 454 grams.12 By anal­
ogy to the numerical case, then, mental properties should not be 
considered genuine relations between people and abstract objects. 
Thus, Brentano’s problem does not apply, and mental properties 
supervene on physical properties.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed and defended a notion of mental 
properties as -  potentially heterogeneous -  collections of physical 
properties that are identified by their unifying causal role in bring­
ing about behaviour. I have argued firstly that facts can be the 
relata of the relation *• causes and hence that the realization of 
a mental property can be such a relatum. Further, I presented a 
concept of mental properties as internal factors as insufficient but 
necessary parts of a collection of internal and external -  trigger­
ing and facilitating -  factors that is sufficient but unnecessary in
12Thus the measurement theorist does not have to retreat into banality and claim that the 
representational space consists only of nom inal scales, as for example claimed here: ‘We are 
entirely free to use any predicate we like for ascribing any property . . . we do not need 
justification by proving the existence of suitable empirical and numerical relational systems 
or by demonstrating corresponding representation theorems’ (Beckermann 1996, 11).
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the production of behaviour. The question then arose how men­
tal properties could be causes at all. I argued that they are not 
causally efficacious, but causally relevant in that they program for 
efficacious properties. This programming notion, as I explained, 
rejects both type-reductionism and epiphenomenalism, while main­
taining a naturalistic understanding of mental properties. One of 
the most fundamental anti-naturalistic attacks on such a position 
is the claim that mental properties are intentional properties, and 
that their semantic content makes them different in kind from phys­
ical properties. If this attack was valid, then the social sciences 
would face fundamentally distinct objects and had to employ fun­
damentally distinct methods. To defend the naturalistic position, 
I therefore argued against the claim that mental properties are in­
tentional properties by showing how the propositional content of 
them arises in their measurement, without any significance for their 
ontological status.
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Chapter 2
The M ethodology of M ental 
Property A ttribution
2.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, I argued that mental properties are specified as 
causal roles in the interplay between sensory input and behavioural 
output of a sufficiently complex system. These causal roles are re­
alised by the physical properties mental properties program for; thus 
mental properties are significant in action explanation as they name 
causes of behaviour. Mental properties therefore have a potential 
function in those social sciences that strive to explain.
However, this conclusion says little about the methodological 
problems that the social sciences face. All that has been clarified 
is that the explanandum of the social sciences -  human behaviour 
and derived from that the emergence and persistence of social in­
stitutions -  is the effect of the explanans -  mental properties of the 
agent. How the explanans as the cause of this effect is identified -  
that is, how mental predicates arejncaningfiilly attributed to agents 
-  remains an open question. ~
In this chapter, I will argue that a methodology that determines 
the meaning of mental predicates through a methodology of constant 
conjunctions is not sufficient for the social sciences. In particular, 
I will criticise introspection as a methodology in this direction as 
insufficient. Further, I will caution against a wholesome rejection 
of mental properties as explanans, as scientific behaviourists did in 
response to the shortcomings of introspective psychology.
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Instead, I will argue that social science methodology has to at­
tribute mental properties as theoretical terms. I will start with a 
caution: one cannot hope that a theory of these terms can be di­
rectly derived from our folk psychological practices. Prank Ramsey’s 
and David Lewis’ discussion of how theoretical terms acquire mean­
ing will serve as a basis here: the meaning of mental predicates is 
determined through a theory, with the evidence exclusively based 
on behavioural observations.
The approach that I advocate is to take an appropriately designed 
theory and employ it as a conjectured hypothesis. The attempt is to 
subsume all observed behaviour under a theory as simple as possible: 
with as little theoretical terms as possible and as strong restrictions 
over them as possible. If one succeeds in achieving a satisfactory 
fit, we have assigned meaning to the theoretical terms and learned 
something about the agent.
However, this raises the problem how to select any candidate from 
the infinite set of possible conjectures. Contrary to some claims, I 
will dispute any apriori arguments, and admit that mental proper­
ties are epistemically indeterminate. The view of cognitive theories 
presented here is consequentially instrumental to some degree.
2.2 Insufficiency of Causal M ethodology
One of the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for causal in­
ference is information about constant conjunction (or, expressed 
in more contemporary terminology, information about probabilis­
tic correlation). To secure this information, it is necessary that 
the purported cause and effect can be observed independently of 
each other.1 If one wants to derive one’s methodology of mental 
property ascriptions directly from their ontological characterisation 
as (programming) causes of behaviour, one has to proceed in two 
steps. First, a set of possible mental properties of the agent has to 
be identified, which are observable independently of her actions; and 
second, it has to be shown that a member of such a set is correlated 
to a specific action of hers. This correlation then could function as 
the basic evidence for a causal methodology of mental state ascrip­
tions.
1 By observing purported causes and effects independently I mean that it is logically possible 
that each realization of a property can appear without the other.
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The claim that such properties are independently observable was 
put forward in most of the 19th century writings of psychology. It 
claimed that the occurrences in our minds were susceptible to intro­
spection; that we could observe orlisten to -  in analogy to our sense 
organs -  ourselves thinking, feeling or wanting. Although this view 
is not prevalent anymore in today’s psychology,2 it can still be found 
in many a social scientist’s working assumptions. Occasionally (as 
witnessed by myself), teachers still explain the utility function with 
reference to pleasure as an introspectable quantity. Further, many 
microeconomic textbooks start their curriculum with consumer the­
ory that takes preference as a primitive notion (or, at least, they offer 
such an account as one option besides the revealed preference ac­
count -  compare Varian 1992; MasCollel et al. 1995). This approach 
however, by abdicating from any account of a preference-ascribing 
methodology, suggest that these preferences can be readily found 
in economic agents -  or as it is often put, that although we can­
not introspect the magnitude of our desires, the introspection of our 
preference orderings is unproblematic. Last, empirical studies of 
consumption patterns often use questionnaires. Information asked 
in those questionnaires includes the evaluation of quality aspects.3 
These techniques implicitly assume that the individual has privi­
leged access to such information -  and thus assumes the possibility 
of introspection.
In the following section I will rehearse some arguments to the 
effect that introspection is both incomplete and fallible. From this I 
conclude that introspection cannot yield a secure basis of a method- 
ology of preference ascriptions. Some of these arguments were first 
put forward Ty~ partisans of Scientific Behaviourism in the first half 
of the 20th century. Although I share their critical perspective, I find 
fault with their own constructive program of replacing mental prop­
erties in the explanation of behaviour with observable stimuli and 
stimuli-response regularities. Scientific Behaviourism, I will argue
2However, for a cautious advocacy of a return to introspection in psychology, see for ex­
ample Liebermann (1979).
3 The subdiscipline of Consumer and Market Research relevant here is attitude research. 
Typical question techniques include the rating scale, by which the respondent is asked to 
indicate her position on a dimension of opinion. Scales are often calibrated numerically (‘give 
a score out of ten’), diagrammatically (‘Indicate in which area you feel most represented’) or 
semantically (‘rate on a field between very good and unacceptable’). For further discussion, see 
Worcester 1986, p. 127-142. Other techniques involve the ascription of adjective to concepts, 
or vice versa, or a choice between alternative attitudinal positions.
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in sub-section 2.2.2, suffers from a vicious circularity in its attempt 
to explain human behaviour.
I will conclude from this section that mental properties are neces­
sary for the explanation of human behaviour, although these mental 
properties cannot be observed independently.
2.2.1 Incom pleteness and Fallibility o f Introspection
Even if we cannot observe other people’s mental properties, we have, 
introspective psychology claims, direct access to our own beliefs, 
desires, feelings, etc. If this was true, introspective data can be 
obtained either by truthful reports of the introspecting agent; or, by 
assuming a basic similarity of the human mind, a psychologist can 
obtain data through empathy. But introspection is troubled by at 
least three problems: it does not satisfy inter-subjective agreement, 
it is incomplete and faltiblev TTvIir argue for these three claims in
turn.
The objection that introspection does not achieve inter-subjective 
agreement arises from methodological concerns. For progress in a 
scientific discipline, the data base chosen should allow the great­
est possible degree of agreement and communication amongst ob­
servers. Reports about the physical world satisfy the criterion of 
inter-subjective agreement to a higher degree than introspective re­
ports do. Scientists can look at the same physical object and com­
pare their observations. If disagreement about a certain observation 
prevails, the physical object can be subjected to various measure­
ment procedures. Mental occurrences do not share these properties. 
Strictly speaking, no-one can introspect the same mental occurrence 
as anyone else. All that we can do is to put ourselves in an identi­
cal position as someone else, and report our introspection. Further, 
there is no alternative measurement procedure that could facilitate 
or even replace introspection: no meter, no microscope, and no spec­
trograph. For these reasons, although it might exist, introspection 
can be rejected on purely methodological grounds as too unreliable 
a technique to be granted scientific status.
But there are metaphysical claims to the opposite of this rejec­
tion. Introspection is said to be the privileged access of the individ­
ual to her mental occurrences: unmediated, immanent and direct.
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Thus, although it does not satisfy inter-subjective agreement, intro­
spection is claimed to be the most reliable method to obtain infor­
mation about mental occurrences. This claim finds its strongest pro­
ponent in Cartesian psychology, which proposes that mental prop­
erties like beliefs or desires are essentially conscious states, and that 
this characteristic of consciousness guarantees the introspectability 
of any such property. Descartes himself took being ‘conscious’ to 
refer to an allegedly intimate source of knowledge about one’s own 
mental occurrences. For example, he says that ‘to be conscious 
is both to think and to reflect on one’s thought’ (Descartes 1991, 
335), and elsewhere he had defined ‘thought’ as ‘all the operations 
of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses’ (Descartes 
1984, 113), and reflection means the mechanism that forms thoughts 
about thoughts. Thus, Descartes treats everything mental as intro- 
spectively accessible:
As to the fact that there can be nothing in the mind, in 
so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware, 
this seems to me to be self-evident. For there is nothing 
that we can understand to be in the mind, regarded this 
way, that is not a thought or dependent on a thought. If 
it were not a thought or dependent on a thought it would 
not belong to the mind qua thinking thing; and we cannot 
have any thought of which we are not aware at the very 
moment when it is in us. In view of this I do not doubt 
that the mind begins to think as soon as it is implanted 
in the body of an infant, and that it is immediately aware 
of its thoughts, even though it does not remember this 
afterwards because the impressions of these thoughts do 
not remain in the memory. (Descartes 1984, 171-172)
This claim allows him to conclude that introspection is necessarily 
infallible, providing one with the complete picture of the contents of 
one’s mind. Perhaps even more thoroughly than Descartes, Locke 
identifies the mental with the introspectively conscious, claiming 
that it is unintelligible ‘that any thing thinks without being con­
scious of it, or perceiving, that it does so’ (Locke 1975, 115) because 
thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks.
The Cartesian position has been attacked from two angles. On 
the one hand, it has been argued that introspection is incomplete
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-  that one might have a mental property without being aware of 
it. On the other hand, it has been argued that introspection is 
fallible -  that one can introspect a mental property without actually 
having it. I will present these two lines of attack here in turn, and 
thus argue that introspection is not the reliable instrument it is 
sometimes claimed to be.
Doubts about the completeness of introspection were sometimes 
raised even in the heyday of philosophical introspection, the 17th 
and 18th century. Descartes himself seemed to have not been free 
of such doubts, for example when he says that ‘many people do 
not know what they believe, since believing something and knowing 
that one believes it are different acts of thinking, and the one often 
occurs without the other’ (Descartes 1985, 122). Similarly, Hume 
admits that
’tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, 
which, tho’ they be real passions, produce little emotion 
in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by 
their immediate feeling or sensation. (Hume 2000, 417)
Despite these admissions, no clear line was drawn between having 
a mental property and being aware of that mental state by any 
of the quoted thinkers. Instead, those cases cited were treated as 
pathological by them. Many later psychologists followed them in 
this view and expressed their confidence that profound training and 
exactness in method would remedy these cases4
More recent discussions made clear that to have a mental prop­
erty without being aware of it is far from pathological, but is rather 
a systematic condition of the human mind. Many of Conan Doyle’s 
stories draw their dramatic drive from the fact that the story’s char­
acters did perceive important evidence without being conscious of 
it. It then takes a mastermind like Sherlock Holmes to identify the 
importance of some possible evidence for the others (and of course 
in particular of the loyal Dr. Watson) to become aware of their 
perception. So for example in Silver Blaze: ‘ “Is there any point to 
which you would wish to draw my attention?” -  “To the curious in­
cident of the dog in the night-time.” -  “The dog did nothing in the 
night-time.” -  “That was the curious incident”, remarked Sherlock
4 For such a view, see James 1890, Otis 1920, Bentley 1926, Pennington and Finan 1940.
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Holmes’. Holmes’ conversational partner believed that the dog was 
silent the night the crime was committed, but he would not have 
expressed this as one of his beliefs about the facts of that night -  to 
him, the dog did ‘nothing’.
Adding fact to fiction, Dretske (1993) offers a couple of self­
experiments for the reader. The reader is asked to view all the 
elements of two relatively complex two-dimensional figures. Those 
two figures differ in some minute detail. Now Dretske focuses on 
those readers who could not tell the difference. Assuming that in­
deed they saw the figure in its entirety, the readers experienced dif­
ferent visual stimuli, and thus, according to Dretske’s terminology, 
had different state conscious experiences for each figure. However, 
they were not able to tell the difference between the two figures -  
thus they were not conscious of the difference in their experience, 
they were not fact conscious of the difference, in Dretske’s terminol­
ogy. Like Sherlock Holmes, they might at some later point identify 
the differences from memory (state consciousness is a condition of 
the brain, not the eye!), but at the moment they are state conscious 
without being fact conscious of it.
There can be conscious differences in a person’s experi­
ence of the world -  and in this sense, conscious features 
of his experience -  of which that person is not conscious.
. . It follows, therefore, that what makes a mental state 
conscious cannot be our consciousness of it. If we have 
conscious experiences, beliefs, desires, and fears, it cannot 
be our introspective awareness of them that makes them 
conscious. (Dretske 1993, 278-79)
Introspective awareness thus is not necessary for being in a conscious 
state (having a mental property). Consciousness does not imply 
introspectability, as Descartes or Locke claimed. The distinction 
between state consciousness and fact consciousness thus opens the 
conceptual door for the possible incompleteness of introspection.
The empirical findings of many psychological experiments con­
firm this possibility. Particularly relevant for the question of com­
pleteness are experiments that show the inability of test persons to 
register and hence to report a changed evaluation or motive state. 
Experiments in the cognitive dissonance tradition, and in particular 
in the area of insufficient-justification and attribution manipulation,
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show these results with great clarity.5 Bern and McConnell (1970) 
asked subjects to write an essay opposing their own views and then 
report their views afterwards. Subjects bribed or coerced into as­
suming the counter-position showed no change of their evaluation in 
their post-essay reports; subjects who were given insufficient justifi­
cation for writing the essay, or who were manipulated into believing 
that they had a free choice, showed a significant shift of their evalua­
tion towards the position assumed in the essay. Bern and McConnell 
then asked the individuals in the latter group what their evaluations 
had been one week earlier, before they received the task to write the 
essay. Subjects reported throughout that their attitudes had not 
changed, and that they were the same as before writing the essay; 
while control subjects had no problems reporting their previous at­
titudes with great accuracy. Thus subjects apparently changed their 
attitudes in the absence of any subjective experience of change.
A related experiment by Goethals and Reckman (1973) supports 
this conclusion. High school students changed their opinions on a 
policy issue in the face of persuasive counterarguments from an au­
thoritative person, but later reported that the post-discussion opin­
ion had been their opinion throughout. Again it seems that subjects 
changed their attitude in a cognitive process -  understanding and 
accepting a position that reportedly was not their own -  without 
being able to introspect and report this change themselves.
Nisbett and Schachter (1966) followed up on these phenomena 
and confronted subjects with their change in behaviour. They asked 
subjects to take a series of electric shocks of steadily increasing mag­
nitude. Before administering the shocks, half the group were given 
placebo pills which purportedly produced heart palpilations, breath 
irregularities, hand tremor, and butterflies in the stomach -  symp­
toms most often reported as accompanying the experience of elec­
tric shocks. It was postulated that those who took the pill would 
attribute the symptoms of receiving the shocks to the pill, and thus 
would endure more severe electric shocks. And so they did: subjects 
who took the pill endured four times as much amperage as those who 
did not. In the debriefing interview, pill-attribution subjects were 
asked with increasing precision about the effect of the pill. Most 
of them denied that their belief in the pill’s effects bore any signifi­
5Nisbett and Wilson (1977) survey five other literatures significant in this context. I will 
confine myself to discussing the following three experiments for their simplicity, clarity and 
convincing results.
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cance to their ability to take the shocks; instead, they claimed that 
all their attention was consumed by shocks themselves. Only 3 out 
of 12 subjects reported having attributed their symptoms during 
the administration of the shocks to the pill. When the experimenter 
finally revealed the design of the experiment, including the postu­
lated effect of the placebo, most subjects found the postulated effect 
of the pill plausible, but non-applicable in their own case.
The experiments clearly show the severe limits of introspection. 
Although subjects in each case must have been (state) conscious of 
the relevant stimuli -  as they were verbally reported in each case 
and although their behaviour significantly changed because of these 
stimuli, they were not able to report this change, even upon direct 
questioning. The most plausible answer for these test results is that 
the subjects were state conscious of the stimuli in such a way that 
the stimuli were causally efficacious, but that the subjects were not 
fact-conscious of the determining influence of these stimuli. This 
in turn seems most likely the case because the subjects did not 
have the introspective facility to gain such a fact consciousness, or 
that there was something that blocked this introspective facility for 
example in high-dissonance contexts. Therefore, introspection is at 
best incomplete.
This insight stood at the beginning of modern decision theory. 
Ramsey rejected the measurement of an agent’s beliefs from intro­
spection,
for the beliefs which we hold most strongly are often ac­
companied by practically no feelings at all. (Ramsey 1926,
65)
Instead, he confined himself to a derivation from actual and hypo­
thetical choices. Considering this fortunate start, it is surprising 
how much introspective residue is still found in the social sciences 
of today.
It could still be argued that despite its limitations, introspection 
may be epistemologically reliable within its proper domain. In other 
words, as soon as a subject has introspective access to her thoughts, 
then her verbal report, if truthful, constitutes reliable data. Even 
more, if there is any introspective data, then it could still count as 
the best possible data, if one agrees with those philosophers who 
thought that the individual has privileged access to her own mind.
Descartes for example argues that the mind is ‘better known’ than 
the body (in his Second Meditation). Locke claims that our knowl­
edge of ‘things without us’ is ‘not altogether so certain, as our intu­
itive knowledge’ (Locke 1975, 631).
The thus claimed infallibility (if incompleteness) of introspection 
was first challenged by Kant, who pointed out that introspection
. . . represents to consciousness even our own selves
only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. 
(Kant 1929, B153)
Kant thinks of introspection as an ‘inner sense’. In introspecting, 
the mental occurrences of the agent appear to the agent herself; the 
agent senses herself thinking. But if there is something that is sensed 
and something that is sensing involved in introspection, then there 
are two separate entities with a relation that is fault-prone. Arm­
strong, following Kant, holds the introspecting state and the state 
being introspected to be ‘distinct existences’. He draws a mechan­
ical analogy to the awareness of mental states: the introspecting 
mind acts like a scanner scanning itself.
It is clear that the operation of scanning and the situation 
scanned must be ’’distinct existences”. A machine can 
scan itself only in the same sense that a man can eat him­
self. There must remain an absolute distinction between 
the eater and the eaten: mouth and hand, say. Equally, 
there must be an absolute distinction between the scan­
ner and the scanned . . . the registering will have to 
be something logically distinct from the featured that are 
registered. (Armstrong 1969, 107)
If this analogy holds for introspection, introspected states are dis­
tinct from introspecting states. The relation then certainly cannot 
be one of necessity -  a mechanism correlating one’s thoughts with 
one’s thoughts about them is breakable, or even manipulable. The 
understanding of introspection as an ‘inner sense’ implies that the 
relation between mental property and introspection is contingent, 
and prone to error.
The possibility of errors is again substantiated by psychologi­
cal experiments in the cognitive dissonance tradition. Particularly 
interesting in this context are those experiments that show how sub­
jects report the influence of non-effective stimulus factors. Nisbett
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and Wilson (1977) report three such experiments. In the first, sub­
jects were given a selection from a novel that described a situation 
of strong emotional impact. Some subjects read the whole selection, 
others read parts from which passages had been deleted. From the 
subjects’ reports, there was no difference in the emotional effect of 
the full selection or the reduced ones. However, confronted with the 
deleted passages and asked about the relevance of the passages on 
the emotional impact of the selection, a large majority of the sub­
jects reported that the passage had an influence (those who got the 
reduced version reported that it would have had an influence).
In the second experiment, subjects were asked to view and rate 
a documentary film according to three dimensions -  how interesting 
they thought it was, how much they thought other people would be 
affected by it, and how sympathetic they thought the main char­
acter to be. Half the viewers were exposed to a distracting noise 
while watching the film. Although the rating from the noise-exposed 
group and the control group showed no significant differences, a ma­
jority of the subjects exposed to the noise reported that it had an 
impact on their rating.
In the third experiment, subjects were asked to predict the mag­
nitude of shock they would take in experiments on the effects of 
intense electric shocks. Half of the subjects were given an ’assur­
ance’ that shocks would not yield ‘any permanent damage’; the other 
half was not given such an assurance. The inclusion or exclusion of 
the assurance did not have a significant effect on the prediction.
Nevertheless, a majority of subjects reported that it did.
The experimental results show that introspection is both incom­
plete and sometimes fallacious - and this ‘sometimes’ is sufficiently 
often to worry even from a methodological point of view. Together 
with the initial methodological concern, one can therefore conclude —  
that introspection, as it is understood today, is a method too unre­
liable to be employed for preference attribution. It does not satisfy 
inter-subjective agreement; it'is Incomplete and often fallacious. As 
long as the systematic causes for incompleteness and error are not 
identified, and methods developed to circumvent them, introspection 
cannot be the method to provide us with independent observations 
of mental properties. To use correlations between introspected men­
tal properties and actions for causal inference is too unreliable to be
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adopted in a science of behaviour.6
Further, I believe that introspection is the only candidate that 
promised to provide direct and independent observation of mental , ,
properties. With this option gone, we have to abandon our hopes r °  & ;
for a theory of behaviour that is based on probabilistic correlation 
between mental properties and behaviour altogether. From this re­
sult, psychology can draw two very different conclusions. The one 
is to insist on a causal methodology based on correlations between 
observable stimuli and behaviour and negate the theoretical role of 
mental properties in general. This is the route the psychological 
mainstream took in the first half of the 20th century with scien­
tific behaviourism. As it will become clear in the next sub-section,
I think that this was the wrong choice. The other conclusion is 
to abandon a methodology based on correlations and reconstruct 
mental properties as theoretical concepts. This is the way cognitive 
science made popular from the ’70s onwards, and I will argue for it 
in the second section of this chapter.
2.2.2 T he C ircularity o f Behaviourism
In the last section I argued that psychology and the social sciences 
couldn’t hope to employ introspective information as their database.
The exclusion of introspective data shifts the methodological focus 
onto behavioural observation itself (which includes verbal behaviour, 
which is to be distinguished from verbal accounts of introspection 
in the way it is interpreted). Insofar as the critique of introspection 
leads to the conclusion that all data employed in psychology and the 
social sciences must be behavioural or at least. publicly observable
data , this critique is in accord with a methodological behaviourist 
posit ion.
Such a position, however, needs to be clearly delineated .f ro m the 
claim that psychological theory should eschew-discussion of inferred 
mental processes and mechanisms altogether, which was the essence
6In a very interesting monograph Ericsson and Simon argue th a t ‘verbal behaviour is to 
be accounted for in the same way as any other behaviour . . .  by developing and testing 
an information-processing model of how information is accessed and verbalised in response to 
stimuli’ (Ericsson and Simon 1993, 62) This proposal might possibly make introspective data  
fruitful again: by employing to it the same cognitive theory of behaviour th a t will be discussed 
below, and thus deriving mental properties from it. This approach puts introspection from its 
head on its feet: it trea ts introspective data through the lens of the theory, instead of granting 
it privileged access, and trying to  construct the theory from it.
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of scientific or radical behaviourism.7 In the following, I will show 
that the version of scientific behaviourism as defended by B.F. Skin­
ner is untenable as a methodology of human action explanation.
Skinner contended that scientific psychology ought to be con­
cerned only with the formulation of laws relating observables such 
as stimuli and responses; not with unobservable mental processes 
and mechanisms such as attention, intention, memory and motiva­
tion.
The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, 
but that they are not relevant in a functional analysis.
We cannot account for the behaviour of any system while 
staying wholly inside it; eventually we must turn to forces 
operating upon the organism from without. Unless there 
is a weak spot in our causal chain. . . , the first [sensory 
input] and the third [behavioural output] links must be 
lawfully related. If we must always go back beyond the 
second link [mental states] for prediction and control, we 
may avoid many tiresome and exhausting digressions by 
examining the third link as a function of the first. (Skinner 
1953, p . 42)
This quotation shows what is fundamentally right with scientific 
behaviourism: its quest for simplicity in theory and for a data base 
that -  through public observability -  maximises the potential for 
intersubjective agreement between skilled observers. Both criteria 
are universally acknowledged conditions for the acceptability of a 
scientific theory. First, the theory accepted should be the simplest 
among those that are formally capable of accounting for the data. 
Second, the data that the theory accounts for, and by which it is 
appraised, should be only data that skilled observers can agree upon. 
Both criteria seem to be exemplarily satisfied in some paradigmatic 
cases of animal behaviour. For example, when a rat learns to press 
a lever to obtain food, Skinnerians explain this by an appeal to the 
‘law of effect’. This law says that a response - emitted in the presence 
of a stimulus and followed by a reinforcer -  increases the probability 
of that response in the presence of that stimulus. Another strong
7The third major strand of behaviourism, analytic  behaviourism, is a theory o f m eaning  
of mental properties and does not have a direct bearing on the methodological discussion 
followed here.
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case for the application of the law of effect appears in situations 
driven by instinct, as beautifully described by Wooldridge:
When the time comes for egg laying the wasp Sphex builds 
a burrow for the purpose and seeks out a cricket which she 
stings in such a way as to paralyze but not kill it. She drags 
the cricket into her burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes 
the burrow, then flies away, never to return. In due course, 
the eggs hatch and the wasp grubs feed off the paralyzed 
cricket, which has not decayed, having been kept in the 
wasp equivalent of deep freeze. To the human mind, such 
an elaborately organised and seemingly purposeful routine 
conveys a convincing flavor of logic and thoughtfulness -  
until more details are examined. For example, the wasp’s 
routine is to bring the paralyzed cricket to the burrow, 
leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well, 
emerge, and then drag the cricket in. If, while the wasp 
is inside making her preliminary inspection the cricket is 
moved a few inches away, the wasp, on emerging from the 
burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but 
not inside, and will then repeat the preparatory procedure 
of entering the burrow to see that everything is all right. If 
again the cricket is removed a few inches while the wasp is 
inside, once again the wasp will move the cricket up to the 
threshold and re-enter the burrow for a final check. The 
wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight in. On one 
occasion, this procedure was repeated forty times, always 
with the same result. (Wooldridge 1963, 82; quoted from 
Dennett 1978)
In such a case, the regularity of the behaviour is so deeply rooted, 
that the two above criteria dictate the application of the law of the 
effect. In fact, it would be wrong to interpose any ‘inner states’ here.
If the wasp’s behaviour was explained on the basis of her desire to 
drag her victim into the burrow, it would become inexplicable why 
she would not learn from experience -  that is, why she did not end 
all that cricket-magic after a certain number of repetitions with a 
courageous push right over the threshold into the final destination.
Instead, her seemingly erratic behaviour is explicable by a (possibly 
genetic) conditioning that has her perform the individual steps in 
accord with the respective stimuli (the positions of the cricket).
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The problems with scientific behaviourism begin where its pro­
ponents claim that this kind of Baconian explanation -  subsuming 
observations under generalizations about lawful regularities -  is all 
that psychology should aim for.
We change the relative strength of responses by differen­
tial reinforcement of alternative courses of action: we do 
not change something called a preference. We change the 
probability of an act by changing a condition of depriva­
tion or aversive stimulation; we do not change a need. We 
reinforce behaviour in particular ways; we do not give a 
person a purpose or an intention. (Skinner 1971, 94)
That this methodological confinement is too tight to work for the 
explanation of human behaviour can be shown in at least three in­
stances: scientific behaviourism cannot account for many kinds of 
learning, it suffers from an infinite regress and it cannot explain why 
systems behave differently under identical stimuli environments.
First, the law of effect has problems to correctly model learning 
in animals and humans. The wasps of the above example does not 
learn, hence the application of the law of effect is safe. But there 
are animals that learn without showing the postulated stimulus- 
response-reinforcer cycle. For example, the juvenile white-crowned 
sparrow is incapable of singing during the critical learning period; 
all it does is listen.8 Similarly, nestling buntings, when they are 
too young to fly, learn to identify north as the centre of rotation of 
the night sky; they do so by watching the movements of the stars 
and inferring their centre of rotation. Months later, they use this 
knowledge to keep oriented during the night-time portions of their 
migratory flights.9 Human learning behaviour -  for example from 
textbooks -  seems to fall in similar patterns. Most learning depends 
on the perception over time of a systematic stimulus relationship. 
Whatever response the animal or human may or may not make 
during the period when the relationship is perceived is of little rele­
vance to the learning that occurs. The lack of a response and hence 
of a potential reinforcer poses the problem for behaviourism of how 
to distinguish the acquisition of new stimulus-response mechanisms
8 For a discussion how white-crowned sparrows learn songs, see Nelson and Marler, 1994.
9For a series of wonderful experiments, involving young buntings and a planetarium, see 
Emlen 1972.
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from the disregard of any such stimuli. While a cognitivist approach 
can explain those learning phenomena as the acquisition of beliefs -  
and hence of behavioural dispositions -  the behaviourist either has 
to find some form of reward mechanism, or has to deny that any 
learning is happening here at all.
This problem is exacerbated in explaining human behaviour. Hu­
mans are regularly faced with situations they never encountered be­
fore - never even envisaged before. However, they have the ability to 
behave in a systematic and reasoned manner, that is in accord with 
general patterns of human behaviour. Confronted with a threat in a 
stick-up (Dennett’s example), most people will stay quiet and hand 
over their wallet, even though they might never have been in such 
a situation before.
It is perfectly clear that what experience has taught me 
is that if I want to save my skin, and believe I am be­
ing threatened, I should do what I believe my threatener 
wants me to do. But of course Skinner cannot permit this 
intentional formulation at all, for in ascribing wants and 
beliefs it would presuppose my rationality. He must in­
sist that the ’’threat stimuli” I now encounter are similar 
in some crucial but undescribed respect to some stimuli 
encountered in my past. . . He is positing an external 
virtus dormativa. He has no record of any earlier expe­
riences of this sort, but infers their existence, and more­
over endows them with an automatically theory-satisfying 
quality. (Dennett 1978, 67)
To explain systematic behavioural patterns like this, the behaviourist 
must revert to an antecedent that does not satisfy the criterion of 
observability at all. Instead of having prior evidence for a particular 
conditioning, the behaviourist now postulates such a conditioning 
because he needs it for the required explanation.
Secondly, the Skinnerian ‘law of effect’ is very vague in its scope 
of application. It does not really clarify how similar the experienced 
stimulus and enforcer have to be to a new situation to elicit the 
response detailed in the law. It is clear that in Pavlov’s famous 
conditioning experiment, an untrained dog will not exhibit saliva­
tion, even if exposed to the bell sound under laboratory conditions. 
But even a trained dog conditioned on the sound of the bell might
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not salivate when immersed in water, or when exposed to a bitch in 
heat. Similarly, the behaviourist might insist that when confronted 
by muggers, the subject reacts as in other situations with a ‘threat 
stimulus’. But how do we identify the scope of these claims? How 
do we determine that situation X is still determined by a ‘food stim­
ulus’ or a threat stimulus’, while situation Y is already outside of its 
scope, obeying different laws of effect? For laws of effect to be oper­
ational, the behaviourist has to apply to particularly strong ceteris 
paribus conditions.
In characterizing a man’s behaviour in terms of frequency 
[of bits of behaviour in response to stimuli], we assume cer­
tain standard conditions: he must be able to execute and 
repeat a given act, and other behaviour must not interfere 
appreciably. . . . We eliminate, or at least hold constant, 
any condition which encourages behaviour which competes 
with the behaviour we are to study. (Skinner 1953, 42)
The laboured attempt to formulate the ceteris paribus conditions 
in terms of behaviour shows its fatal shortcomings. First, it is un­
clear how behaviour could interfere with behaviour. It seems already 
here that a concept of consistency is needed, and that such a con­
cept cannot be defined over stimuli or behaviour. A similar point 
can be made about the concept of ’competing behaviour’. Second, 
the ‘conditions which encourage behaviour’ cannot be reduced to 
the stimuli which stand at the beginning of the causal chain. One 
stimulus can give rise to very many different reactions. Any at­
tempt to purify one reaction as the only one involves determining 
the presence or absence of further stimuli, which in turn need spe­
cific conditions to play their ‘purified’ role. The attempt to eschew 
the mental property level by referring to observable behaviour only 
requires a never-ending qualification of background conditions and 
hence leads to an infinite regress.
Thirdly, behaviourism suffers from the fact that systems -  and 
in particular humans -  behave differently in identical stimuli en­
vironments. In Balzac’s Old Goriot, for example, the manipulator 
Vautrin offers the poor student Eugene a cash credit, which the lat­
ter rejects. But moments later, after Vautrin had implied that he 
would ask for a high interest, Eugene is ready to take the money. 
Why? Eugene is faced with the same stimulus environment: the
59
money he so urgently needs in Vautrin’s hand. But the latter’s de­
mand of a high interest is not a stimulus that would make Eugene 
take the money -  unless for a complex chain of beliefs and desires 
that made him believe he could save his honour by taking a usurious 
credit from Vaudrin, but not by taking a chanty. If such scenarios 
are admitted at all, then the explanation of different actions under 
identical present stimuli must revert to differences in the past of 
the system -  differences that could give rise to different perception, 
interpretations and expectations. But once that is admitted, the 
boundaries of scientific behaviourism are crossed and we are in the 
realm of the cognitive, as will become clear in the next section. Sci­
entific Behaviourism cannot account for some kinds of learning, it 
suffers from an infinite regress and it cannot explain why systems 
behave differently under identical stimuli environments. It therefore 
does not provide a workable methodology of action explanation.
Skinnerian Behaviourism set itself and everybody else a very 
high-minded goal: to allow psychology into the realm of science 
only with the highest credentials of simplicity and inter-subjective 
agreement. Unfortunately, they threw out the baby with the bath­
water. In the face of the problems discussed, it seems little more 
than highhanded to claim that
. . . psychologists have unwittingly been analysing contin­
gencies of reinforcements, the very contingencies responsi­
ble for the behaviour mistakenly attributed to an internal 
originator. (Skinner 1990, 1209)
Even though it is -  from a scientific standpoint -  undoubtedly desir­
able to explain behaviour in terms of stimuli and reinforcers alone, 
this method has failed for the above reasons for most cases of human 
behaviour.
For all those cases, there is an explanation involving intentional 
mental states, and this explanation should be applied at least in all 
those cases where behaviourism fails. Skinner, as Dennett points 
out, fails to see the distinction between explaining and explain­
ing away, and thus he thinks that behaviourist methodology has 
to replace a cognitive one. That position merely leads to the rejec­
tion of most of psychology as non-scientific, without any operational 
methodology. Instead, cognitive explanations co-exist with S — R
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explanations (where those are possible at all) -  they are explana­
tion of higher complexity with lesser possibility to test, but they are 
explanations nevertheless.
2.2.3 Saving Behaviourism?
Behaviourists have tried to defend their position against the above 
arguments by making two concessions. First, they have expanded 
the S — R  relationship to a functional relationship between the envi­
ronment and the behaviour. The behavioural variable B is now seen 
as a function of the intensity vector of the environmental influences 
I  : B =  F(I) .  F  is interpreted as a description of the functional 
stimulus for a response B  (Zuriff 1976, Gibson 1950, Ullmann 1980). 
Second, the past environmental stimuli affecting the agent are now 
included in the vector I  (Rachlin 1977c). Behaviourist explanation 
then operates as follows:
A stimulus like water may now be threatening to a person 
due to its past interaction with the person. The quality of 
being threatening to a person can be viewed as a current 
dispositional property of the stimulus acquired through 
its membership in a stimulus class which previously in­
teracted with that person. . . . being a threatening
stimulus does not require a representation of the stimu­
lus inside the threatened person to explain why only this 
person is threatened by the stimulus. Thus, for the be­
haviourist, the behaviour of the hydrophobic is a function 
of a number of environmental variables, and one of these is 
the environment’s history of interaction with this person. 
(Zuriff 1985, 165)
An agent’s behaviour is now explained by reference to present as 
well as past stimuli affecting the agent. But unlike Skinner’s pro­
gram, there is no prior evidence that past stimuli have conditioned 
the agent. In fact, no such conditioning is on the record at all, as 
no stimulus-response-reinforcer relation was observed. Rather, the 
influence of past stimuli as potential conditioning factors is hypoth­
esised. As we find the agent to act overly fearsome in proximity to 
water, we diagnose the agent to be hydrophobic. We then search 
for past incidents that could have conditioned the agent to perceive
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water as threatening. Given that the search is successful, the be­
haviourist finds the functional relationship between a stimulus class 
and the behaviour supported. What is missing from this type of be­
haviourism is the prior identification of conditioning stimuli through 
a reinforcer: e.g. an accident when swimming or boating at early 
age, pressure from swimming instructors or parents, vivid imaginary 
story about monsters or big fish underwater, etc. that resulted in 
the compulsive avoidance of water already observed before the cur­
rent phenomenon is to be explained. Instead of the rigid Skinnerian 
stimulus-response-reinforcer regularity the behaviourist now invokes 
stimuli that are potential and plausible conditioners, without any 
independent evidence available for this role.
This watered-down version of behaviourism faces two conceptual 
problems. First, the connection between past stimuli and present be­
haviour is unclear. Skinner requires a direct ‘causal chain’ between 
behaviour and ‘forces operating upon the organism from without’ 
(Skinner 1953. 42). For the newer version of behaviourism, the ques­
tion arises: how can a past stimulus (no longer present) be a cause 
for a present behaviour? To clean up this chain conceptually, some­
thing has to be interposed that creates continuity between stimulus 
and behaviour -  a state or a property, at least a dispositional one. 
Second, the ex post hypothesis is not based on any selection criteria. 
Agents are exposed to an enormous number of stimuli throughout 
their lives. What are the scientist’s criteria in selecting the causally 
relevant stimuli? Which of them are potential and plausible con­
ditioners? To stay with the example, there are many people who 
experience some threatening situation involving water in their early 
lives; however, only a few of them develop hydrophobia. So what 
made the respective stimulus condition some people to avoid water, 
and others not? Within the framework of conditioning, the new- 
version behaviourist is unable to answer this question. As long as 
the behaviourist insists on the direct causal chain from stimulus to 
behaviour, it remains unclear how some members of the set of all 
stimuli of an agent’s history can obtain causal relevance.
The two problems that a watered-down behaviourism faces -  the 
continuity of the causal chain and the selection of relevant stimuli 
-  are solved by the re-introduction of mental properties into the 
prediction and explanation of behaviour. Mental properties are ac­
quired at a point in time, retained over a period, and they become
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efficacious when at a later time specific conditions are satisfied. Thus 
they do provide the continuous chain between a stimulus and a later 
response. Further, mental properties are assigned under the regime 
of a theory that postulates specific relations between stimuli, mental 
properties and behaviour. As will become clearer in the discussion 
below, the theory and the mental properties governed by it cannot 
be disassociated. Hence for all mental properties assigned, a selec­
tion rule comes attached to them. Whether the mental property 
assignment is correct of course remains to be tested against real­
ity, just as the behaviourist’s claim about a functional relationship 
between stimuli input and response output; because of the intercon­
nection between assignment and selection, however, the former is 
much clearer in its claims than the latter.
The nature of mental properties employed in this fashion was 
discussed in chapter 1. The possible justification for assigning par­
ticular configurations of these mental properties will be discussed in 
the next section.
2.3 A  C ognitive Theory o f Behaviour
A modified version of behaviourism, conceding that behaviour is a 
function of past and present stimuli, faced the problems of how to 
model this claim causally, and how to select the causally relevant 
stimuli. These two problems can be resolved by reintroducing men­
tal properties into the explanation of behaviour. A stimulus at t\ 
caused the agent to believe p\ this belief is a disposition to per­
form act q at £2 , given certain conditions. Thus the causal chain 
runs from stimulus to belief and from belief (plus further condi­
tions) to behaviour. Further, mental properties are hypothesised ex 
post just as the behaviourist hypothesises the past stimulus. But 
mental properties are highly modularised. They are distinguished 
in kind (at least two: beliefs and desires) and are individuated by 
their content. A mental property is ascribed not on the basis of the 
(repeatable) response in one highly specific situation alone -  as the 
behaviourist does -  rather, it is ascribed on the basis on a variety 
of situations, in each of which it plays a causal role.
In this section I will discuss the approach of identifying mental 
properties as theoretical concepts. I will present the origin of this 
account -  Sellar’s myth -  first, and show that the common-sense
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interpretation of the theory implied here is not warranted. Instead, 
I will argue for the Ramsey-Lewis account of theoretical terms. To 
show that the use of theoretical terms construed this way is common 
beyond the social sciences, I will give two examples from the natural 
sciences, and only then discuss the application to mental properties 
and cognitive theories of behaviour.
2.3.1 A N ew  Type of M ental Properties
The mental properties reintroduced are quite different from those 
employed in 19th century psychology. They respond to the need to 
organise connections of higher complexity between past and present 
stimuli and behaviour; but otherwise, they accept many of the 
methodological positions the behaviourists argued for. First, they 
are assigned exclusively on the basis of behavioural evidence (in­
cluding verbal behaviour). Second, they are assigned as the causes 
of that behaviour. Third, their assignment -  in whatever form -  
does not say anything about the internal representation of these 
causes. In particular, the complexities of mental-material dualism 
do not arise -  mental properties, as discussed in section 1.4, program 
for physiological or physical causes. Further, even though mental 
properties might be ascribed as intentional attitudes (properties di­
rected to a semantic object), this ascription does not imply that 
they are internally represented as such. As argued in section 1.5.2, 
their intentional quality might arise solely in the process of their 
measurement.
The justification for this new type of mental property ascription 
is that it is driven by a theory that allows better explanation and 
prediction of behaviour than a behaviourist position. This theory 
postulates a particular mechanism for how mental properties inter­
act in bringing about behaviour; and in accord with this mechanism, 
the theory attributes mental properties to individuals such that their 
past and present stimulus experience and behaviour is fitted best 
under its pattern. It is the need for this pattern, which allows for 
more complex connection than direct relations between stimuli and 
responses, which gave rise to the new concept of mental properties. 
Sellars illustrates this idea nicely by ’making a myth. . . or, to give 
it an air of up-to-date respectability, by writing a piece of science 
fiction -  anthropological science fiction’ (Sellars 1956, 309). This
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myth suggests a development of cognitive theory in three stages. 
First, in the prehistory of psychology, humans spoke in a purely be- 
haviouristic idiom -  all their descriptions and explanations of their 
and others’ behaviour were in terms of ‘public properties of public 
objects located in space and enduring in time’. In the second stage, 
this idiom is found wanting, and is consequently replaced by a more 
complex idiom that includes mental properties:
In the attempt to account for the fact that his fellow 
men behave intelligently not only when their conduct is 
threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes -  that is to 
say, as we would put it, when they ’’think out loud” -  but 
also when no detectable verbal output is present, Jones 
develops a theory according to which overt utterances are 
but the culmination of a process which begins with certain 
inner episodes. And let us suppose that this model for 
these episodes which initiate the events which culminate 
in overt verbal behaviour is that of overt verbal behaviour 
itself. In other words, using the language of the model, 
the theory is to the effect that overt verbal behaviour is 
the culmination of a process that begins with inner speech’ 
(Sellars 1956, 317-18)
In Sellars’ myth, Jones invents a new stance towards his fellow hu­
mans: he interprets them as intelligent beings, instead of seeing 
their behaviour -  in a proto-Skinnerian perspective -  determined by 
present stimuli. He does not do so out of humanistic motives, be­
cause he wants to bestow an air of freedom and dignity upon them; 
rather, he has to do so because the simplistic stimulus-response 
explanations do not work. By postulating intelligent human be­
haviour, modelled as semantic internal episodes, Jones provides him­
self with a richer explanatory tool.
Sellars’ myth then continues to a third stage, where Jones’ new 
theory has proven successful and hence has been adopted by many 
of his fellow human beings. In that situation, the theory that was 
meant to ascribe mental properties to others is employed by Jones 
and his compatriots to ascribe mental properties to themselves as 
well -  on the basis of their own behavioural evidence. This devel­
opment leads to a shift in the theory’s role. While in stage two it 
is the prediction and explanation of others’ behaviour that required
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the ascription of mental states to them, in stage three the ascrip­
tion itself comes into prominence. ‘What began as a language with 
a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role’ (Sellars 1956, 
320). This ascriptive function of the theory has mislead many to be­
lieve that they indeed do have privileged access to their own mental 
properties.
As I showed in section‘2.2.1, there are no convincing arguments 
for such a privileged access, but there is lots of experimental ev­
idence against it. But the finding of Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
and others not only show that the purported introspection is rather 
blind; they also show that the purported introspective access leads 
to systematically wrong results. This requires explanation. If people 
systematically report wrong stimuli, motives or cognitive processes, 
then there must be some mechanism that provides these reports, but 
which is not connected to introspection. Sellars’ myth provides an 
explanation for this other mechanism: a theory of the deliberating 
mind that arises out of the need to explain other people’s behaviour 
more adequately (while of course open to mistakes), which finally is 
transformed into a theory of self-ascribed mental properties.10
RB.
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Because of its purportedly wide-spread use and deeply ingrained 
character, the theory of Sellar’s myth has been alternately baptised 
‘folk theory’ or ‘common sense psychology’. Both of these names 
betray two crucial but possibly unwarranted assumptions. The first 
is that Sellar’s ‘theory’ can indeed be seen as a body of folk psycho­
logical laws. If that was so, the explanatory and predictive device 
that Jones uses could be made explicit it could be expressed in 
sentences using only well-defined terminology -  and without further 
ado be used as a scientific theory. The second assumption is that 
all theories satisfying Jones’ needs in stage two of the myth must be 
of the same kind, if not identical, and that this unified theory must 
be by and large true.
The truth of both claims would have important consequences 
for the methodology of behavioural explanation. If the first claim
10In the cases discussed by Nisbett and Wilson, the system aticity of the errors becomes 
explicable only once we turn our backs on introspection and see th a t people ascribe mental 
properties to themselves with the help of a theory. In the cases discussed, people had the wrong 
theory, but for a good reason: dissonance reduction. Faced with insufficient justification for 
a task a t hand, they attributed  themselves mental properties th a t provided th a t justification. 
Faced with attribution manipulation, they attributed  to themselves those mental properties 
the simplest theory would attribute.
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is true, a theory of behaviour based on mental properties could 
readily adopt the form  of folk psychology; if the second was true, a 
theory that could claim folk theory as its basis would have a good 
justification. Decision theorists have banked on both claims. A good 
example of this is David Lewis, who suggests:
Collect all the platitudes you can think of regarding the 
causal relations of mental states, sensory stimuli, and mo­
tor responses. Perhaps we can think of them as having the 
form: ‘When someone is in so-and-so combination of men­
tal states and receives sensory stimuli of so-and-so a kind, 
he tends with so-and-so probability to be caused thereby 
to go into so-and-so mental states and produce so-and-so 
motor responses.’ Add also all the platitudes to the effect 
that one mental state falls under another. . . include 
only platitudes which are common knowledge amongst us. 
(Lewis 1972, 212)
Lewis assumes that folk theoretical ‘platitudes’ are of the form of 
lawlike generalizations that capture causal relationships. This is a 
widespread assumption in the philosophical discussion of folk theory. 
In particular, folk theory is often assumed to consist of three dif­
ferent types of these lawlike generalizations; those between stimuli 
and mental states, those between mental states and those between 
mental states and behavioural responses, where —> signifies a causal 
relation:
(1) { x ) x  perceives [something]—► M i ( x )
(2) (x ) M i ( x ) A M j { x )  —► M k(x)
(3) ( x ) M i ( x )  A M j ( x )  —> x  does [something]
An example of type (1) would be ‘a person denied food for any 
length of time will feel hungry’; an example of type (3) would be ‘a 
hungry person’s mouth will water at the smell of food’. Examples 
for type (2) are cited by Churchland:
( x ) ( p ) [ ( x  fears that p)  —> (x  desires that -»/?)]
( x ) ( p ) ( q ) [ ( ( x  believes that p)  A (x  believes that (if p  then 
q)) )  —► ( barring conflicting desires, distractions, etc., x  
believes that <?)]
(Churchland 1981, 71)
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But despite its pervasiveness in the philosophical literature, the form 
of folk psychology is all but uncontroversial. I will briefly discuss 
two competing approaches to point out the difficulty with the as­
sumption of folk psychology’s form.
The first is an approach of social psychology, the branch of psy­
chology that investigates folk. Social psychology makes clear that 
trait attribution constitutes an important part of folk psychologis- 
ing. Instead of attributing mental states as the effects of stimuli and 
the causes of behaviour, social psychologists have found that people 
attribute personality traits to others on the basis of their appear­
ance, behaviour and certain stereotypes, then associate further traits 
with the attributed traits and explain their behaviour on the basis 
of the thus accumulated traits.11 This approach differs from the one 
commonly assumed by philosophers in two ways. First, the traits 
attributed are different from the desires and beliefs philosophers a
typically think about. Traits like ‘honest’, ‘selfish’, ‘humorous’ or 
‘nervous’ comprise a wide field of behavioural dispositions.12 They 
are not necessarily inconsistent with belief-desire ascriptions, but it 
needs to be argued quite specifically which desires and beliefs make 
up any given trait. As a little reflection will show, this connection 
between desire-belief and trait attributes is not the common fair of 
folk psychology: few people can readily say what desires and beliefs 
they ascribe to a person when they attribute a trait like ‘easy-going’ 
to her. Second, the interconnection between traits is not considered 
to be causal, but of purely associative character: people ‘seem to J  
hold that traits “go together” . . .  if a person is judged to be 
talkative, they are also likely to be judged sociable; in contrast, if 
they are judged to be cautious, they are also likely to be judged 
silent’ (v. Eckhardt 1995, 36). But while it is commonly claimed 
that a belief that p  and a belief that if p  then q causes the belief 
that q, it is not claimed that talkativeness causes sociability or the 
other way around. The trait ascription theory is thus not a causal 
theory.
The second dissenting approach comes from within philosophy 
itself, and its implications for the form of folk psychology are more 
radical than the trait ascription theory. It claims that people obtain
11 For a good discussion of this approach in social psychology, see v. Eckhardt 1995, 35.
12Rosenberg and Sedlak 1972 asked experimental subjects to describe persons with at least 
5 psychological adjectives. The results were ordered by frequency; all traits mentioned here 
are from this list.
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their folk psychological intuition by putting themselves in someone 
else’s position and then use their own decision-making system to 
simulate the other person’s decision making.13 Prom such a sim­
ulated deliberation, people derive predictions about other people’s 
behaviour, without needing to resort to a set of lawlike general­
izations at all.14 Admittedly, there are some important arguments 
against the simulation theory. For one, there is some developmental 
data that the standard theory can explain well, but which poses a 
problem for the simulation theory (Stich and Nichols 1992, 146-50); 
while there so far has not been any set of psychological phenomena 
that posed a serious problem for the standard theory, but would 
be explicable on the simulation account. Further, the simulation 
account is in need of some sort of introspection, and I have raised 
serious doubts about such a possibility in section 2.2.1. However, 
none of the arguments are conclusive at this point, so that the sim­
ulation account is a contender to the more standard understandings 
of how people obtain folk psychological intuitions.
As long as these competing accounts are not securely defeated, 
it cannot be claimed with any justification that folk theory has the 
form of a set of lawlike generalizations. Decision theorists and other 
scientists interested in constructing a cognitive theory of behaviour 
therefore cannot hope to derive the form of their theories directly 
from folk psychological platitudes.
Even if one cannot hope that folk psychology will provide the 
form for a scientific theory of behaviour, one might still be opti­
mistic that the folk intuitions people have -  when translated into 
the right form -  can serve as the justifying basis of any such the­
ory. Lewis seems to have this second idea in mind when he pro­
poses to employ only ‘the platitudes which are common knowledge
13T o be more exact, this is Alvin Goldman’s view, which differs from the position of sim­
ulation theory’s other main proponent, Robert Gordon. Gordon claims that the explaining 
observer simulates by trying to adjust for relevant psychological differences between the sub­
ject and her and by imagining what the subject would do. Compare Goldman (1992) and 
Gordon (1986).
14It has been claimed that if the simulation approach is true, then ‘there is no such thing 
as folk psychology!’, as Stich and Nichols emphatically claim (Stich and Nichols 1992, 125). I 
think this is an unfortunate terminological move. One should understand folk psychology in 
a wider sense, as ‘a set of attributive, explanatory, and predictive practices [aimed at people’s 
own and others’ psychological states and overt behaviour], and . . .  a set of notions used 
in those practices’ (v. Eckhardt 1994, 300). Then the ‘set of lawlike generalisations’ is one 
possible form of folk psychology; but there are other possible explanatory practices that are 
called folk psychology without having the form of a proto-scientific theory.
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amongst us’. Examples of such platitudes, which in very important 
methodological approaches have been given foundational status for 
economics, can be found in Mill, who claims that ‘a greater gain 
is preferred to a smaller one’ (Mill 1949, 6.9.3) or in Robbins, who 
claims that ‘individuals can arrange their preferences in an order, 
and in fact do so’ (Robbins 1935, 78). This account presupposes 
a great deal of agreement about these matters of mind. But what 
guarantees such a common agreement? Defenders of this uniformity 
of folk psychology can point to the relative success we have in pre­
dicting other people’s behaviour. To those who doubt this success 
they might point out the many activities we only engage in because 
we can predict with great accuracy the behaviour of others: road 
traffic, contractual agreements, games of chess, etc. To those who 
claim that ‘folk’ accounts of behaviour in these situations is trivially 
true, they might point out the behaviour of the mentally ill, in par­
ticular of paranoid or autistic people and the seriousness of a lack 
of such a capacity.15
This conviction goes as far as to claim that the principles of folk 
psychological theory represent the fundamental rational principles 
of human conduct.
I think everyone does subscribe to these principles, whether 
he knows it or not. This of course does not imply that no 
one ever reasons, believes, chooses, or acts contrary to 
those principles, but only that if someone does go against 
those principles, he goes against his own principles. 
(Davidson 1985, 351)
This is a bit fast. While all theories of this sort arise from a common 
need -  to explain and predict human behaviour -  they do not all 
have a common structure and content. To unreflectively speak of 
‘the’ folk psychology is thus misleading.
The argument against a common structure and content of folk 
psychology starts with pointing out the ostensible lack of a source 
of this purported agreement. If all mentally healthy people engage 
in behaviour-explaining and -predicting activities, and I do think 
that they do, then the question is how they acquired the capacity
15 It has been argued that autism is the pathological lack of access to folk psychology and 
hence the inability to understand and predict the actions of others. Compare Baron-Cohen, 
1995.
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to engage in these activities? Three potential answers offer them­
selves: they could have been instructed, they were endowed at birth 
with this capacity, or they could have learned from their own expe­
rience. The first option is easily dismissed: Children are certainly 
not taught by their parents in the way Jones supposedly taught his 
fellow human beings in Sellars’ myth. Few people, after all, could 
readily produce a summary of folk psychology; so parents would be 
hardly able to explicitly instruct their children in something that 
they do not know how to express.
The second, nativist, option is more of an answer to reckon with. 
In analogy to other theories of innate capacities, it could be ar­
gued that the folk psychological capacities are part of the innate 
endowment bestowed upon every human being at birth.16 Obvi­
ously, it is not the case that the full capacity of folk psychologising 
is innate -  babies are not from birth onwards able to predict and 
explain others’ behaviour. Nativists instead argue that certain as­
pects of mental capacities are innate, while other aspects that com­
plete these capacities to their operative stage are acquired through 
empirical learning. The tradition following Chomsky’s generative 
grammar focuses on the innateness of underlying rules; while fol­
lowers of Fodor’s nativism focus on the innateness of concepts. In 
both cases, the innate structures need ‘filling in’ by experience. The 
linguistic experience of a child in an anglophone family is captured 
in a pattern governed by the rules of generative grammar; this pat­
tern then enables the child to speak English. Fodor’s concepts are 
dormant and require experience of particular sensations as a trigger 
-  the sensation of red, for example, triggering the dormant concept 
of ‘red’, ‘colour’ and ‘not-red’. Similarly, it could be claimed that 
the ‘rules’ underlying folk psychology -  be it the trait associations 
or the causal relations between mental properties -  are innate, but 
in need of patterns of behaviour to fill them with; and the concepts 
of ‘desire’, ‘belief’, or character traits could be innate but dormant 
and waiting for experiences that required their employment.
It could be argued that the apparent correlation between physio­
logical birth-defects and the lack of a folk psychological ability (see 
footnote above) supports the innateness of folk psychological rules 
and concepts. But this impression is wrong: for such an argument
161 do not know of such a position concerning folk psychology in particular; hence I will 
take the arguments from broader positions of nativism.
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it has to be assumed that the defect affects the postulated folk psy­
chological apparatus directly, and not the general abilities to sense 
other people’s behaviour and learn about its regularities. But any 
such assumption would beg the question and therefore invalidate 
the argument.
The argument for these positions rather follows the so-called 
’poverty of the stimulus’ scheme. Nativists point to the discrepancy 
between our experience and the ideas, concepts, principles, etc. that 
we eventually come to have, and argue that this discrepancy cannot 
be fully explained by the empiricists’ notions of learning. It follows 
that we must be contributing something substantial ‘from our side’ 
in the construction of knowledge, and this is what is innate. Em­
pirical evidence seems to give some credence to these arguments in 
the case of linguistic capacities. The grammatical rules that mod­
ern linguistics has identified to govern natural languages are too 
complex and non-obvious to be known by mere casual reflection on 
one’s own linguistic practice. Instead, their application seems to re­
quire a very sophisticated technical apparatus; an apparatus whose 
existence cannot be explained in terms of generic requirements on 
communication (Compare Chomsky 1988). Further, the linguistic 
evidence available to children severely underdetermines any theory 
of grammar. Many different grammars would be compatible with 
this evidence; hence it is not explicable from the available evidence 
alone, that children at a very early age learn and employ a highly 
homogeneous grammar.
The same arguments do not mutatis mutandis apply to folk psy­
chological capacities. First of all, folk psychology has not been inves­
tigated to an extent that a secure body of folk psychological rules 
-  comparable to the rules of generative grammar -  could be pre­
sented. Thus the argument from its high complexity fails. Further, 
folk psychological capacities are acquired over a much longer time of 
child development than linguistic capacities are. For example, ex­
periments show that children before the age of four lack a concept 
of belief, or at least lack the capacity to make allowances for false or 
differing beliefs in other people, while most children from the age of 
five already master the rules of grammar and meaning fully. Thus, 
the acquisition process is supported by a much longer exposition to 
behavioural evidence than the parallel grammar-acquisition by lin­
guistic evidence. Last, while children exhibit a highly homogeneous
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knowledge of grammar, the same cannot be said about folk psy­
chology. This difference might just arise from the relative difficulty 
in observing folk psychological practices in comparison to linguistic 
practices; but so far no argument for the existence of a particular 
homogeneous folk practice is made.
The view I want to present here is an alternative to the explicit 
learning and nativist accounts. In deviation from Sellars’ myth, 
it contends that every mentally healthy human being ‘invents’ the N £
theory again for him or herself. It seems unproblematic to most of 
us that childreriTeafn"about the external world, its properties and 
the individuation of its objects. We believe that they do so without 
their parents giving them a lecture in folk physics (which, again, 
most parents couldn’t), and without them having any sort of innate 
knowledge of the world, its objects and properties. So if children can 
develop a complex conceptual framework about the external world, 
why should they not be able to construct a similar framework to 
understand and predict other people’s behaviour, without explicit 
teaching or tacit internal knowledge? In this sense, everybody is 
a little Jones, having insight into the necessity of explaining and 
predicting his fellows’ behaviour with a richer apparatus than mere 
S — R  regularities.
This view implies two consequences. First, common agreement is 
far from guaranteed. The ‘learning by doing’ approach, with ample 
adjustments along the way, will secure some sort of convergence, 
but there are enough loopholes and space for maneuvering to leave 
everybody with their own peculiar psychological theory. Mutual 
understanding is secured by partial overlap, not by identity.
Second, any such theory is highly fallible. Even though people 
will adjust their theories in light of failed predictions, their expe­
rience (and their methodology) will be highly domain-specific and 
thus do not suffice to guarantee a correct theory. Under the account 
proposed here, people in the majority will hold theories that yield 
roughly correct predictions which are non-robust and are based on 
regularities widely off the mark. Anecdotal evidence gives plenty of 
examples of what sort of funny psychological preconceptions people 
have about other people.
Thus, we shouldn’t rely on the form nor the content ‘folk in­
tuitions’ when constructing a scientific cognitive theory of human
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behaviour. The ‘commonly agreed platitudes’ are not a guaran­
teed material for this purpose. This is an important result for 
the methodology of microeconomics, where it has been prominently 
claimed that the fundamental axioms of a theory of behaviour can 
be directly taken and justified from our common sense knowledge.
To the contrary, I propose that any such theory is constructed 
conjecturally. The psychologist might start with what she thinks 
are her common-sense psychological notions of causal relations be­
tween sense impressions, behaviour and mental properties of the 
subject she wants to ascribe the mental properties to; she further 
might construct it according to criteria of simplicity and coherence. 
The conjectured theory is then tested against all observations of an 
agent’s behaviour in specific environments. I will discuss the struc­
ture of such a conjectured theory in the next subsection.
2.3.2 M ental Properties as Theoretical Terms
In the last subsection I argued that a cognitive theory of behaviour 
cannot hope to obtain its form nor its justification from folk psycho­
logical intuitions. Instead, the form of the theory will be a collection 
of lawlike generalizations -  regardless of the form of our folk intu­
itions -  and the content of the theory will be conjectured, instead 
of being based on allegedly correct folk intuitions.
What does the structure of such a theory look like? An answer 
can be found in Frank Ramsey’s account of theories, later to be elab­
orated by Lewis (1970, 1972) and Balzer et al. (1987). In response 
to the verificationist program of the 1920s, Ramsey developed his 
own account of the relation between theoretical and observational 
terms. His first insight was that useful theories in general used terms 
that were too complex to be directly reducible to observational con­
cepts.17 Instead of trivially tying each theoretical term to an observ­
able event or object, a theory takes an observation as evidence for 
the truth of a conjunction of sentences involving theoretical terms.
17Maybe fascinated by the newly introduced Goedel numbers, Ramsey decided to repre­
sent the terms of the theoretical and non-theoretical systems as numerical functions, whose 
arguments were interpreted as instances of space-time coordinates. He then found that the 
functional representation of the theoretical terms generally required more arguments than 
the non-theoretical ones (that they had a ‘higher degree of multiplicity’), and derived from 
this that the theoretical terms were not directly reducible to the non-theoretical ones. ‘Such 
an increase of multiplicity’, Ramsey claimed, ‘is, I think, a universal characteristic of useful 
theories (Ramsey 1929, 122).
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The architecture of theories T suggested by Ramsey consists of a 
theoretical or formal and a T-non-theoretical part.18 In the theoret­
ical part, the theoretical terms are interlinked via the theory’s ax­
ioms. These axioms restrict the co-existence of theoretical terms, or 
stipulated the existence of one concept from the presence of another. 
The whole structure, not the individual terms, is then connected to 
the T-non-theoretical terms. If the theory structure fits these T-non- 
theoretical terms, the theoretical terms would obtain their meaning 
from exactly the relations they were put in; if it didn’t fit, the the­
oretical terms would not have meaning at all. Once the theoretical 
terms had acquired meaning, they would in addition to that pro­
vide information about the systematic behaviour of the phenomena 
subsumed under the theory. Examples of this form of theory con­
struction can be found in both the social and the natural sciences. 
I will give two illustrations from chemistry and biology, before dis­
cussing theories of behaviour from this perspective.
The theory of chemical bonds proceeds from a number of key ob­
servations. Substances can be identified by characteristic properties 
like colour, smell, density and structure. Bringing them together, 
substances are sometimes observed to transform in reactions, al­
though closer observation reveals that the total mass of the reac­
tants does not change. There is a particular subgroup of reactions, 
called chemical analysis, where the number of substances after the 
reaction is higher than before (electrolysis, heating under exclusion 
of other substances, exposure to highly reactive substances). It has 
been observed that the analysis of a specific substance always yields 
the same compounds, and that it always yields them in exactly the 
same proportions. In those cases where the analysis of different 
substances yields the same compounds, it is found that these com­
pounds exist in the same proportions, or in exact multiples thereof.
Starting with these observations, the theory hypothesises some 
products of chemical analysis as ‘elements’ as the last products 
of analysis. It then defines the smallest unit of an element as the
18Diez correctly points out th a t the distinctions ’T-non-theoretical/T-theoretical’ and 
‘observational/non-observational’ are it not identical — contrary to the claims by Ramsey 
and Carnap. ‘The former is local, relative to theories (a concept may be T-non-theoretical 
but T '-theoretical), the latter is global (a concept -  perhaps at a given time -  is observa­
tional or it is not, period)’(Diez 2002, 15). I agree with this view and will from now on use 
‘T-non-theoretical’ or ‘extra-theoretical’ to denote those concepts which the theory is meant 
to account for.
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atom, and it hypothesises a reaction to consist in a process where 
an atom of one element combines with a specific number (or at the 
least, with specific numbers) of atoms of another element. The thus 
described valence property of an element was historically measured 
as the number of hydrogen atoms that would combine with one atom 
of the element in question.
The unified theory of ionic and covalent bonds, first developed 
by Gilbert Lewis in 1916, models the valence of atoms as a property 
of electronic structures and inter-atomic forces. All elements of the 
periodic table are uniquely characterised by the number of electrons 
in their atomic structure. Further, each element in each period is 
characterised by the number of electrons on its outmost shell. The 
maximum number of electrons on that shell is eight, as found in 
the noble gases. Now the theory postulates the tendency of each 
atom to transfer (in case of the ionic bond) or share (in case of the 
covalent bond) electrons with other atoms in its environment until 
both have reached the electronic composition characteristic of the 
nearest noble gas atom in the periodic table (either in its period or 
the period above). This theory rudiment is the basis for all prevalent 
explanations of chemical bonding -  and thus for chemical reactions 
in contemporary chemistry.
The theory constructs a mechanism that allows one to systemat­
ically relate a range of pre-reaction substances to a range of post­
reaction substances. It does so by postulating a hierarchy between 
substances, such that some substances (’elements’) turn out to be 
the most primitive, out of which all other substances are composed. 
It then associates each element’s atom with a particular property 
(electrons in the outmost shell) and then specifies a process between 
atoms with particular realisations of that property. This process is 
captured in a set of axioms of the sort ‘if an atom with two elec­
trons on its outmost shell meets another atom with six electrons 
on its outmost shell, then the former transfers its two electrons to 
the latter’. The theory predicts from this process and information 
about the pre-reaction situation the existence of certain substances. 
The substances and their properties in the pre-reaction situation 
and the ones in the post-reaction situation are the only observ­
able evidence for the theory. The postulated properties only exist 
or to puFltjnQre precisely, the employed predicates have meaning 
only -  if the theory fits the data. The postulated mechanism itself
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is merely conjectured and not directly confirmed by any evidence. 
Even extremely refined measurement instruments (X-ray diffraction, 
electronic microscope, scanning tunnelling or the particle chamber) 
only reveal the existence of atoms or electrons; they do not give any 
information about the processes involved in chemical bonding.
A second example of a Ramsey-type theory is found in biology. 
Here, the botanist distinguishes between different species (a species 
being defined as the group of organisms that can successfully breed 
offspring) and records differences in properties between members of 
one species. Exemplars of the common garden pea, for example, 
bloom either white or purple. It is further observed that the pea 
plant is dominantly self-pollinating, and that its descendants tend 
to have the same trait as its parent.
For the explanation of this observation, Mendel proposed that 
the visible phenotype of the exemplar is determined by a theoret­
ically conjectured genotype. A gene, however, cannot be directly 
read off from the phenotype. Instead, genes determine a phenotype 
only in pairs. If gene pairs consist of mixed traits, the gene which 
determines the phenotype is said to be the dominant gene. A par­
ticular pea plant might bloom white, but some of its descendants 
might bloom violet. In such a case, the pea is said to carry the 
dominant and the recessive gene.
Genes cannot be directly observed in organisms (and the re- 
ducibility of Mendelian genetics to molecular genetics is highly con­
troversial -  see Kitcher 1984), nor can they be defined in direct 
relation to any phenotypical property of an organism. Instead, the 
genotype of an organism is a theoretical concept, and it is attributed 
according to a pattern that subsumes information about the pheno­
types of the organisms ancestors, the phenotypes of its descendents, 
and the phenotypes of the ancestors of that organism’s with which 
it produced these descendents. To take the simplest possible exam­
ple from Mendel’s original field of application, the common garden 
pea is said to carry the recessive gene either if it has a white flower, 
or if it has a purple flower and its offspring, stemming from self- 
pollination, has a white flower with probability 0.25. Mendelian 
genetics fits data of this sort extremely well; hence the predicate 
‘has genotype X’ identifies a property if it is used in accord with the 
theory. But this doesn’t say anything conclusive about the realism
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of the conjectured mechanism and attributions itself.
Similarly, mental properties are attributed to agents to account 
for their pattern of choices. Nowhere are the references of these 
predicates directly observed; and nowhere can a causal relation be­
tween a mental property and an observable stimulus or choice be 
ascertained before the whole of the theory has been applied to the 
behavioural phenomena. Davidson expresses this characteristic of 
mental properties as follows:
’if we were to ask for evidence that the explanation [of 
behaviour in terms of reasons] is correct, this evidence 
would in the end consist of more data concerning the sort 
of event explained, namely further behaviour which is ex­
plained by the postulated beliefs and desires. Adverting 
[mental properties] to explain action is therefore a way of 
fitting an action into a pattern of behaviour made coherent 
by the theory.’ (Davidson 1975, 159)
To assign mental properties to an agent is therefore not just an 
epistemological exercise: the result of finding out about the agent’s 
mental constellation. It is also a determination of the meaning of 
mental predicates: if a theoretical framework fits the choices an 
agent has made, then the mental predicates assigned to the agent 
through that theoretical framework obtain their meaning from their 
role in the true framework.
Lewis (1972) employs this general idea for his discussion of the 
meaning of mental predicates. According to him, any such theory 
consists of three types of statements: (1) conditionals expressing 
causal relations between stimuli type descriptions and mental state 
descriptions (mental predicate ascriptions); (2) conditionals between 
mental state descriptions of different kinds; and (3) conditionals be­
tween mental state descriptions and behaviour type descriptions. 
More formally, these three types of statements are expressed as fol­
lows, with x being the person, and being a mental predicate of 
type i.
(1) ( x ) x  perceives [something]—> M i ( x )
(2) (x ) M i ( x ) A M j ( x )  —> M k(x)
(3) (x ) M i ( x ) A M j ( x )  —* x  does [something]
where —» denotes a causal relation. The mental predicates and the
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interrelations between them constitute the T-theoretical part; the 
T-nontheoretical part is constituted by the assumed sensory per­
ception and the observed choices between options of an assumed 
calibration. I quoted typical examples for the relations between the­
oretical concepts in section 2.3.1; here they are again for illustrative 
purposes:
( x ) ( p ) [ ( x  fears that p)  —> (x  desires that -*p)]
(a;)(p)(<7 )[((:c believes that p)  A (x  believes that (if p  then 
q))) —► ( barring conflicting desires, distractions, etc., x  
believes that q)]
(Churchland 1981, 71)
The theory T  -  if true -  covers the causal relations of mental prop­
erties. Now instead of specifying first the meaning of all predicates 
included in T  and then determining whether the theory is true, Lewis 
suggest that we can first check whether the theory is true and then 
determine from the theory what the predicates mean. This strategy 
is pursued with the help of the Ramsey sentence, in which all men­
tal predicates M< are replaced with variables bound in existential 
quantifiers:
3M1, 3M2, . . . , 3 M n : T( M1, . . . , M n)
The Ramsey sentence says that there is at least one realization 
of T, with some constellation of mental predicates M i . . . ,  Mn. The 
meaning of any predicate M* is then determined as M* : (3 Mi ),
. . . ,  3Mf_i, M^ 3Mj+1, . . . ,  3Mn : T ( M i , . . . ,  Mn). This of course 
implies that M< does not have any meaning at all if T  is not true 
for any such constellation. But if T is true for some specification of 
predicates, then that specification of predicates names the proper­
ties which make the theory true. The Ramsey-Lewis strategy thus 
leads to the specification of mental properties as causal roles be­
tween stimulus input and behavioural output, assuming the causal 
structure in which they occur.
This provides the mere bare bones of an architectonic of theories 
of behaviour. In the following section, I will discuss some concrete 
examples of these theories, and explain what implication their in­
terpretation under a Ramsey-Lewisian framework has.
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2.4 C ognitive Theories in A ction
In the last subsection, the overall structure of all cognitive theories 
of behaviour was discussed. But how is this structure filled? What 
sort of theoretical concepts are conjectured, and what sort of ax­
iomatic relationships hold between them? Naively, one might think 
that all conjectures are random concoctions of some rich syntax, 
only governed by rules of consistency and non-repetitiveness. The 
resulting collection of possible theories might compete with Borges’ 
Library of Babel; but it is certainly not the way social scientists 
arrive at their conjectures. Rather, they can help themselves from 
an affluent set of proposed theories of deliberation, that have been 
found plausible and convincing -  without, of course, being neces- 
saily true. In the following, I will briefly review three types of these 
theories: those that attribute the will an autonomous role in delib­
eration; those that model deliberation as formed only by passions 
and beliefs; and those that reduce all passions to one form of moti­
vation: desire, want or preference. I will then discuss two theories of 
the latter type, Ramsey’s version of Bayesian Decision Theory and 
Loomes’ and Sugden’s regret theory.
2.4.1 W ill, Passions, Desire
Prom Plato to Kant, the will has been assigned an important role 
in theories of human agency. Neglecting many differences between 
authors, their common denominator was the claim that the will 
has an autonomous influence on human behaviour. The will was 
understood as the capacity to become motivated to act based on 
deliberations about what actions would be justified. Aquinas, for 
example, maintained that the practical intellect determined which 
action should be performed; the will as a ‘rational appetite’ thus rep­
resented a motivating force in competition with the passions. Kant, 
in a different theory, cast ‘Wille’ as the capacity for autonomous self­
legislation, restricting or overriding the motivating force of the pas­
sions. In contemporary philosophy, theories of human agency that 
cater for a direct influence of rationality as a motivating force still 
play an important role -  for example Sen (1977), who stresses the 
role of commitment as non-welfare-maximizing motivation; Nagel 
(1976), who argues in that morality is concerned with the will; and 
Bratman (1987) who claims that intention cannot be assimilated
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under the concept of desire.
In contrast to this, Hume conceived of the will as ‘nothing but the 
internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly 
give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our 
mind’ (Treatise in ‘Of liberty and necessity’). Will as an autonomous 
motivation was thus eliminated, and the passions gained importance 
as the only motivating forces. Consequently, the philosophical in­
terest of the passions rose. Descartes, although still committed to 
the notion of will as an autonomous motivating faculty, developed a 
system in which six passions were conceived of as primitive (wonder, 
desire, love, hatred, joy and sadness), while ‘all the others are either 
composed from some of these six or they are species of them’ (On 
the Passions of the Soul P69).
In the second part of the Treatise, Hume fleshed out the notion 
of passion. A passion is a reflective impression; it arises not immedi­
ately and directly from some impression of the senses, but through 
the mediation of the idea of that impression.
An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us 
perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain 
of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy 
taken by the mind, which remains after the impression 
ceases; and this we call idea. This idea of pleasure or 
pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new 
impression of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which 
may properly be called impression of reflexion, because 
derived from it. (Hume 2000, 7-8)
As any impression, a passion is an original existence, a state of a per­
son analogous to other physical states of the person.19 The fact that 
it arises through the mediation of an idea only specifies the causal 
conditions of its existence; it does not mean that it can be reduced 
to other mentally represented components, like ideas or other im­
pressions. Hume even doubted the possibility of a comprehensive 
but non-reductive analysis. As he said about the (indirect) passions 
of pride and humility:
19‘A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains 
not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. 
When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more 
a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high.’ 
(Hume 2000, 415)
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. . . it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of 
words, give a just definition of them, or indeed any of the 
passions. (Hume 2000a: 277)
In this sense, passions are primitive, irreducible entities of the mind. 
Hume nevertheless ventured to undertake an extended analysis of 
passions, carefully avoiding any reductive attempt. His analysis, in­
stead, relied upon a dual classification scheme. On the one hand, 
passions are distinguished by their felt intensity. Those commonly 
experienced at low intensity (or not experienced at all) are consid­
ered the calm passions, while those experienced at high intensity are 
the violent passions. Hume made it clear that experienced intensity 
of a passion is not at all correlated to the strength of its effect.
On the other hand, passions can be classified in terms of the 
causal conditions under which they come about. The primary pas­
sions arise from ‘a natural impulse or instinct’ without any inter­
mediary role of pleasure or pain. Their violent type is manifested 
in hunger and lust, for example, their calm type in benevolence, re­
sentment and the love of life. The secondary passions are aroused 
by the preceding impression of pleasure or pain or the idea of these. 
Of these, the direct passions are those that are from pleasure or pain 
immediately. Their violent type is manifested in desire and aversion, 
joy and grief, hope and fear, despair and security, while their calm 
type is exemplified in the basic moral and aesthetic sentiments. The 
indirect (secondary) passions are caused by pleasure or pain, but the 
object of these passions is not identical with that cause. For exam­
ple, hatred is an indirect passion of the violent type: caused by the 
pain of a particular event or series of events, but directed at a per­
son, not that event. Similarly, this relation holds for pride, humility 
and love, or in the calm variant, the approval and disapproval of 
persons. According to Hume, nothing further can be said about 
the constitution of the passions, and he consequently spends most 
of Book II of the Treatise analyzing the specific causal conditions 
under which indirect passions come about.20
20It is important to repeat that despite this categorization, which consists in a causal anal­
ysis and the comparison of similarities between the different passions, Hume thinks of all 
passions as simple and non-reducible. This interpretation is supported by Ardal: ‘A simple 
perception cannot be analyzed into distinct parts. Yet Hume thinks that it can be charac­
terised by pointing outs its similarity to other simple perceptions or its difference from them. 
One can also state the conditions under which it is found to arise, or, in other words, its 
causal conditions. Thus, for Hume, a simple perception is not just something that can only be
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Little remains of Hume’s non-reductive theory of agency in con­
temporary philosophy and social sciences.21 Instead, a unified ac­
count of the passions became dominant, first through psychological 
hedonism as exemplified by economists like William Stanley Jevons 
or Francis Edgeworth, and later through the representation of all 
types of motivations by a preference order -  pioneered by Vilfredo 
Pareto, and developed into the now orthodox economic position by 
Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu. This unified account has found 
entrance into the philosophical literature through Donald David­
son’s work, who speaks of pro-attitudes towards state of affairs, un­
der which are included ‘desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a 
great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic preju­
dices, social conventions, and public and private goals and values’ 
(Davidson 1963, 4) and who just a few pages later claims that ‘it 
is not unnatural, in fact, to treat wanting as a genus including all 
pro attitudes as species’ (ibid. 6). Whether one speaks of wantings, 
desires or preferences then mainly is a formal question; content wise, 
they all express a disposition to behave under specific conditions.
The three positions on agency sketched above are prima facie 
distinguished by the number of motivational forces they allow. As 
I have argued above, they therefore have to be distinguished by the 
whole of their theoretical architecture. In particular, in the termi­
nology of the Ramsey-Lewis account of theories, they are to be dis­
tinguished by their definitions -  the ‘contact points’ between theory 
and non-theoretical terms -  and by their axioms -  the interrela­
tion between the theoretical concepts themselves. In the following, 
I will discuss two cognitive theories that employ a unified account 
of motivation.
2.4.2 Ram sey: Bayesian D ecision Theory
Ramsey’s account of decision starts out with three assumptions: 
that the definitions must only refer to observed actions or reported 
hypothetical choices, but not to any other introspective data (com­
pare also his quote in section 2.2.1); that choices are to be inter­
pointed to or given a name. Many things may be predicated to it. I shall, indeed, emphasise 
that the bulk of the second book of the Treatise is concerned with stating the causal conditions 
for the emergence of simple impressions, and indicating various similarities between them .’ 
(Ardal 1989, 12).
21 For an account of the relevance of Hume’s notion of the passions for his economic and 
political thought, see Gruene and McClennen (forthcoming).
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preted as choices over gambles; and that choices are the outcome of 
only two psychological factors, beliefs and desires, where the con­
cept of desire is cast as a preference ordering and the concept of 
belief as a probability measure.22 The problem of such a theory is 
nicely summarised by Donald Davidson:
Choices between gambles are the result of two psycholog­
ical factors, the relative value the chooser places on the 
outcomes, and the probability he assigns to those out­
comes, conditional on his choice. Given the agent’s beliefs 
(his subjective probabilities) it’s easy to compute his rela­
tive values from his choices; given his values, we can infer 
his beliefs. But given only his choices, how can we work 
out both his beliefs and his values? (Davidson 1974a, 145)
I will give a rough account of Ramsey’s solution to this problem.23 
Ramsey takes as evidence hypothetical choices, in particular indif­
ference judgments. An agent is supposed to have a preference over 
all available options, and she is supposed to have beliefs ‘about ev­
erything’. Then, to measure her beliefs and evaluations, an agent is 
offered two gambles, (a; E; b) and (b; E ; a), where the options a and 
b are of different value to the agent.24 E  is an event such that the 
agent is indifferent to whether E  is realised or not. The probability 
of E  is defined to be 0.5 iff the agent is indifferent between the two 
gambles. This definition is plausible insofar that if the agent judged 
E  to be of different probability, she would -  under the given inter­
pretation -  be indifferent between a smaller and a larger expectation 
of her preferred option. This would be incoherent.
Then, in a next step, all options are assigned numbers to reflect 
their position in the preference ordering. This numerical assignment 
only represents the order in which they stand. In a further defini­
22 Ramsey cautions about the approximateness of the theory that he is about to use: ‘In 
order therefore to construct a theory of quantities of belief which shall be both general and 
more exact, I propose to take as a basis a general psychological theory, which is now universally 
discarded, but nevertheless comes, I think, fairly close to the truth in the sort of cases with 
which we are most concerned. I mean the theory that we can act in the way we think most 
likely to realise the objects of our desires, so that a person’s actions are completely determined 
by his desires and opinions. This theory cannot be made adequate to all the facts, but it seems 
to me a useful approximation to the truth in the case of our self-conscious or professional life, 
and is presupposed in a great deal of our thought’ (Ramsey 1926, 69).
23See Bradley (2001) for a detailed account and a representation theorem for Ramsey’s 
measures.
24Read ($x;i?;$0) as the gamble that if E  is the case, you receive $x, if E  is false, you 
receive $0.
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tion, Ramsey gives meaning to the numerical differences between 
two options. He defines that the numerical differences between op­
tions a and b and between c and d are the same iff the agent is 
indifferent between the gambles (a;P;d ) and (6;P;c), where again 
P  is assumed to be evaluatively neutral and has probability 0.5. 
This definition is plausible insofar that if the agent judged the eval­
uative differences to be non-identical, she would -  under the given 
interpretation for example trade b for a more readily than d for 
c, despite the fact that she was indifferent between gambles that 
yielded a or d and b or c in equal parts. This would be incoherent.
With the help of this definition, as well as a few further axioms, 
Ramsey is able to provide a utility measure u(-) for all options and 
gambles between options such that u(a) > u(b) iff a is preferred to 
b and u(a) — u(b) = u(c) — u(d) iff the difference between a and b is 
the same as that between c and d.
Last, Ramsey presents a definition for belief in all kinds of propo­
sitions, including those that are not ethically neutral. Given that 
an agent is indifferent between an option a and a gamble (6;P;c), 
his belief in P  is determined by the utilities for a, b and c : Pr(P) = 
l/(6)-[/fcj ' ^his definition is plausible insofar that if the agent judged 
P  to have a different probability, she would -  under the given in­
terpretation -  be indifferent between options of different expected 
utilities. This would be incoherent.
Ramsey’s measurement of utilities and beliefs illustrates well the 
gist of the Ramsey^Eewis theory. The m e^qcQ akes^ypotfien- 
cal choices as given data, and superimposes a theoretical structure 
to subsume this data under a systematic pattern. Davidson sum­
marises this as follows:
The explanation of a particular preference [standing here 
for hypothetical choices] involves the assignment of a com­
parative ranking of values and an evaluation of probabili­
ties. Support for the explanation doesn’t come from a new 
kind of insight into the attitudes and beliefs of the agent, 
but from more observations of preferences [choices] of the 
very sort to be explained. In brief, to explain (i.e. inter­
pret) a particular choice or preference, we observe other 
choices or preferences; these will support a theory on the 
basis of which the original choice or preference can be ex­
plained. Attributions of subjective values and probabili-
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ties are part of the theoretical structure, and are conve­
nient ways of summarizing facts about the structure of 
basic preferences; there is no way of testing them inde­
pendently. (Davidson 1974a, 146)
Ramsey’s theory neatly exemplifies such a pattern. The (extrathe- 
oretical) data -  real and hypothetical choices over certain and prior 
specified outcomes as well as choices over gambles with specified out- 
comes -  is subsumedTunder the theoretical pattern of expected utility 
maxmnzaTiohT TFe hypothesis consists of definitions: of choices over 
certain outcomes in terms of preferences over those outcomes, and 
of choices over gambles in terms of an expected utility index. It fur­
ther consists of a series of axioms that restrict the theoretical terms: 
the transitivity of the preference ordering over certain outcomes; 
the interrelation of preferences between gambles, preferences over 
certain outcomes and the subjective probability of neutral events; 
the interrelation of preferences between gambles probability of the 
neutral event and the numerical evaluative differences between gam­
bles; and the interrelation between numerical differences between 
gambles, probabilities of gambles, preferences over outcomes and 
the expected utility index. These two realms of the theory are illus­
trated in figure 2 .1 .
Through its definitions, the theoretical terms are connected to 
the extra-theoretical data depicted in the lower box. This connec­
tion only runs from theoretical to extra-theoretical terms, notT the 
other way^around T therefore speak of ‘fitting the data’ instead 
oFdefirhng the "theory in terms of it. Now the theoretical terms 
‘preferences over outcomes’ and ‘preferences over gambles’ are in 
turn governed by a regime of axioms that interconnect all theoreti­
cal terms. As I showed above, the interconnection is established by 
construction. The ‘probability of the neutral event’ is constructed 
out of the ‘preferences over outcomes’ and ’preferences over gam­
bles’. The ‘numerical difference between gambles’ is constructed 
out of the ‘probability of neutral events’ and the ‘preferences over 
gambles’, which in turn defines the ’probability of gambles’. ‘Prob­
ability of gambles’ in combination with the ‘preference over certain 
outcomes’ constructs the ’expected utility of gambles’, which in turn 
defines the extra-theoretical terms of ‘choices over certain outcomes’ 
and ’choices over gambles’. The theory now has come a full way 
around; because the ‘expected utility of gambles’ again defines an
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Figure 2.1: The basic architecture of Ramsey’s Theory
extra-theoretical term, the theoretical terms between it and ’pref­
erence over gambles’/ ’preferences over outcomes’ have to construct 
these terms in such a way that they can fit the data. For this reason 
the argument for the construction of each theoretical term was: ‘if 
this term was constructed differently (e.g. if the probability of the 
neutral event E  was not 0.5 in the case where the agent was indif­
ferent between (a; E ; b) and (6 ; E\a)) then the theory would make 
incoherent predictions’.
Ramsey’s theory is tested in two ways: (i) Existing evidence 
that was not directly involved in the theory’s construction -  is sub­
sumed under it, beliefs and utilities derived from it under obedience
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of the axioms governing these measures, (ii) From the measures, 
with increased generality, choice behaviour is predicted. If any pre­
diction does not fit with actual evidence, the theory is incoherent. In 
the synchronic case, the theory is thus shown to not fit the data and 
has to be reconstructed. In the diachronic case, where behavioural 
evidence from a later time is used, the question how to deal with 
the theory is more complex. This will be discussed in chapter 4.
If my account of the construction Ramsey’s theory is correct, 
then the theory does not have any claim to the realism of the mech­
anism it uses. Available data severely underdetermines the ttieo- 
retical structure; even from a good fit of the theory to the data we 
cannot hope to derive an argument for the reality of preferences and 
beliefs in human agents that would satisfy Ramsey’s axioms.
As it turns out, Ramsey’s theory -  or rather the further devel­
opments it has enjoyed by the hands of von Neumann/Morgenstern 
and Savage -  does not enjoy such a perfect fit even with the data 
available. A number of decision situations was developed for which 
these theories could not account; most prominently amongst them 
the Allais and the Ellsberg Paradoxes. 25 Two responses to the bad 
fit are of particular interest here. The one is to expand the the­
ory to include some of the extra-theoretical concepts in its domain. 
Broome responds this way to the Allais Paradox by suggesting that 
the theory should take into account the individuation of outcomes. 
While the original theory from Ramsey to Savage takes the choices 
over specified outcomes as extra-theoretically given, a refined the­
ory would determine the individuation as part of the utility maxi­
mization mechanism (Compare Broome 1991, 95-100). The second 
response is to change the mechanism of the theory itself, attempting 
to achieve a better fit. Many of these attempts exist; I will focus 
here on an alteration made in direct response to the Allais’s Paradox 
-  regret theory.
2.4.3 R egret T heory
Regret theory as an alternative to Bayesian Decision Theory was 
proposed independently by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden 
(1982). In the following I will discuss Loomes and Sugden’s ver­
sion.
25The paradoxes are well described in many textbooks, amongst them in Hargreaves Heap 
et al.(1992), so that I do not need to describe them here again.
Regret theory proposes an alternative motivation for actions. In­
stead of choosing actions according to their expected utility, regret 
theory claims that agents choose an action according to the experi­
ence of regret and rejoice expected from it.
Loomes and Sugden start by defining a choiceless utility function 
C(-) over all possible consequences. C(-) represents the agent’s eval­
uation of prospects she experiences without having chosen them. If 
an agent chooses between two actions, she evaluates the prospects 
she experiences as an effect of her action differently from C(-). Let 
the consequence of an action A l 5  given that the state j  of the world 
occurred, be x\ j .  Then the evaluation of action A \  does not only 
depend on x\j,  Loomes and Sugden claim, but also on x 2j , the conse­
quence of the alternative action A 2 . By having chosen A \ ,  the agent 
forgoes the outcome of A 2 if j  occurs; the possible relative loss, for 
which she is partly responsible herself, will influence her decision in 
addition to the absolute value of the outcomes attained. Each con­
sequence of an action A*, conditional on a state of the world j , where 
A i  is chosen over action A/., is therefore evaluated by a function M  
of the choiceless utility indices of the consequences of both actions, 
Xij and Xkj- m J- =  M[C(xij),C(xkj)\. The thus defined modified 
utility function m is proposed as a measure of action evaluation 
that takes regret and rejoicing in pairwise action comparisons into 
account. Loomes and Sugden then impose certain restrictions on 
M .26
In a decision situation between two actions and a partition of the 
world into states k , . . . ,  an action A i  is thus evaluated by its ex­
pected modified utility Ef =  Ylj=i Pjm i j ’ This evaluation is different 
from classical expected utility frameworks as long as ^  C (xij ) . 27 
One interesting consequence of this difference is that the expected 
modified utility index defined over actions does not necessarily rep­
resent a transitive preference order over these actions. Thus if the 
modified expected utility would define choices over gambles directly, 
the theory would be incoherent. Instead, Loomes and Sugden pro­
pose an additional theoretical term, weighted expected modified util-
26In particular, they assume that (i) if the evaluations of the consequences are identical, 
there is no regret and =  C ( x i j ) \  (ii) Increase in the evaluation of the foregone consequence 
increases regret and hence decreases modified utility: d m ^ / d C { x k j )  <  0; (iii) Modified utility 
rises with the evaluation of the obtained consequence: d m ^ / d C ( x i j )  > 0.
27Given the above-mentioned restrictions imposed on M , the difference between the two 
theories can be measured as the regret-rejoice function R  : m -  =  C ( x i j )  +  R [C (x i j )  — C(xkj)]-
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*ity which is the average of the modified expected utilities of in 
comparison to all other possible actions Ak G S. The maximization 
of this parameter allows an unambiguous choice between all actions 
in S. The architecture of regret theory is illustrated in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: The basic architecture of Regret Theory
What is striking in comparison of the architecture of 2.1 and 2.2 ^
is (i) that regret theory relies on a number of extra-theoretical data  \ 1 
whose availability is strongly disputed. Loomes and Sugden express \ (  UW''
their belief ‘thatltT s possible to introspect about utility, so defined, '
and that it is therefore meaningful to talk about utility being ex- </<
perienced in choiceless situations’ (Loomes and Sugden 1982, 807). d T
Additionally, they take the probability of states of the world as inde- 
pendently given. But (ii), it is remarkable that the interconnections  ^ bk?
4 |
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between the theoretical terms are weaker and less forked than in 
2.1. Naturally, this allows the theory to be fitted to more versatile 
data; but it identifies a pattern that is not as powerful as Ramsey’s, 
exactly because of its higher versatility.
I conclude from this that the development of cognitive theories 
of behaviour is evaluated by two standards. On the one hand, the 
constructed pattern should fit the available extra-theoretical data 
as well as possible; on the other hand, the more parsimonious it 
is, and the more the interconnections of the theoretical terms are 
branched, the more powerful the theory is, and the better it is able to 
explain and predict. Given the currently available (and justifiable) 
data, Ramsey’s theory might be too tight, while regret theory might 
have some slack. Which of them -  and the many other alternatives 
available -  will be adopted, is a question at least partially dependent 
on further empirical research.
All these theories, however, are within the category of a unified 
concept of motivation -  i.e. operate with only two mental proper­
ties, desires and beliefs. With the given data, there is no reason 
to get more complex than this -  the current evidence base already 
underdetermines the dual theories, and even more complex theories 
could not be matched up by it.
Two possible future developments could change this diagnosis: 
first, the data base could be expanded, for example through the de­
velopment of a better method of introspection than currently avail­
able. The discussion of Ericsson and Simon is instructive here, as 
well as Davidson’s program of a unified account of thought and ac­
tion. Second, arguments from other human faculties -  e.g. morality 
-  could lead to a notion of the autonomous will as their necessary 
condition. Nagel (1976) makes such a point, but I will not fol­
low this argument any further here. Instead I conclude that so far 
belief-desire theories, without having any rockdjottom arguments 
for them, seem the most parsimonious and yet versatile candidates 
to fit The data. The question now is therefore not whether to ex­
pand on the*mental properties, but which axiomatic framework is 
appropriate for the given ones.
2.4.4 H olism , Rationality, Intelligibility
A third response to the paradoxes mentioned above is to retreat to 
a position that proposes the normative validity of the theory, and to 
denounce any deviation from the theories predictions as irrational 
mistakes, that might occur locally, but are non-sustainable in the 
long run . 2 8  In a normative interpretation, the theory’s axioms are 
interpreted as principles of rationality.
These axioms have sometimes been called rationality require­
ments. But when employing such a grand title, a few caveats are in 
order. First, these axioms only represent an absolute minimal form 
of rationality. They only regulate the interaction between mental 
states; no judgment is passed as to the rationality of any mental 
state by itself.
No factual belief by itself, no matter how egregarious it 
seems to others, can be held to be irrational. It is only 
when beliefs [or other mental states] are inconsistent with 
other beliefs according to principles held by the agent him­
self . . . that there is a clear case of irrationality. Strictly 
speaking, then, the irrationality consists not in any par­
ticular belief but in inconsistency within a set of beliefs.
I think we must say much the same about . . . other 
propositional attitudes. (Davidson 1985, 348)
Further, the axioms only restrict the interaction of mental prop­
erties in a static framework. The mental states are only judged 
consistent or inconsistent in relation to those other mental states 
which are present in the agent at the same time. Questions of dy­
namic consistency, that relate present to future mental properties -  
for example Quine’s principle of conservation -  are not covered at all 
in this simple framework. (An extension to that effect is developed 
in chapter 4).
Within these confines, however, it has been claimed that the 
axioms of the theory are rationality principles. A proponent of this 
view is Donald Davidson. He reminds us that the theory (and hence 
its axioms) are constructed such as to achieve a ‘best fit’. It is 
supposed to subsume the observed actions under a true pattern -
i.e. a pattern that will manifest itself in future behaviour again. For
28I will neglect here the arguments that the paradoxes as well exhibit the problems of the 
normative validity of the theory.
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that to be the case, the ascribed theoretical terms must be largely in 
agreement with the observed evidence. Observing an agent’s choice, 
we ascribe those desires and beliefs to her that would have motivated 
a fully rational agent to choose this way. A critic might object 
that we don’t know whether this particular agent is rational at all, 
and that we hence beg the question in the ascription. Davidson’s 
response is that the diagnosis whether an agent is rational or not 
presupposes that we have ascribed mental properties already. This is 
only possible under the assumption of global rationality. Thus while i
it might be possible to identify local irrationality, the condition for I
such a possibility is the global rationality of the agent.
What justifies the procedure is the fact that disagreement 
and agreement alike are intelligible only against a back­
ground of massive agreement. (Davidson 1973, 137)
The mental properties exist only insofar as they are identified by
the theory in terms of their causal roles in the production of be­
haviour. The theory, in turn, only exists on the basis of axioms that 
impose restrictions on the theoretical terms. With different axioms, 
the whole theory and hence the mental predicates that it ascribes 
would be different. But against a completely different background of 
mental properties it is not possible to identify a particular response \ 
as a violation of rationality. Thus Davidson thinks that a unified j
formulation of the axioms variably called ‘global rationality’ or j
‘massive agreement’ -  is the necessary.,condition for the possibility 
ofjLScribmg~menT^
. . . it is a condition of having thoughts, judgments 
and intentions that the basic standards of rationality have 
application. The reason is this. Beliefs, intentions, and de­
sires are identified, first, by their causal relations to events 
and objects in the world, and, second, by their relations to 
one another. . . . these obvious logical relations amongst 
beliefs; amongst beliefs, desires and intentions; between 
beliefs and the world make beliefs the beliefs they are; 
therefore they cannot in general lose these relations and 
remain the same beliefs. Such relations are constitutive 
of the propositional attitudes. . . . Rationality . . .  is a 
condition of having thoughts at all. The question whether 
a creature “ subscribes” to the principle [s] is not an empir-
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ical question. For it is only by interpreting a creature as 
largely in accord with these principles that we can intel­
ligibly attribute propositional attitudes to it. (Davidson 
1985, 351-352)
In this view, global rationality is the condition for the assignment 
of mental properties, which in turn is the condition for the identifi­
cation of (local) irrationality. This way, rationality is the condition 
for the possibility of irrationality.
The methodological advice to interpret in a way that op­
timises agreement should not be conceived as resting on 
a charitable assumption about human intelligence that 
might turn out to be false. If we cannot find a way to 
interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a creature 
as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by 
our own standards, we have no reason to count that crea­
ture as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything. 
(Davidson 1973, 137)
This is in accord with the Ramsey-Lewis account of theories. The 
theory is to be constructed such that it fits the data best, and this 
involves the manipulation of the axioms in the appropriate way. As 
discussed in section 2.3.2, the application of the theory constitutes 
both its meaning and the knowledge we derive from it. This is what 
Davidson has in mind when he says that ‘the methodology of inter­
pretation is, in this respect, nothing but epistemology seen in the 
mirror of meaning’ (Davidson 1975, 169). But what Davidson seems 
to claim over and above the necessity to construct the axioms in 
suchT'a way that the theory fits the data -  is that this exercise of 
aSdom-manipulation and theory-fitting leads to a unique set of ax­
ioms.
This is where I disagree. I argued in the last subsection that 
there are different variants of the belief-desire theories that seem 
equally applicable to the presently available evidence. Whether the 
extended (outcome-individuating) utility-maximizing theory or the 
regret theory is correct, or maybe another variant like Machina’s 
utility theory without the independence axiom, is currently unde­
cided. Behaviour can be made intelligible under each of these theo­
ries, however. From a specific theoretical perspective, it is therefore 
necessary to stick with the axioms e.g. it is not intelligible to al­
0
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low global preference intransitivity in classical utility maximization 
-  but with the change of the theoretical perspective, the axioms also 
change. Davidson seems to admit this when he says:
. . .  we make sense of aberrations when they are seen 
against a background of rationality; but the background 
can be constituted in various ways to make various forms 
of battiness comprehensible. (352)
So if the background can be constituted in various ways, Davidson’s 
earlier claim that everybody does subscribe to the principles of de­
cision theory, because ‘if someone does go against those principles, 
he goes against his own principles’ is problematic. The axiom of any 
theory can only be seen as a rationality principle from-lhe_persp.ec- 
tive of that theory. ^ThFTfansItivity of preferences is a rationality 
requirement only for those preferences that are part of a utility- 
maximizing theory. For another theory, say the Regret account, 
transitivity of preferences (at least over actions) is not a rationality 
requirement: under such a regime, an agent’s choices are intelligible 
even if they are motivated by an intransitive preference ordering.
T he theory-dependence of the rationality principles supports the 
conclusion of section 2.3.1. There I argued that a cognitive theory 
of behaviour cannot be directly derived from folk psychology. In 
this section I have argued that the axioms of any theory can be 
seen as rationality principles only in so far as they are necessary for 
the intelligibility of an agent’s choices from the perspective of that 
particular theory. From a different or more global perspective, they 
might neitheFTe necessary for the intelligibility nor rational. To 
claim that any theory models the folk intuitive notion of rationality 
therefore implies that this theory is identical to folk theory -  a claim 
that so far has been difficult to prove. To claim that any theory 
models the global notion of rationality implies that the theory is 
true -  a claim even more difficult to prove at present.
2.5 C onclusion
I have argued on the one hand against the possibility of ascribing 
mental properties through introspection, and on the other hand I 
gave reasons for why the initial reaction of the psychological profes­
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sion, to discard mental properties altogether, leads to vicious circu­
larities in the theory of human behaviour.
Instead, I proposed that mental properties are ascribed through 
a theory, with the evidence exclusively based on behavioural obser­
vations. This required that the correctness of the theory and the 
appropriateness of the mental states had to be taken care of at the 
same time. I objected that common sense notions were of no help 
in determining the correctness of both; and I further disputed the 
claim that there are a priori reasons for any specific structure of the 
theory.
The approach that I advocated in its place was to take an ap­
propriately designed theory and employ it as a test hypothesis. The 
attempt should be to subsume all observed behaviour under a the­
ory as simple as possible: with as little theoretical terms as possible 
and as strong restrictions over them as possible. If we succeed in 
achieving a satisfactory fit, we have assigned meaning to thelheoret- 
ical terms and learned something about the agent. This structure, 
I believe, is structurally similar to any measurement procedure: A 
theoretical structure is developed, and then applied to a set of phe­
nomena. If the structure yields consistent results, then it is assigned 
a meaning (in relation to the phenomena) and it yields information 
about those phenomena.
A critic might respond that under the conditions specified here, 
the ascription of mental properties is epistemologically indetermi­
nate. There might well be more than one measurement procedure 
that satisfies the constrains, leaving us with different mental prop­
erty ascriptions for the same behavioural evidence. That is correct; 
but I do not see it as a problem. The mental properties are real in­
sofar as they account for an objectively present pattern of behaviour 
(compare Dennett 1991). This behaviour is ultimately determined 
by physiological or physical causes, as I argued in chapter 1. Beyond 
the account for this pattern, I am happy to concede that the mental 
properties only have an instrumental quality but a very useful one.
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C hapter 3
Preference Explanation on  
the Basis o f Causal 
Structure
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I discuss the minimal structure required for prefer­
ences to function in the explanation and prediction of behaviour.
As argued in the previous chapters, the explanation and predic­
tion of behaviour proceeds in three steps. First, mental properties, 
understood as behavioural dispositions, are ascribed to agents on 
the basis of observations of their behaviour. Secondly, a hypotheti­
cal mechanism assigns causal efficacy to some of these dispositions 
contingent on the presence of other dispositions and environmental 
conditions. The effects of the efficacious dispositions are aggregated 
to yield the prediction or explanation (retrodiction) of behaviour.
Preferences are a particular kind of these mental properties as­
cribed and employed in the course of explaining and predicting be­
haviour. They dispose the agent who holds them to behave in a 
particular way, given the right constellation of other mental states 
(chiefly beliefs and other preferences) and environmental conditions 
(availability of the options, feasibility of the behaviour). Because 
preferences are essentially assigned to explain, the conditions for 
the possibility of explanation of behaviour function as restrictions 
on the concept of preference. These restrictions are two: First, 
the ascription of a preference must be empirically justified. Second,
97
preferences must be sufficiently abstract to be employed in the ex- 
planation oT^Trua^iMs'fKa*t^r^different_from those_in whichJh  
wefe~asCnbedT   ~
To justify preference ascriptions empirically, one has to refer to 
the observed choices of the agent in question. This empirical basis 
includes linguistic behaviour, but it does not treat verbal reports as 
privileged introspective access. From choices, however, one can only 
infer preferences of the most specific states of the world. After hav­
ing determined that the behaviour in question was indeed a choice 
between various options, it must be assumed that the option was 
chosen in all its specificity over all other options available. For exam­
ple, when one observes someone wearing Wellington boots, one can 
ascribe a preference only by taking into account the full situation: 
the weather, the time of the day, his destination, the social sur­
rounding, etc. One cannot ascribe a preference for wearing Welling­
ton boots over sneakers, e.g., in general; but only a preference for 
wearing Wellington boots over sneakers, say, in wet weather, in the 
countryside, in a casual or work environment, when heading across 
the meadow. The preferences derived from behavioural evidence are 
therefore highly specific.
To be useful in explanation, ascribed preferences are applied in 
new combinations to different and possibly completely new situa­
tions. To take up the example from section 2.2.2, a pedestrian is 
mugged in the street. Even though she was never in a similar sit­
uation before, she remains calm, does not look at the mugger and 
hands over her wallet in a very cautious manner. We can explain 
her behaviour by pointing out her beliefs and preferences: she be­
lieved that muggers might harm her if she did not yield or if they 
felt threatened; and she preferred staying unharmed over retaining 
her material possessions.
We might have inferred her preference for physical integrity over 
material possessions from choices completely different from the given 
situation. Maybe we observed her spending a lot of money on health 
insurance in the past, or something similar. If, on the other hand, 
the wallet contained something different than money -  say the heir­
loom engagement ring of her late grandmother -  and we found her 
in the past to put family tradition over her personal health, we 
would have predicted that she would fight instead of handing over 
her wallet.
*The point of this example is that the ascription of mental prop­
erties only lends itself to an operational framework of explanation 
orjprediction of behaviour if the ascribed mental properties are suf­
ficiently versatile. If one only ascribes preferences over maximally 
specific states of the world -  as for example the preference to deliver 
the wallet to the muggers over a fight with them at Boerum Street, 
Brooklyn, on September 4th, 9.30 pm then preferences cannot 
account for anything but that particular event.
This presents a problem for the explanation and prediction of 
behaviour. If the outcomes over which preferences are defined are 
too specific, then our explanatory theory is empty. But as argued 
above, only the most specific preferences can be derived from an 
agent’s observable behaviour. Thus with preferences directly de­
rived from observed choices one cannot explain any situation that 
is not an exact repetition of those choices. Additionally, such an 
exercise wouldn’t really be an explanation. So how can we ascribe 
preferences in an empirically justified manner that are sufficiently 
versatile for explanatory and predictive purposes?
What is needed is a way to construct abstract preferences on 
the^basis of specific preferenceSj such that the empirical justification 
of the specific preferences is preserved in the derived abstract ones. 
The degree of abstraction of a preference is determined by its relata, 
which can be specified within a wide range. They can be the most 
specific states of the world (from here on simply: ‘worlds’); or they 
can, in the other extreme, be highly abstract properties. Over these 
two extreme types of outcomes, and all levels in between, prefer­
ence orderings can be defined. But all that is given so far are those 
preferences over worlds which can be derived from observed choice 
behaviour. This paper develops a principle of equivalence that con­
nects the world-preferences with the more abstract ones.
Two different conceptual approaches are offered here. Either, 
sufficient distinctions are made to achieve good explanatory and 
predictive results, ‘without making so many distinctions that no 
choice bears on any other’ (Pettit 1991, 211). Or, we individuate 
outcomes to the finest level and then look for a principle to tell us 
which differences ought not rationally to matter (compare Broome 
1991, 95-115).
Pettit argues that world preferences are not basic in decision
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making, and that instead we make decisions from values (abstract 
preferences) to ends (preferences over options we choose) . 1 From 
this argument about where we deliberate from, he argues against 
the methodological construction of abstract preferences from more 
specific ones.
For a disposition to choose to count as a preference, it 
must be a disposition to choose with a reason -  a dispo­
sition to choose on the basis of the properties displayed 
by the alternatives. . . . The equation of preferences 
with such brute [mere behavioural] dispositions is bound 
to seem inappropriate under the assumption of desidera- 
tive structure. And rightly so. After all, even if a person is 
disposed to choose one unconsidered prospect rather than 
another, he will be equally disposed, if possible, to con­
sider the properties before making his choice. (Pettit 1991,
209, my italics)
This may be an argument against a kind of Skinnerian Behaviourism, 
but not against the methodological identification of prospect prefer­
ences from behavioural data. What needs to be distinguished is 
a metaphysical from a methodological meaning of ‘basic’. While 
the atomism-holism debate remains undecided, it is methodologi­
cally non-controversial that the only empirical justification can be 
obtained from specific preferences. The principle of equivalence pre­
sented here therefore does not take a stance on the former debate, 
but is only constructed to clarify the role of preferences in the ex­
planation of behaviour.
In this paper, J  will start with preferences over outcomes indi­
viduated to the maximal cfegree and then provide a principle that 
allowsTo distill preferences of considerably higher abstraction from 
fhis~w6 rld-preference ordering. I will provide a principle that is 
based bn a rnodel of causal beliefs, and that I think is acceptable
1 P ettit’s claim is that property preferences determine  world-preferences. The ultimate 
determining preference is often called value (as does Pettit himself). Disagreement prevails 
between those who defend value atomism -  that value has its origin in a few very abstract 
aspects of the world (compare Harman 1967; Quinn 1974; Carlson 1997) -  and those who 
defend value holism -  that value has its origin in the most specific states of the world (com­
pare von Wright 1963, 29-34 and 1972; Rescher 1967; Trapp 1985; Hansson 1989 and 2001). 
Pettit claims that it is a folk psychological platitude that ‘choosing on the basis of the prop­
erties displayed by the alternatives’ captures ‘choosing for a reason’. As there is considerable 
disagreement amongst philosophers about this claim, I am cautious granting it folk status.
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&on the basis of very weak plausibility considerations. The final as- ^  J &
sessment of the model presented here, however, is not philosophical, I twA
but empirical. How exactly the partitions are made is a question ??
df precfictive success, not of rational appraisal. In this sense, this
paper can only conjecture a structure for empirical investigations,
whose utility needs to be proven in its application.
3.2 Prospect Preferences
To formally present this principle, I will make a number of assump­
tions. First, I assume that there exists a level of maximally specific 
states of the worlds, denoted w i , . . . ,  wn.2
Second, a weak preference pre-order (i.e. a binary relation over 
worlds that is reflexive and transitive) is defined over these worlds, 
based on the agent’s choices. For simplicity reasons, it will be as­
sumed that all choices are made over certain outcomes.3 Choices 
are made over certain, most specific outcomes -  over worlds. Pref­
erences over worlds are derived from these choices as follows: An 
agent (weakly) prefers Wi to Wj (wi > Wj) if she chooses Wi over 
the available Wj. She is said to be indifferent between Wi and Wj 
(wi & Wj) iff both Wi > Wj and Wj > Wi. She is said to (strictly) 
prefer Wi to Wj iff Wi > Wj and not Wi ~  Wj.A Obviously, it would 
be extremely unrealistic to assume preferences over worlds to be 
complete on the basis of such a definition. 5
2The specification of which can be dependent on an array of parameters. I will discuss the 
problem of ‘small worlds’ and choice of partitions in section 3.4.2.
3This in effect assumes th a t all choices are, in Savage’s terminology, constant acts (Compare 
Savage 1972, 25). I make no a ttem pt to justify this assumption, as I do not think th a t it can 
be empirically justified. However, as I will operate in a deterministic causal framework in 
the rest of this paper, I wanted to exclude all considerations of uncertainty for the sake of 
simplicity. To elaborate in a probabilistic framework what is discussed here deterministically 
will be the task of another paper.
4This account must not be identified with revealed preference theory known from neoclas­
sical economics. Revealed preference theory defines preferences as consistent choices over 
options under a  given budget. The revealed preference relation xV y  is defined as the result 
x of the choice function h selecting from the set of those options y affordable under a given 
price p and a given endowment m.
xV y o  3(p, m)(Plm)ec : x ^  ^(p, (Richter 1966, 637-638)
Instead of defining a preference, the behavioural evidence in the account presented here only 
indicates a preference. The most obvious difference to revealed preference theory is th a t 
the account here only employs a “<=’ instead of a  ‘<V. Besides choice evidence, d a ta  from 
hypothetical choices (i.e. the agent is confronted with counterfactual scenarios and reports 
which option she would ‘choose’) and verbal accounts are also taken into consideration.
5The determination of preferences through choices as propagated here leaves open the
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Third, I assume that worlds are fully analysable into conjunctions 
of certain prospects. A prospect can be the particular realization 
of a property, or a conjunction thereof, or the fact that a prop­
erty is realised at all. Trivially, worlds are prospects as well. A 
further restrictive assumption I make is that of determinism. Ulti­
mately, there is no uncertainty in any world, hence every world is 
fully analysable into certain prospects. Prospects are denoted p, q, r 
and for simplicity, I take worlds to be sets of the prospects into 
which they are analysable: for example p E W{.
Last, I assume a deterministic causal relation to be defined over 
certain prospects. This relation is irreflexive, asymmetric and acycli- 
cal, but again is not assumed to be complete. I will not discuss any 
empirical basis for this relation. It is interpreted as the beliefs an 
agent holds about the causal dependence of particular prospects. . ^|VWvA XVsAA
— v  o
The principle of equivalence I propose comes in the guise of a J w v - a *  
definition of the preference relation >: over prospects p, q , . . .  in terms 
of the preference relation > over worlds Wi, ic2, • • •• It employs a 
representation function f  that picks out pairs of worlds (wf, wq) for 
each pair of propositions (p, q): /  ^  u
J ^  -IK
D efin ition  1 p >z q wf > wq for all {wf, wq) E /((p , q)). v' v
Definition 1 is trivial if the propositions p and q are worlds them­
selves. Otherwise, the definition is not trivial. It now requires a 
specification of /  such that all the relevant worlds are picked out in 
such a way that through the preference defined between them they 
determine the preference between the two prospects.6 I will discuss 
the form of /  in two separate installments. In the first step, I will 
focus on the special case where prospect preferences are only defined 
over a prospect p and its negation -ip. In such a preference, mutu-
possibility that inconsistent preferences are ascribed on the basis of behavioural observation.
This problem will be discussed in section 4.2.1.
6It now becomes clear why the paper is restricted to certain prospects. This definition does 
not work if p or q are gambles over worlds. Take the following example: p and q are gambles 
such that
p: if dice rolls 6 you receive $100. 
q: if dice rolls 4 or 5 you receive $100.
According to the definition, one prefers q to p only if one both prefers world w ‘dice rolls 4 
and you receive $100’ to wp as well as world w  ^: ‘dice rolls 5 and you receive $100’ to wp. But 
of course it is natural to be indifferent between these worlds, even though it is very plausible 
to prefer q to p. I thank both Richard Bradley and an anonymous referee, who independently 
brought this to my attention.
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ally exclusive and conjointly exhaustive prospects are compared . 7  In 
the second step, I will discuss prospect preferences defined between 
mutually exclusive, but conjointly not exhaustive prospects . 8  This 
distinction is important, because the latter feature in preference or­
derings beyond the pairwise level, while the former don’t. Thus 
preferences over mutually exclusive, but conjointly not exhaustive 
prospects are subject to the transitivity property, and I will present 
an interesting result here.
3.2.1 Conjointly Exhaustive Prospects
In this subsection I will restrict myself to cases where definition 1  de­
fines preferences over prospects and their negations only; preferences 
of the sort p >z -ip. The way /  picks out worlds is of central im­
portance for the preference relation between prospects; definition 1  
says nothing about it. There are at least three different doctrines 
about how to specify / .
The absolute preference approach stipulates that all worlds which 
are logically compatible with a prospect have to be taken into ac­
count. That is, any world wp that contains a prospect p  has to 
be preferred to any other world w~ip that does not contain the 
prospect p. This very quickly leads to enormous numbers of world- 
comparisons necessary for the derivation of a prospect preference. 
For example, imagine worlds instantiated by only four prospects, 
p, q, r, s. Then there would be 23  =  8  different worlds that con­
tain p, and 8  that do not. In the absolute preference approach, all 
possible 8 2  =  64 comparisons between p-worlds and -«p-worlds have 
to show a preference for p  worlds, in order to derive the prospect 
preference p h  ~*P from it.
In such a universe, let p be the agent’s consumption of Marmite, 
q and r  prospects irrelevant at the moment, and s the case that 
the agent is allergic to Marmite. Now, whether q and r  are realised 
or not, as long as s isn’t, the agent prefers the world in which she 
consumes Marmite to the one where she doesn’t. But, quite un­
derstandably, she does prefer the world where she is allergic to the 
stuff and does not consume it to worlds where she does consume
7This is the case that comes closest to Pettit’s discussion of property desires.
8I will argue that the third case, preferences over mutually non-exclusive prospects, must 
be translated into preferences over mutually exclusive ones. A translation procedure will be 
discussed in section 4
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it and suffers the allergic consequences of her actions. Should her 
preference between those last two worlds determine her prospect 
preference over Marmite consumption? I don’t think so. The sce­
nario is counterfactual, she does not actually suffer from the allergy. 
This doesn’t mean that counterfactual scenarios do not have any in­
fluence on prospect preferences; I will show further down that they 
do. But in this case, the counterfactual scenario is causally inde­
pendent of the prospect in question; Marmite consumption does not 
cause Marmite allergy. The absolute account does not allow this 
abstraction and thus should be discarded.
The ceteris-paribus preference approach stipulates that only those 
worlds are taken into account which are as similar as possible to 
each other, while realizing and not realizing the prospect in question 
respectively. That is, any world wp that contains a prospect p  has 
to be preferred to that other world u;",p which is as similar to wp in 
as many aspects as possible . 9
For illustration, let’s imagine that the four aspects of our four- 
aspect worlds are logically independent. Then, clearly, there is ex­
actly one u;p-world that is most similar to one uTp-world: namely 
that world that shares with wp the realization or non-realization of 
all aspects but p. According to the ceteris-paribus approach, then, 
there are only eight comparisons between the four-aspect-worlds nec­
essary to establish prospect preferences. This can be illustrated in 
figure 3.1, where the numerals in the columns signify the realization 
or non-realization of an aspect in the respective world.
Figure 3.1 shows the sufficient conditions for p h  ~*P according to 
the ceteris-paribus approach. Each world in which p  is realised is 
compared with the world in which p  is not realised, but which is
9This approach was to my knowledge first discussed by von Wright 1972, 146. It is also 
defended in Hansson 2001, 67-94.
Wi P Q r s w fp p q
(1) 1 0 0 0 > (1) 0 0
(2) 1 1 0 0 >  (2) 0 1
0  0  
0  0
r s
(8) 1 1 1 1 >  (8) 0 1 1 1  
Figure 3.1: Ceteris paribus comparisons
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otherwise as similar as logically possible. If all aspects are logically 
independent -  that is, no aspect is implied by any other aspect nor 
implies any other aspect -  then the two worlds compared differ only 
in the realization of p. We are free to choose how to partition the 
worlds into aspects, and it is not conducive for the purpose of deriv­
ing more abstract prospect preferences to partition the aspects such 
that they are logically dependent. Thus the situation will always 
look like that illustrated in figure 3.1.
There are two fundamental problems with the ceteris paribus ac­
count. First, it rests on a concept of logical possibility, which is too 
wide for the purpose at hand. Second, it disregards the world the 
agent is in when making the comparison. The following example 
will illustrate both of these shortcomings in turn.
Diogenes Laertius, the ancient chatterbox, tells of an incident 
where Alexander the Great puts Diogenes of Sinope to the touch. 
‘Ask of me any boon you like’ the Macedonian is reported to have 
offered; to which the reply came: ‘stand out of my light’ . 1 0  The 
anecdote is quite popular, and rightly so. At first sight, Diogenes 
seems to act contrary to a knee-jerk reaction of most of us. You are 
offered wealth or power for free -  then take it! In this version of the 
story, Alexander embodies the ancient idea of Kairos, Machiavelli’s 
Fortuna or, if you will, one of the brothers Grimm’s good fairies. 
When Diogenes declines the seemingly irresistible offer, he must 
have good reasons for it.
As revealed in his choice, Diogenes prefers a world wu undis­
turbed by any patron, however powerful, to a world w° which pro­
mises all the wealth and influence Alexander has to offer. If we 
now think that the two worlds differed in only one relevant aspect, 
wealth, we could derive Diogenes preference for poverty over wealth. 
But even though we don’t know much about them, we can suspect 
that Diogenes’ other choices could not have been subsumed under 
such a simple prospect preference. Even that most hardened de- 
spiser of material wealth, we suspect, must see that wealth and 
power are desirable for him too: he wouldn’t have to go panhan­
dling anymore, he could have bought his freedom from Xeniades, 
his owner, or he could have convinced the elders of Sinope to re­
10Diogenes Laertius VI, 38. I use the source as an inspiration, and hasten to add that the 
following is not meant as a textual analysis.
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move the ban and let him return to his homeland. So if Alexander 
-  who’s immediate reaction is not reported -  had asked, in slight 
astonishment: ‘but don’t you want to be rich?’, Diogenes answer, 
if for once straightforward, would have been complex. ‘On the one 
hand’, he would have retorted, ‘there is a sense in which I want to 
be rich. But on the other hand look at the world I live in: if I took 
a significant boon from you, I would be obliged to show my grat­
itude. Further, my lifestyle would be considered implausible; and 
people would envy me for my easily achieved wealth. Under these 
conditions, I do not want to be rich.’
With this extra bit of information, we may try to apply the 
ceteris-paribus framework for an analysis of Diogenes’ preferences. 
According to the account that I put into his mouth, Diogenes iden­
tifies four aspects of w u and w° to be relevant: wealth (r), indepen­
dence from donors (i), personal credibility (c) and envy of others 
(e). But clearly, all these aspects are logically independent. Thus 
the specification of /  in figure 3.1 applies. According to it, Dio­
genes compares w* =  {->r, —i®, —«c, ->e} with w° =  {r, —«z, —ic, —*e}, 
u>2 =  { - t ,  i, ~>c, ->e} with w£ — {r,i,-ic,->e}, etc. Whatever his 
preferences between those worlds are, and whatever the resulting 
prospect preferences are, this specification of /  does not capture his 
story at all if it goes: ‘on the one hand, I want to be rich. But 
on the other hand look at the world I live in. . . ’. There, he 
compares w f =  { -r ,  i, c, -ie} with w° =  {r, —iz, —»c, e}. According to 
the ceteris-paribus approach and the assumed logical independence 
of the aspects, such a comparisons is not admissible, because the 
worlds are too far apart. So does Diogenes tell us an incoherent 
story, or is the ceteris-paribus approach wrong?
I propose that it is the ceteris-paribus approach that is flawed. 
Diogenes does not employ logical but causal possibility when assess­
ing the independence of the worlds’ aspects. He envisages a partic­
ular way in which he can achieve wealth: through his submission 
under a donor. As he tells us, he believes in the causal dependence 
of the other relevant aspects on this genesis of wealth. His wealth 
would cause the envy of others; his submission under a donor would 
cause the loss of his independence, which in turn would cause the 
loss of his credibility. Given the causal dependence Diogenes be­
lieves in, worlds which are most similar to wu but for the realization
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of wealth are not the ones the ceteris-paribus account suggests. It is 
causally impossible for Diogenes to be wealthy without being envied; 
it is equally impossible for him to be wealthy through the benefits 
of a donor without becoming dependent on him and hence losing his 
credibility. Even though these worlds are logically possible, I have 
argued that what matters for a principle of equivalence is causal pos­
sibility. Logical possibility only forbids what is inconsistent, while 
causal possibility allows only what can be produced. The agent takes 
only those worlds as possible given p which are producible according 
to her causal beliefs. This epistemic notion of causality will restrict 
the selection function in the following way:
R estriction  1  f  picks out only those worlds which are causally 
compatible with p and ~>p, respectively.
But this restriction alone is not sufficient for the right choice of / .  
The causal structure an agent believes in restricts the worlds she 
will deem possible; but she will not compare all possible worlds, as 
some of them are too far removed from her actual situation. Thus, 
facts believed to be actual play a role too.
To stay with the above example, Diogenes might reasonably be­
lieve that secretly inheriting from a distant relative causes one to 
be wealthy without any strings attached. Thus, such a causal story 
would allow him to introduce into definition 1 the world w° where he 
is wealthy, independent, credible and not envied by anybody due to 
the secrecy of the inheritance. So it might seem that because of the 
possibility that this belief opens, Diogenes does not prefer poverty 
over wealth simpliciter. It seems he only prefers it conditional on 
other aspects, in this case the absence of any living bequeather.
This appearance is wrong. Diogenes does not have any wealthy 
relatives from whom to inherit (or at least, we, as the interpreters 
of his behaviour, do not know of any). To define his prospect pref­
erences, we not only take into account the causally possible worlds 
that realise the relevant prospects; we only take into account the 
aciwnrcausal~p6 ssibilities, which can be realised, conditional upon 
the world the agent is in.
The above preference expression should therefore be interpreted 
as taking the relevant causal background conditions to be the same 
as in the actual world. Of course, not all background conditions can 
be the same: otherwise no counterfactual world could be constructed
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adhering to the causal structure. For Diogenes to imagine a world 
in which he is wealthy -  seen from his actual predicament of poverty 
a counterfactual change is necessary. But changing the facts does 
not mean changing the causal dependency structure. The change of 
facts, under stable causal dependencies, will require certain causally 
prior prospects to change as well: somehow, his wealth has to be 
caused in this possible world. But there are facts in the actual world 
which offer themselves as ready causes: there are donors offering 
their support, but there aren’t any wealthy distant relatives ready 
to bequeath Diogenes. Those facts that do not have to be changed 
in order to accommodate the counterfactual either because there 
is no causal link to them at all or because there are other causes 
closer to the actual situation -  remain as they are in the actual 
world. Hence,
R estriction  2 f  picks out only those worlds which realise p and q 
but maximally comply with those background conditions pertaining 
to the actual world.
Under the two restrictions on /  for which I argued here, we can 
indeed say that Diogenes preferred poverty to wealth simpliciter. 
What definition 1 in combination with the now specified /  does, 
is to identify the necessary preferences over worlds in order to de­
termine a prospect preference. This prospect preference so far 
discussed only in the context of mutually exclusive and conjointly 
exhaustive prospects then represents a highly abstracted disposi­
tion to choose, given that an option promises the realization of that 
prospect. In this sense, definition 1 is a principle of equivalence.
3.2.2 C onjointly N on-E xhaustive P rospects
Prospect preferences are not only used in the sense that one prefers 
the realization over the non-realization of a prospect, as Diogenes 
prefers poverty over wealth, according to the scheme p y  ->p. Pref­
erences also occur in contexts where the two relata do not exhaust 
the possibilities. For example, over breakfast I prefer reading an 
English paper to a German one; and I prefer a German to a Russian 
newspaper. These three types of newspapers certainly do not ex­
haust the possibilities of breakfast reading, nor do they exhaust my 
ordering of breakfast readings. However, it is perfectly intelligible to 
hold preferences between conjointly non-exhaustive prospects; the
*problem is only that such preferences cannot be represented as cases 
of the scheme p y  -*p.
Conjointly non-exhaustive relata occurring in preference types 
p y  q are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, one can 
meaningfully hold a preference like ‘I prefer an apartment in New 
York to a house in Tuscany’, even though it is clearly possible to 
own an apartment in New York and a house in Tuscany at the same 
time . 11 However, to express a preference p y  q without meaning to 
express a preference for p A ->q over q A-*p violates Grice’s Coopera­
tive Principle (Grice 1989). In particular, if uttered in a situation of 
choice between either p or q, the conversational contribution made 
does not satisfy the pragmatic convention of relevance: preferences 
over relata involving p A q do not help making such a choice. If 
uttered in a situation where information about the speaker’s eval­
uations is sought, it does not satisfy the pragmatic convention of 
informativeness: p A q > z q A p i s  tautological and thus empirically 
empty. By conversational implicature, then, a preference between 
mutually non-exclusive relata is interpreted as a preference between 
the corresponding mutually exclusive relata . 12 This conventional 
translation procedure has to be amended for cases where at least 
one relatum logically implies the other or causally requires the pres­
ence of the other. Thus p y  q is translated to p A ->q >z q A -»p only 
if it is possible that p A ->q and q A -■ p. In cases where it is not, 
the original relatum rematas'untranslated (compare Hansson 2001, 
68-70). Thus restriction 1 needs to be reformulated for conjointly 
non-exhaustive prospects in the following way.
R estriction  3 f  picks out only those worlds which are causally 
compatible with p A ->q and q A ->p, respectively. 1 3
Concerning the actual causal background, the same restriction holds 
as for the conjointly exhaustive case. An example is given by Trapp 
(1985) for preferences over different diseases (of which the compari­
son between two of them is obviously not conjointly exhaustive). A 
man who prefers contracting cholera to being ill with cancer should
11 Trapp claimed th a t ‘no two relata of a preference relation should be considered to be true 
in the same possible world’, at least in those worlds th a t are chosen by the selection function 
(Trapp 1985, 301). For a rejection of this view, see Hansson 1989, 6.
12 Such an translation, albeit without the conversational implicature justification, was first 
presented by Hallden (1957, 28).
13Or, if one of the relata is not causally compatible with any world, /  picks out worlds 
which are compatible with the untranslated relatum.
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not be interpreted as preferring a situation where there is no cure for 
cholera (say for example he would be in a country where there are 
no antibiotics available). The existence of a cure has significance 
consequences if one has either cholera or cancer, and hence natu­
rally plays a crucial role in the evaluation of both situations. Thus 
the agent prefers cholera to cancer iff he prefers a world where he 
has cholera and all the contemporary cures are available to a world 
where he has cancer and all the contemporary cures are available. 
The restriction is thus reformulated as follows.
R estriction  4 f  picks out only those worlds which realise p A ->q 
and q A ->p but maximally comply with those background conditions 
pertaining to the actual world.
A particularly interesting feature of preferences over conjointly non- 
exhaustive prospects is that the pairwise comparisons can give rise 
to a preference ordering but they don’t have to. Under particular 
conditions, the preference pairs p >z q and q >z r imply the additional 
preference pair p >z r. This transitivity property of preferences 
need not be fulfilled by prospect preferences, even though it is (by 
assumption) satisfied by the preferences over worlds underlying it. 
All that needs to be established is that the world wpA"q -  compared 
in p >z q with the world wqA^ p and the world wrA^q compared 
in q >z r with the world wqA~'r are not the same as the worlds 
wpA~'r and wrA^ p compared in p >z r. Thus, if wpA^ q > wqA^ p and 
wqA"r > wrA"q but wpA^ q 7  ^ wpA~'r and wrA^ q ^  wrA^ p, it does not 
follow that wpA^ q > wrA^ q\ and hence it does not necessarily follow 
from p >z q and q > zr  that p>z r.
3.2.3 A ctions
An action is a particular kind of prospect. It has been attempted 
to characterise it metaphysically as a species of events ‘that can be 
described under an aspect that makes it intentional’ (Davidson 1971, 
46). What the correct account of agency is will not be discussed 
here; it suffices for the present purpose that there is some criterion 
of distinction.
The relevant point to note in this context is that agents evaluate 
their own actions, and sometimes those of others, in a different way 
from evaluating other prospects. While the evaluation of a prospect
*
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takes into account all causal antecedents of that prospect, the eval- 
uation of an action only takes into account the action itself and all 
its consequences, while disregarding any causal history that led to 
the action. ~
Take Diogenes’ example again. The only way for him to achieve 
wealth would have been to submit under a donor, which in turn 
would have had consequences for his independence and credibility. 
All in all, he preferred a world without those consequences to a world 
with them; thus he preferred poverty to wealth. But if he took those 
indirect consequences of wealth and poverty into account, shouldn’t 
he cast the net even wider? Let us imagine that Diogenes’ choice 
to reject a donor would be caused by his contempt for authority. If 
Diogenes had this character trait, he would have so mortified and 
frustrated his father as an adolescent that (unbeknownst to him) his 
begetter subsequently would have turned into an unbearable tyrant, 
spelling doom over Diogenes’ mother and siblings after Diogenes had 
left the Ionic coast.
Now, if these causal dependencies did indeed exist, would it make 
Diogenes change his preferences between being rich and being poor? 
Some claim it would:
. . .  to the extent that acts can realistically be identified 
with propositions, the present notion of preference is active 
as well as passive: it relates to acts as well as to news 
items. . . . From this viewpoint, the notion of preference 
is neutral, regarding the active passive distinction. If the 
agent is deliberating about performing act A  or act B , and 
if AB  is impossible, there is no effective difference between 
asking whether he prefers A  to B  as a news item or as an 
act, for he makes the news. (Jeffrey 1983, 84)
On Jeffrey’s account, Diogenes takes his rejection of a donor as the 
news for his character trait and its consequences just as he takes 
the observation that he is wealthy as the news that he accepted the 
donor’s offer. Presumably, what Jeffrey means by ‘he makes the 
news’ is that there is no further causal history to an action that 
carries news characteristics. But the above example shows that this 
assumption is not generally true. If Diogenes took his action as a 
news item, then his choice to reject the donor would tell him about 
his contempt for authority, his father’s frustration and the plight of
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his family. If he then found that world worse than a world where he 
himself became wealthy, dependent and incredible, he would indeed 
prefer being wealthy over being poor . 1 4
I think this model of evaluation is flawed. Diogenes -  nor any 
other responsible actor -  takes into account the causes of their ac­
tions and the effects of these causes when evaluating their actions. 
An agent who evaluates a non-action state of the world takes a pas­
sive outlook: he takes into account what consequences this state has, 
and how this state came about, with the other consequences which 
that cause witnessed. An agent who performs an action exhibits 
an active outlook: she chooses between various options according to 
tHe~BMefit~pf^heirConsequences; but she takes the world as_it is, 
disregarding~lmyAnflueff^ might have caused her action.
Statements that describe acts are different in kind from 
other sortETCPpfbpd^ because the actor has
thq pQweFTb^ake~lhem"true. With this power comes 
a kind ofTisponsibility. An agent must, if rational, do 
what she can to change things for the better. . . .  ra­
tional decision makers should choose actions on the basis 
of their efficacy in bringing about desirable results rather 
than their auspiciousness as harbingers of these results. 
Efficacy and auspiciousness often go together, of course, 
since most actions get to be good or bad news only by 
causally promoting good or bad things. In cases where 
causing and indicating come apart, however, the causal 
decision theorist maintains that it is the causal proper­
ties of the act, rather than its pure evidential features, 
that should serve as the guide to rational conduct. (Joyce 
1999, 150)
Thus Diogenes would disregard the causes of his choices and their re­
spective effects when evaluating the prospects of wealth and poverty, 
respectively. Acts must be considered exogenous. Instead, he would 
fill in those parameters with what he actually believes happened, 
irrespective of what option he chooses. The principle of equivalence 
is therefore amended for the case of actions.
R estr iction  5 If p is an action, f  picks out all those worlds that
14This situation is in many ways similar to the so called N ew com b’s Problems  in probabilistic 
models of decision making.
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are causally compatible with pA~>q and its consequences only, while 
disregarding any causal history of p A ->q.
The disagreement between the two positions sketched remains, how­
ever, in so far as prospects often cannot clearly be identified as ac­
tions or non-actions. Thus the allies of Jeffrey might be right in 
insisting that some apparent actions are evaluated as news items. 
This does not touch on the basis of the argument, and is of no 
further relevance here. With these amendments added to the speci­
fication of / ,  definition 1  is a principle of equivalence for all prospect 
preferences.
3.3 C onstructing the Selection Function
The concepts of causal compatibility, m axim a^ compliance with 
the actual world and causal history so far have been given only 
intuitive meaning. This section seeks to specify their meaning more 
formally, by reference to a formal concept of causal models.
A causal model is defined by Pearl (2000, 203) as a triple
M  =  (U, V, G)
where:
1 . U is a set of background variables, determined by factors outside 
the model.
2 . V  is a set of endogenous variables, determined by variables of 
the model -  that is, variables in U U V.
3. G is a set of functions {<7 i, £2 , • • •, <7n) such that each gi is a 
mapping from U U (V \V i )  to V* and such that the entire set G 
forms a mapping from U to V. In other words, each tells us 
the value of V* given the values of all other variables in U U V, 
and the entire set G has a unique solution V{u). Symbolically, 
the set of equations G can be represented by writing
Vi 9 i(Vj, Ui), i 1 , . . . ,  n
Ui C U stands for the unique minimal set of variables in U 
sufficient to determine Vi on the basis of G.
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The variables in Pearl’s model are random variables. I take the 
individual realization of a random variable to be equivalent to a 
prospect, e.g. p =  (Vi — v}). Given a particular constellation of 
background variables u* =  {U\ =  u \ , . . . ,  Un =  i^ } , the model has 
the unique solution V(u*). Prospects can be directly deduced from 
this solution: V(u*) h p , where h is the classical inference relation.
M  can be represented as an acyclical directed graph, with the 
arrows representing the function g. Forked arrows show that g 
has more than one argument. Figure 3.2 is an example of such 
a representation of M* =  (U*,V*,G*), with all variables in U* =  
{ U i , . . . ,  C/4 } and V* =  {Vi , . . . ,  V4 } having only two realisations 
each, and G* — {Vi =  pi(i t i ) , . . . ,  V4 =  <7 4 (^2 , w4)}. Each realiza­
tion is then equivalent to a proposition or its negation. Let the 
first realization of a background variable be expressed by a, b, c..., 
i.e. a =  (Ui =  itj), etc.; the realization of a endogenous variable 
by p, q, r , . . . ,  i.e. p =  (Vi =  t>J), etc.; and the respective second 
realization by a negation of that proposition: -*p =  (Vi =  vf), etc.
U2 = V\
Figure 3.2: An example of a causal graph
Each world w specifies the values for all Ui and for all Vi of every M. 
Because the functional relationships ^  of M  restricts the endogenous 
V ’s given the exogenous C/’s, not all worlds are consistent with a 
specific causal model.
D efin ition  2  A world w is consistent with a causal model M  =
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(U, V, G ) iff there is a set of realisations u* =  {U\ =  u\ , . . .  ,Ui =  
U}} for which w\~ u* and w\~V(u*).
For example, the world w\ = {a, —ife, c, -id, p, q, r, -is} is consistent 
with the model M  represented in figure 3.2, while the world W2 = 
{-•a, b, -1  c, d,p, q, r, s} is not. Having specified the relations between 
prospects and worlds on the one hand and the causal model and its 
variables on the other, we can now define causal compatibility:
D efinition 3 w is causally compatible with p with respect to M  iff 
there is a causal model M  =  (U, V, G) such that w is consistent with 
M , and w b p.
For example, the world w\ = {a,-ib ,c ,-'d ,p ,q ,r,->s}  is compatible 
with p with respect to M. Worlds which are causally compatible 
with p represent the possible causal histories of p. In such a world 
there is at least one ‘chain’ that leads from background conditions 
to p in the following way.
D efinition 4 A prospect p is dependent with respect to the back­
ground conditions in U* C U iff there is a functional chain: V\ =  
9\ (u*),V2 =  92(u*),... ,Vn
=  gn{Vi, ■ • •, Vn-i,u*) with g\ , . . . ,  gn G G and p being equivalent to
Vn =  9n{Vl } - . . , V n- i , U* ) .
According to M  represented in figure 3.2, for example, q is depen­
dent on a and (6, c), while r  is dependent on a, (6, c) and d.
Now if a prospect p is not realised in the actual world tu®, all it 
takes for p to be realised is that one background condition on which 
p is dependent is realised. Of course p is realised as well in worlds 
where more than one background condition on which p is dependent 
is realised, but in those cases the ensuing worlds are not as similar 
as possible to the actual world.
D efinition 5 A world w* is maximally similar to the actual world 
'Iff for w* out of the set of all worlds: max{${w* P| w®)).
# here signifies the cardinality of the intersection of the respective 
world with the actual world. By maximizing the cardinality of this 
set, those worlds are chosen which have the highest overlap with the 
actual world.
Restrictions 1 and 2 (or 3 and 4, respectively) are satisfied if 
/  selects worlds wp and ic9, which are compatible with p and q
/vs, <A ?
lr *
with respect to M, respectively, such that both wp and w q are most 
similar to w® by the above similarity measure. With the concepts 
discussed in this section, we can therefore specify definition 1 :
D efinition 1* p >z q w? >  w*- for all (w?, w?) which are com­
patible with p A ->q and q A ->p with respect to M , respectively, such 
that both wf  and wj are most similar to w®.
Definition 1* yields a preference relation y  over propositions with 
the following properties.
Theorem  1 If the causal model is non-cyclical, y  is reflexive.
Proof For each world Wi compatible with p, there is a realization of 
the background variables Ui such that the proposition equivalent to 
V(ui) \JUi contains Wi. u can be distinguished into the independent 
and the dependent background conditions, u*. If there is only one 
set u* for p, the proof is trivial, because there is only one world 
that is compatible with p. If there is more than one u*, then the 
similarity relation ensures that only identical u*’s are paired. Hence,
fo r  all(wu Wj) e  /((p ,p )) : wt =  Wj.
Given that >  is reflexive, the relation y  defined thus is equally 
reflexive. □
Theorem  2 If for all prospects p , q , r . . all causally possible con­
junctions p A -ig, p A - r  are dependent on the same background vari­
able up* (and similarly for q A —«p, r  A -iq , . . .), then a prospect pref­
erence ordering over p , q , r . . .  is transitive.
Proof Without loss of generality, we take the case where p >z q and 
q y  r. If all p A ~'q,p A ->r are causally possible, then there are 
causally compatible worlds wpA^ q h p A- > g  and wpA^ r h p A  ->r. If 
for all p ,q ,r ,  p A~*q and p A ~>r are dependent on the same variable 
u*, then there is at least one world wp =  wpA^ q =  wpA^ r which is 
causally compatible with both p A ->q and p A t .  If p A ~>q and 
p A ->r depend only on u*, then wp =  wpA^ q =  wpA^ r is the world 
causally compatible with p A -iq and p A - r  which by definition 
5 is most similar to w® (for the same reasons, mutatis mutandis, 
wq =  w qA^ p =  wqA^ r is the world causally compatible with q A ->p 
and qA-ir  which is most similar to w @). By definition 1*, and p y  q
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and q >z r, wpA^ q > w qA^ p and wqA^ r > wrA^ q. By the argument 
above, u; p A _ ’9  =  wpA~"r and wqA^ p =  wqA^ r, hence wpA^ r >  wqA^ r and 
wqA~"r >  u;rA_np, and thus by transitivity of >  wpA~"r >  wrA~'p. Then 
by definition 1 *, p y  r .d 1 5
It is further noteworthy that y  is not complete, even if >  is. 
This can easily be seen by the following counterexample. Take a 
pair (p,q) such that (w l,w \)  G f((p,q)) and (wp2 ,w q2) e f{(p,q)) 
such that w \ > w \  and w2 > w2. Then y  is not defined over (p , q).
These results are quite weak, but they represent genuine proper­
ties of pairwise preferences. The antecedent of theorem 2 is of course 
often not fulfilled, which explains the manifold existence of intran­
sitive preference comparisons. That preferences are not complete 
over the set of all propositions, should not be surprising at all.
The formal apparatus developed in this section can now be ap­
plied to the case of Diogenes’ discussed in section 3.2.1. Diogenes 
lives in world where he is without donor, and therefore poor and 
not envied, but independent and credible in his ideology: w® =  
{-is, ->r, —»e, i, c}. The causal model M  that Diogenes believes in is 
represented in figure 3.3.
submission under donor (s)
/  \
wealth(r) dependence(-ii)
rejection of donor (->s)
poverty(-ir) independence(i)
envied (e) no credibility (-ic) no envy (~>e) credibility (c)
Figure 3.3: Diogenes’ causal beliefs
The actual world is thus causally compatible with the prospect 
of poverty ( -r )  with respect to M, and it is obviously maximally
15The reverse claim does not hold: one cannot infer from the transitivity of a preference 
relation over p , q , r , . . .  that all their causally possible conjunctions pA->q,pA->r  are dependent 
on the same background variable u p*. For example, the evaluation of tnpA-,<J and w pA~'r might 
coincide without the two worlds being identical.
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similar to itself. The world w° = {s, r, e, -ii, -ic} on the other hand, 
is compatible with the prospect of wealth (r) with respect to M. 
Because wealth is dependent on only one background variable in 
model M, there is no other world compatible with the prospect of 
wealth with respect to M. Thus even though (l(rcoP)ic@) =  0, w° 
is picked by / .  By definition 1*, ->r >z r iff w® > w°. Diogenes’ 
behaviour in front of Alexander, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, 
does reveal his preference for w@ over w°\ and hence -  through his 
causal beliefs his preference for poverty over wealth.
But what if the causal model gets extended to include causes of 
Diogenes choice between accepting and rejecting the donor? The 
background intuitions of such an extended model were discussed in 
section 3.2.3. In figure 3.4, the corresponding causal model M ' is 
represented.
If definition 1* operated with M ' instead of M , the conclusions
prefer poverty over wealth if and only if he preferred the world 
w° = {->aa, ->/, —»p, s, r, e, —iz, ->c} over the world waa =  {aa, / ,  p, ->s, 
—ir*, -ie, i, c}; which is a completely different condition from prefer­
ring w° to the actual world.
However, restriction 5 tells us to neglect all causal antecedents of
contempt for authority (aa)
r
paternal 
frustration(/) /
/
/
/
rejection of donor (-is)
poverty(-r) independence(i)
family 
plight (p) /
/
/ no envy (-ie) credibility (c)
Figure 3.4: Truncating the causes of Diogenes’ action
of the above example would no longer be valid. Diogenes would
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a prospect if that prospect is an action. When evaluating non-action 
prospects, we assumed the truth of a prospect counterfactuaily and 
mvesttgatedTiow the causal dependencies and effects of that_c.Qlin- 
terfactuaI~lissurhDHon"wonld determine the worlds compatible with 
tli^prospectTWVh'en'evaluating an action, we assume the truth of 
thaf~acTion-prospect not counterfactuaily, but as an intervention. 
An Tnterventicm',"m”contrast t 6 "a^counterf^tuaI" assumption? does 
not l^ve a retrospectiveTnhuence on the past . 1 6  An intervention is 
represented as a ifuncddw’noft^ie  causal graph: all direct ancestors 
of the model are removed from a causal model M, the model thus 
transformed into a truncated model M T.
D efin ition  6  A causal model M  is transformed into a truncated 
causal model M T =  (U, V, GT) by eliminating all gi G G which have 
an action prospect in their range.
The thick dotted line in figure 3.4 shows such a truncation. The 
function that connects aa with -is is eliminated, thus cutting the 
causal connection between aa and -<s in M T. By including M T 
instead of M  into definition 1*, restriction 5 is always satisfied.
D efin ition  1** p h  q w? >  w? for all (w^w^) which are 
compatible with p A ->q and q A ~>p with respect to M T, respectively, 
such that both wf and w? are most similar to w®.
In cases where M  does not include any action prospects, definition 
1** is of course identical with definition 1*. In all other cases, 
definition 1 ** still satisfies theorems 1  and 2 , as they were proven 
for all causal models, including truncated ones.
Thus, despite Diogenes’ belief in the extended causal model M', 
definition 1 ** secures that his preference for poverty over wealth is 
still derived on the basis of the truncated model M T, which in this 
case coincides with the original model M.
3.4 C onclusion & Rem arks
I have offered a principle of equivalence between an agent’s prefer­
ences over prospects and her preferences over worlds. More specifi­
cally, I represented the agent’s beliefs as a causal model, and argued
16For a more extensive discussion of intervention, see Pearl 2000, 85-89, Spohn 2002, 23-27.
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with the help of this model which of the agent’s preferences over 
worlds serve as definiens for her preferences over propositions.
I have argued why such a principle of equivalence is necessary 
for the explanation and prediction of behaviour with preferences; 
however, the model presented here leaves open many important 
questions. I will finish with three remarks on how to develop the 
discussion further.
3.4.1 Possibility  or Probability
The criterion of the causal possibility of a world might be too rough 
a distinction to be viable. Instead, it has been suggested that 
prospects should be evaluated according to a weighted average of 
value of those worlds in which they are realised. The weighing can 
be determined as a probability index which measures the likelihood 
of a world occurring given the actual world. Ideally, such a measure 
combines the criteria of causal possibility and actuality.
A first step was made in Rescher (1967). He constructed a rank­
ing over worlds by assigning to them a numerical index of m erit  
From this ranking he derived an index over states: The index num­
ber of a state ft (a) is the arithmetic mean over the index numbers 
of all possible worlds in which a is true. These index numbers over 
states give rise to a semantic definition of preferences over states: a 
is preferred to b iff jf (a) >  #(&).
Trapp (1985) picked up Rescher’s idea; but unlike him, Trapp 
suggested a probabilistic weighing of the index of possible worlds. 
Such a weighing can be interpreted as a continuous similarity met­
ric: An agent assigns higher probability to those worlds that he 
thinks are closer to actuality. A very similar account was given by 
Jeffrey, who derived the desirability index over propositions from 
the desirability index over worlds:
. . . the desirabilities of a proposition is a weighted aver­
age of the desirabilities of the cases [worlds] in which it is 
true, where the weights are proportional to the probabili­
ties of the cases. (Jeffrey 1983, 78)
The most pressing problem of these accounts is their uniform treat­
ment of actions and non-action prospects, as discussed in section 3.4. 
More generally, the probabilistic weighing of the worlds does not
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necessary coincide with the concept of causal compatibility pre­
sented here. Causal decision theory has tried to remedy this problem 
by recasting the probability measure as a specification of objective 
chances or a measure of counterfactual dependency. Instead of try­
ing to import all relevant information into the probability measure, 
the natural expansion of the account presented here suggests to em­
ploy a subjective probability measure conditional on other relevant 
causal factors held fixed. The notion of relevant causal factors, of 
course, needs to be provided independently and prior to the prob­
ability measure; a task fulfilled by the causal graph discussed in 
this paper. The structure needed for a probabilistic weighing of 
worlds to determine the preferences (expressed as a utility index) 
over prospects then requires a Bayesian Network which consists of 
a causal model and a probability function defined over it, satisfying 
certain conditional dependencies. To construct a utility function on 
the basis of Bayesian Networks will be the task of future work.
3.4.2 Small Worlds
What are the objects of world preferences? They are the most spe­
cific items we assign as the content of mental properties. But how 
is ‘most specific content’ defined? This question has not been an­
swered in the account presented here. I have only assumed that 
every world can be partitioned into some collection of prospects.
However, this question is of central importance: if one interprets 
Diogenes’ choice as based on a less or more fine-grained situation 
than I did in w° and wu, the prospect preferences derived from 
those worlds might be different from the ones that I got. This 
partition-dependence of the evaluation of (action-) prospects was 
first discussed by Savage as the small world problem (1972, 82-91). 
A solution in the form of a partition-invariant utility function was 
proposed first by Jeffrey for evidential decision theory and then by 
Joyce (1999) for causal decision theory. The problem of Jeffrey’s 
theory were briefly mentioned in the first remark. The problem of 
Joyce’s utility measure is that it rests on a measure of counterfac­
tual dependence, which ultimately depends on a similarity measure 
between possible worlds -  a very unwieldy and mysterious notion.
Instead of attempting to solve the problem of small worlds in 
all its generality, some decision theorists lately have argued that
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one needs to justify the particular partition in which the situation 
is modelled . 1 7  Two kinds of arguments are of interest here. First, 
partitions have been justified as rational. A partition is rational 
if it serves an advantageous purpose, as expressed for example in 
Broome’s ‘principle of individuation by justifiers’:
Outcomes should be distinguished as different if and only 
if they differ in a way that makes it rational to have a 
preference between them. (Broome 1991, 102)
One particular way to cash out this idea is by specifying the costs in­
volved in refining a partition and comparing them with the expected 
gains from such a refinement. 1 8
Secondly, partitions have been justified by pointing to allegedly 
corresponding representations on the nervous system level of individ­
uals. Monitoring neuron activity in the paretial cortex of animals or 
humans exposed to different stimuli, it is claimed, provides evidence 
to what extent the tested agents differentiate environmental stimuli. 
Interestingly enough, recent research in this field has found evidence 
for cost-benefit considerations influencing these neuron activities:
Current sensory data would reflect the observer’s best es­
timate of the current state of the salient elements of the 
environment. As such, it would be influenced by stored 
information that could improve the efficiency of sensory 
processing through selective attention. (Platt and Glim- 
cher 1999, 233)
Both approaches to partitions are in the midst of current research; 
conclusive arguments are not available for either. Any fuller discus­
sion of these important arguments would therefore be beyond this 
chapter; I restrict myself to pointing out these open questions for 
the framework provided here.
3.4.3 Prospect Preference Aggregation
The model presented here provides a definition of more abstract 
prospect preferences in terms of world preferences. Once the prospect 
preferences are specified for a particular agent, the question arises:
17Compare Lewis 1981, 11, Sobel 1994, 161.
18Compare Halldin 1986.
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how are they employed in the prediction or explanation of the agent’s 
behaviour in novel situations? In the simplest case, the new situa­
tion is analyzed into its aspects, and the prospect preferences of the 
agent may provide us with clues of what the agent will do or why 
she did what she did. An example of such an application was the 
above mentioned case of the mugging. The victim’s behaviour is ex­
plained with reference to her prospect preferences, in this case her 
preference for physical integrity over material possessions. Given 
the absence of other applicable prospect preferences, she will choose 
an action that she believes will leave her unharmed but without 
her money. Such an application is easy in cases where the available 
prospect preferences are unanimous -  that is, where all aspects of 
one situation are either preferred or non-comparable to the aspects 
of another situation. But what can we say if conflicts arise? For 
example, the agent prefers physical integrity to material possession 
and from this perspective would prefer a world in which she com­
plied with the muggers; but she prefers her honour untouched to 
feeling cowardly and from this perspective would prefer a world in 
which she attacked the muggers.
One suggestion for such a case is to employ the framework of or­
dinal preference aggregation as found in the social choice literature. 
But instead of using it for questions of how the rational prefer­
ences of a group of individuals can be aggregated into a coherent 
ranking of the group, the strategy proposes ‘to apply interpersonal 
economic theory to intrapersonal problems’ (Elster 1985, 232) -  i.e. 
the different prospect preferences are aggregated back into one world 
preference.
The general results of such an application are that there is no ag­
gregation rule for prospect preferences that satisfies certain minimal 
constrains and results in a coherent, transitive world-preference or­
der (Compare Steedman and Krause 1986, Rizvi 2001). It does how­
ever not preclude that in many situations, coherent world-preferences 
can be aggregated from prospect preferences, or that with the help of 
external information, the decisiveness of some prospect preferences 
can be justified.
Again, a further discussion of these questions goes beyond the 
scope of this chapter. With the current state of research in this area, 
however, there are prima faciae reasons to believe that prospect 
preferences can, in many cases, be aggregated to coherent world
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preferences and can thus function in the prediction and explanation 
of action.
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Chapter 4
A M odel of Preference 
Change
4.1 Introduction
Preferences are theoretical terms that represented a pattern in an 
agent’s behaviour. They are identified through the causal role they 
play -  in conjunction with other mental properties -  in bringing 
about behaviour. Methodologically speaking, as preferences are not 
directly observable^ and-.intrQ.gp.ectiyej^iden;ce .is not reliable  ^ pref­
erences are assigned exclusively on the evidential basis of observed 
behaviour.
It [intentional action explanation] explains what is rela­
tively apparent -  an arm-raising -  by appeal to factors 
that are more problematical: desires and beliefs. But if 
we were to ask for evidence that the explanation is correct, 
this evidence would in the end consist of more data con­
cerning the sort of event being explained, namely further 
behaviour which is explained by the postulated beliefs and 
desires. Adverting to beliefs and desires to explain action 
is therefore a way of fitting an action into a pattern made 
coherent by the theory. (Davidson 1975, 159)
For all that I have discussed so far, there is still a problem with 
this view. The preferences inferred are preferences at a particular 
point in time. They represent (part of) a pattern from which the 
agent would act at that particular moment; a pattern that restricts
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and regulates the interconnections between specific preferences and 
other mental properties, as it is spelled out in preference and ex­
pected utility theory. But this pattern is synchronic; it only incor­
porates mental properties at one time, not at different times. As 
Davidson says: ‘The theory merely puts restrictions on a temporal 
cross-section of an agent’s dispositions to choose’ (Davidson 1971, 
235). That the theory ascribes particular preferences to an agent at 
present does not imply that this agent will have these preferences 
at some future point in time.
The static nature of preference theory spells problems both for 
the ascription of preferences on the basis of behavioural evidence, 
as well as for the application of preferences in explanations and 
predictions.
First, we are supposed to ascribe and confirm a particular syn­
chronic preference configuration on behavioural evidence that is 
necessarily diachronic. Behavioural evidence is diachronic because 
agents do noTeXhibit many different forms of behaviour at one time. 
People might smoke while listening to the radio, telephone in the 
bathroom, dream while sleeping, etc., but none of these simultane­
ous behaviours are sufficient to ascribe any meaningful preference 
pattern. What is needed is a considerable number of observations, 
and these necessarily have to be made over a period of time. This is 
pretty much the experience in everyday intercourse with other peo­
ple. When meeting a stranger, we are cautious as to what character 
traits to ascribe to her; the more of her behaviour we get to see, 
the more complete our image of her character gets. Once we feel 
confident in ascribing certain preferences to her, we then test our as­
criptions against the further observations we make of her behaviour. 
Hardly ever do we ascribe anything to a stranger upon observing her 
behaviour once; and if we do we are prone to error and subsequent 
disadvantage.
So if the evidence consists of diachronic data, which of it is al­
lowed in the construction of a synchronic preference ordering? How 
‘thick’ is the temporal cross-section allowed to be? A compromise 
has_to beJbund^snch that the cross-section is not ‘too thick but, 
there arg_suffident reservations as evidence TorTHeTiscriptiqn_QLthe 
preference ordering. A static Reference " theOrv" '^does not-give an 
answer to these questions.
Second, a static theory ascribing synchronic preferences at present 
does not justify their application at a future time. It is the nature 
of synchronic preferences that they are causally efficacious only at 
one point in time. In economics, this deficit is remedied with the 
additional assumption that tastes are stable over time. This as­
sumption could be termed the simplest possible type of diachronic 
preferences. It establishes a diachronic preference framework, but it 
fails to establish a dynamic preference theory: nothing explains why 
preferences should be stable over time . 1 The remedy, therefore, is 
ad hoc: economists generally admit that tastes change in the long 
run, but insist that they do not change in the period relevant for 
their explanation/prediction. But the length of such an assumed 
stable period is completely unwarranted; it is held only on the basis 
to remedy the troubling defect.
For both of these reasons, it is therefore necessary to develop the 
concept of diachronic preferences within a dynamic framework. In 
this paper, I will approximate such a dynamic framework by mod- 
elling the transformations an agent has to perform on her preferences 
in order to maintain certain rationality requirements.
In the next section 1  discuss the various possibilities of how in­
consistency of an observed behaviour with an ascribed preference 
order can be interpreted. I argue that one important interpretation 
is that the preferences have changed. Given this interpretation, the 
ascribed preferences need to be transformed to reflect the prefer­
ence change. This is done with the help of a theory of preference 
change, whose guiding principles I will present at the end of the next 
section. I illustrate the different types of preference order transfor­
mation in the third section. In the fourth section I develop a model 
of these types of preference transformation. The first part discusses 
the basic construction of such a structure; the second part actually 
constructs the preference representation, and the three change op­
erators of expansion, revision and contraction. For each of these 
operators, relevant properties are proven. In the fifth and last sec­
tion I will compare the model developed here with the only other 
model of preference change known to me, by Sven Ove Hansson.
1 Attempts to show empirically that diachronic preferences are stable suffer from this lack 
of a dynamic theory. As an example, see Landsburg (1981).
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4.2 A Theory of Preference Change
A theory of preference change starts on the same basis as a static 
preference theory. Observations of present and within a limited 
horizon past observations of behaviour at time t are fitted under 
a pattern of preferences and other mental properties as the causes 
of the observed behaviour. Now the preferences ascribed on this 
basis are employed as diachronic preferences: under the principle of 
unwarranted divergence^ it is assumed that the ascribed preference 
ordering remains stable in time unless there are discernible causes 
that change it. Methodologically, this principle is a bit of a carte 
blanche, as the theory of preference is not sufficiently far developed 
to comprehensively cover the causal mechanisms that change pref­
erences. So even if one subscribes to the principle of unwarranted 
divergence, it will not help much as we do not know what sort of 
causes to look for. Instead, one is thrown back upon behavioural 
observations as the only evidence available for preference change.
Evidence of this sort comes in the guise of future behaviour which 
does not fit the preference ordering assigned. An agent’s behaviour 
that contradicts the preferences assigned to her can be interpreted 
in five ways.
4.2.1 Five K inds o f Interpreting C ontradictory B ehaviour
First, the agent can simply have made a mistake. Due to a misper­
ception of her own preferences, due to beliefs not concurrent with 
available evidence, or due to lack of computational effort, she acted 
in a way contrary to her own preferences. The correctness of this 
interpretation can be tested in cases where the ascriber has recourse 
to post-observational interviews. If it can be communicated to the 
agent that she acted contrary to the preferences assigned to her, and 
she agrees with this verdict, this interpretation is confirmed.
If the agent however does not agree that she made a mistake, 
maybe we can identify her behaviour as irrational in the sense that 
due to external causes -  it was not determined by her preferences 
and other mental properties in the way the theory predicts. Mo­
mentary influences like drug abuse, physical exhaustion or illnesses, 
as well as permanent defects like amnesia2 or the loss of sensory-
2Particularly interesting here is the case of losing one’s memory while retaining all reasoning 
faculties, called Korsakov’s Syndrome
conceptual capacities. 3  If any of these or similar causes can be 
observed, the irrationality-interpretation will explain why the ob­
served actions were inconsistent with the ascribed preferences. If 
the disturbance is momentary, one can expect to explain or predict 
the behaviour after the disturbing cause has ceased (for example, 
after sobriety is restored). In permanent disturbances, obviously, 
the applicability of a preference theory is annihilated, unless the 
disturbance had only a local effect, such that a new pattern could 
be established.
If the agent rejects the possibility of error, and no external dis­
turbing causes can be identified, a third interpretation of the in­
consistency between observed behaviour and assigned preferences is 
that the description of the deliberative situation the agent suppos­
edly faces is incorrect. In particular, what has to be re-assessed 
is the description of the relevant alternatives that the agent faces, 
and over which she has preferences that determine her behaviour. 
Such an interpretation has been offered, for example, by Broome 
in defense of Savage’s subjective expected utility theory against the 
arguments derived from Allais’ Paradox. Broome argues that the 
specification of the situation by Allais is incomplete, and requires a 
further individuation of outcomes. Given that there is indeed a cri­
terion for reasonable individuation (as Broome 1991, 103 provides), 
the full specification shows that agents who choose the seemingly 
erratic combination in the Allais situation do indeed comply with 
the sure-thing principle.
Attempts to explain seemingly erratic behaviour (i.e. behaviour 
inconsistent with preferences ascribed to an agent) by further in­
dividuating the alternatives can be found for example in Freud’s 
theory of repression. It postulates that a desire -  under appropriate 
conditions -  not only causes behaviour that leads to the desire’s sat­
isfaction; rather, an unfulfilled desire as well produces anxiety about 
its satisfaction. Behaviour that seemingly contradicts the existence 
of a particular constellation of desires then is explicable as the at­
tempt to thwart the anxiety produced by these unfulfilled desires.
Similarly, agents might have preferences on which they act but 
which they consciously withhold from publication, thus giving rise
30 .  Sacks describes the case of a patient who lost his capacities to see due to a localised 
stroke. He had lost not only his eyesight, but ‘he had lost the very idea of seeing -  and was 
not only unable to describe anything visually, but was bewildered when I used words such as 
“seeing” and “light” ’ (Sacks 1985, 39).
129
to the impression that their behaviour is inconsistent with prior 
ascribed preferences. Such a concealment tactic is often exhibited 
in legal cases, as illustrated tongue-in-cheek in the court case of the 
former butler of the Princess of Wales:
The police report listed the many explanations Mr. Bur­
rell gave for not having returned objects to the family. 
They include not getting around to it, being too trau- 
matised by Diana’s memory to confront certain objects, 
keeping things for sentimental reasons, guarding things 
that she expressly meant him to have, being unaware that 
a particular object was in his possession, thinking some­
thing was not appropriate for the charity to which it was 
destined and taking off her hands gifts she had never liked 
in the first place. Mr. Boyce [the lead prosecutor] com­
mented dryly, “You may observe some inherent contra­
diction between these various explanations, all of which, 
according to the statement, were existing in the same man 
during the same period”. (‘Diana’s Faithful Butler: In the 
End, Was He False?’, New York Times 18.10.2002)
The multiplicity of motives at the same time indicates, or so the 
prosecutor at least implies, that some crucial motive is missing, or 
is indeed concealed by the agent. Instead, the agent offers different 
motives for similar actions, as if to contradict the impression that 
there was a common pattern displayed in his behaviour.
The above interpretation already proves the preference theory 
partly wrong: it attributed the wrong preferences, by lacking in­
sight into the correct causal relations and by neglecting the degree 
of individuation in the preferences’ objectives. If no reasons can be 
found for this interpretation either, one might want to go further and 
denounce the whole framework of the preference theory as flawed: its 
assumption of a particular causal pattern which underlies behaviour, 
that this pattern is ascribable on the basis of behavioural evidence 
alone, and that the ascribed mental properties are governed by logi­
cal consistency. Examples of this interpretation are the development 
of regret theory in reaction to the preference-reversal phenomena, or 
the ‘toolbox’ approach to bounded rationality in reaction to exper­
imentally observed systematic deviations from probability calculus. 
However, this interpretation is reserved to deviations that are sys-
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tematic, and offers itself only if an alternative theoretical framework 
is available.
If none of the above interpretations apply, another possibility is 
that the preferences the agent had at a particular time have changed 
in such a way that they produced the observed behavioural effect 
inconsistent with the original preferences.
According to the principle of unwarranted divergence, this inter­
pretation depends on the presence of a potential preference-changing 
cause. Thus, a preference change is diagnosed only if there is be­
havioural evidence for it and a cause for it can be identified. Notice 
that now the reasoning does not go from the presence of a cause 
of preference change to the preference change itself. Rather, the 
argument starts from the observed inconsistency of behaviour with 
the prior preference ordering. It then proceeds through the various 
potential explanations for such an inconsistency. It concludes that 
preference change is the correct explanation if some potential cause 
for such preference change can be identified.
The role of the causes of preference change is so weak in this 
explanation because no proper theory of them has been successful 
as of yet. The literature on potential causes of preference change is 
extensive; but their unifying moment is that the causes they identify 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for a change in preferences. Even 
if the list of causes offered in these investigations were comprehen­
sive, one could not infer from the observation of any of them that 
a preference change in a particular direction has occurred. Given 
that one knows that the agent has been exposed, for example, to 
so many billboards praising a low-carbohydrate diet, we still cannot 
infer that the agent now prefers a diet rich in protein and fat to one 
rich in carbohydrates. The conclusion is only that some agents are 
influenced and some are not -  and however detailed the investigation 
becomes, none has so far managed to provide robust predictions of 
preference change from the presence of certain causes . 4
Instead, the existence of such causes functions as secondary evi­
dence for the preference change interpretation in the following way. 
//observed behaviour is inconsistent with the agent’s preferences, if 
external interfering causes do not exist and if mistakes are ruled out, 
then the existence of potentially preference-changing causes deter-
4It seems that all that has been accomplished in this field so far are categorisations of 
preference change. Two good examples of these are Elster (1982) and Bowles (1998).
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mines the interpretation of the inconsistency as a preference change. 
Accepting this interpretation, the seeming inconsistency becomes 
explicable, and further preference changes predictable.
A theory that takes the inconsistency of behavioural evidence and 
attributed preferences as principal evidence for preference change 
supported by the existence of some potential cause for preference 
change is not ad hoc. On the basis of the evidence, the theory first 
of all modifies the prior preference ordering in such a way that it is 
consistent with the observed behaviour. But this initial modifica­
tion will require further modifications. These modifications, in turn, 
have potential consequences on the agent’s behaviour, which can be 
observed under the right conditions. Thus, the preference change 
theory proposed here is not a mere integration of observed evidence 
into the theory for reasons of immunization, but it proposes a more 
general modification of the preference ordering that has empirical 
significance beyond the observations made.
Given the observation of an appropriate cause of preference 
change, the theory takes the observed behaviour as the evidential 
input and models the collateral change of preferences on this basis. 
By focusing on the input and collateral consequences, the theory 
proposed here disassociates causes from inputs. Causes function 
only as secondary evidence, while preferences revealed in observed 
behaviour function as input. It is important not to confuse causes 
and preference inputs in this context.
sitivity, completeness, asymmetry, plus requirements on preferences
preferences conditional on the existence of others. When new binary 
preferences are introduced into the ordering as the preference change 
input, these requirements will stipulate the introduction or elimina­
tion of further preference pairs. To function as an ordering at all, 
the preference ordering has to satisfy all consistency requirements 
after the initial input was introduced.
4.2.2 T he Princip les o f a T heory o f Preference C hange
1 C.
The collateral preference change is governed by four principles: con­
sistency, success, conservatism and entrenchment.
Consistency is the principle that regulates synchronic as well as 
diachronic preferences. Consistency requirements -  typically tran-
over lotteries stipulate or prohibit the existence of certain binary e v - i r
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Success requires that the preference ordering regain consistency 
without eliminating the input. The latter might sometimes be the 
easiest way to regain consistency, but clearly defies the purpose. The 
input must be accommodated. The possibility that the preference 
change was only momentary, and not maintainable in the light of 
the ensuing computational costs, is a question concerning the causes 
of preference change and is consequently not debated here.
According to the principle of conservatism, no preferences shquld 
be given up if not necessitated by a good reason. To understand this 
principle, two types of reason need to be clearly distinguished: rea­
sons for holding a preference and reasons for discarding a preference. 
The arguments for the conservatism principle are related to the com­
putation costs of these respective reasons; and as I shall show, the 
costs of reasons for holding preferences is much higher than the costs 
of reasons for discarding them. Thus conservatism can be split into 
a negative and a positive claim: that one should not in general keep 
track of the justification of one’s preferences, and that one should 
retain all preferences that one has no reason to discard.
As I discussed in chapter 3, I believe that reasons for holding a 
preference for a world w\ over a world W2 are the preferences over 
the aspects p, q, r . . .  that iui, W2 respectively realise. For example, 
the reasons that Mrs. Juniper prefers Paris for her next weekend- 
vacation destination over Barcelona and Barcelona over Moscow are 
as follows: she thinks that Paris has the most interesting art collec­
tions, followed by Moscow and then Barcelona; further, she thinks 
Paris has a cosmopolitan air to it, while Barcelona strikes her as a 
little touristy (she doesn’t know what to make of Moscow in this 
category); the climate strikes her as best in Barcelona, followed by 
Paris and then Moscow; she knows Moscow and Paris are expen­
sive, while Barcelona is moderate in its cost; the best food with the 
greatest choice she will get in Paris, followed by great food, albeit a 
limited variety, in Barcelona, while Moscow’s culinary promises are 
dubious at best. Mrs. Juniper has preferences over these aspects, 
and the result of aggregating these preferences lead her to prefer 
Paris to Barcelona to Moscow for her next trip.
According to this view, the reason for holding a preference a >- b 
consists of three elements. First, the set of possible worlds is par­
titioned in such a way that one part represents a feature realised
N/ 11
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by a while the other part represents a feature realised by b. In­
finitely many partitions are possible, of course, but only some will 
be relevant to Mrs. Juniper. She might for example find irrelevant 
the characterization of Moscow as the city with the highest rate of 
luxury cars, followed by Paris, with Barcelona trailing last; maybe 
because she does has no evaluation associated with it, or because 
she is not even aware of this fact. How many partitions are made to 
characterise the different options, as well as what these partitions 
are, is therefore an essential part of the reasons for preferences. 5  
Second, a preference relation is defined over these partitions. The 
aspects associated with each option then are preferred or dispre- 
ferred to the aspects associated with another option. Third, if it 
is not the case that all aspects associated with one option are pre­
ferred to the aspects associated with another option, there must be 
a process of weighing the preferences. As noted in section 3.4.3, 
there are no good solutions available to this process of aggregating 
prospect preferences yet, but that should not concern us here. If 
it is correct that reasons for holding a preference over options are 
the preferences over the prospects, aspects or properties the relata 
of the target preference respectively realise, then there must be a 
process that involves forming partitions, specifying preferences over 
these partitions and weighing those preferences.
A reason to discard a preference, on the other hand, is based on 
the principles of consistency and success. For example, an agent has 
a preference a >- b. She then comes to prefer b >- a. By consistency, 
this new preference provides a reason to discard the preference a y  b.
Comparing reasons for holding preferences with reasons for dis­
carding preferences thus reveals two differences. First, a reason for a 
preference is always a reason only for that preference. The combina­
tion of specific partitions, aspectual preferences and their weighing 
justifies only this one specific preference. The reasons to discard 
a preference are far more universal: they are the general princi­
ples of consistency and success. Second, a reason for a preference 
might go back into the past, and involve a large number of elements. 
Reasons for discarding preferences, on the other hand, are always
5 Just how important this aspect is for evaluation is betrayed by the effort the advertis­
ing puts into manipulating people’s partitioning. Successful examples of newly introduced 
partitions include: ‘cool -  uncooP, ‘diet/light -  non-diet’,' ‘80s -  ‘70s’, ‘individualistic -  con­
formist’.
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determinable in the present: consistency is violated now by such and 
such a preference, or success needs to be satisfied now. So in both 
comparisons the reasons to discarding preferences come out more 
parsimonious, more accessible and thus less expensive than reasons 
for holding preferences.
The negative claim of conservatism states that agents should not 
keep track of the justifications for all the preferences they hold, 
because the costs are high and the benefits dubious. Costs for keep­
ing track of all justifications are high, because human resources of 
thought are scarce, and filling up memory space with ‘clutter’ (Har­
man 1986, p. 41) is wasteful of these scarce resources. Given what 
I said about the elements of reasons for holding preferences, the 
partitions, aspect preferences and weighing can indeed amount to 
quite some clutter. Take for example one’s preferences over different 
kinds of baby food. Once this was an extremely important issue, 
and one had clear preferences for some kinds over others, based on 
specific aspects of the different foods -  say the delightful mushiness 
of the carrots versus the displeasing tartness of the spinach. But 
one is very unlikely to ever have to choose between eating any of 
those again hence why should one maintain all one’s reasons for 
those preferences?
Further, the benefit might easily not match up to the high costs. 
Because of the instability and manipulability of the partitions, se­
cure justification are very hard to come by. There is always the 
chance that one’s senses did not work correctly when one experi­
enced something, or that one deceived oneself. Hence a reason one 
had for holding a preference might have always been a bad reason. 
The mere possibility of such an error as small as it may be puts 
even more emphasis on the cost-benefit argument. If an agent does 
not have rock-bottom justified preferences in the first place, then 
the high costs involved in tracing everything back to some presumed 
foundations are even less likely to result in a net gain.
The positive claim of conservatism states that people do and 
should retain all preferences which they have no reason to discard. 
First, this is again a question of cost efficiency. To discard pref­
erences one holds is a difficult business, be it to stop desiring a 
cigarette or to distance oneself from a person one was close to -  how-
a i
ever good one’s reasons are. Preferences, unlike beliefs, are strongly 
habitual, and to abandon a habit one’s reasons deem bad is costTy.6 
In order to minimise costs, no one will or should discard preferences 
if she has no good reasons to do so. Second, the agent might assume / ^ ^ y  O 
that she never embraced a preference without a reason. The reason' 
might now be forgotten, but as long as it is not actively contradicted 
by a reason to eliminate or revise the preference, nothing should be 
done about it.
But there are situations where there are equally good reasons to 
discard one preference or the other. For example, an agent who 
holds preferences {a >- 6, b >- c, a >- c} and then comes to prefer 
c y  a by success and consistency has a reason to discard a >~ c 
and either a >- b or b y  c. In those situations, the principle of 
conservatism is of no help to the agent. Instead, the agent has 
a choice between three actions. She can randomly choose which 
preferences to eliminate, she can exploit further reasons she might 
have for retaining one preference over another, or she might violate 
conservatism and discard all preferences in question. I will discuss 
these three options in turn.
First, the agent might randomly decide which preference to elim­
inate. This option satisfies conservatism, but introduces capricious­
ness, and hence should be rejected.
Second, in special cases like these, the agent might revert to rea­
sons for holding preferences and eliminate that preference which 
she has less good reasons to hold. In such a case we say that the 
retained preference is more deeply entrenched than the discarded 9?
preference. Entrenchment orders preferences in a ranking of ‘having ^  ^  
better reasons for this preference than...’. It is important to note 
that entrenchment is a property of a binary preference relation, not 
of the relata of that preference. Following my discussion of reasons 
for holding preferences, I think that a preference is the more deeply 
entrenched (i) the more unanimous the aspectual preferences are in 
its favour, (ii) the larger the number of aspectual preferences that ^  
support it and (iii) the more salient the partitions that underlie all 
the relevant aspectual preferences. Because entrenchment represents 
reasons for holding a preference, it faces the same cost-benefit con-
6Contrast this with the discussion and rejection of the notion of beliefs as habits of thought 
in Harman 1986, 38-41.
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siderations discussed above. However, entrenchment is called upon 
only in particular situations, where the other three principles will 
not yield a unique result. Given the cost considerations, one can 
therefore expect that entrenchment information is not available for 
most preferences.
TheThird option the agent has given she has no entrenchment 
information available and randomization is rejected -  is to elimi­
nate both preferences. This case has some intuitive plausibility: if 
things grow too complicated, if there is evidence that our values are 
inconsistent with a preference we have strong reasons to hold but 
cannot determine which of the values is the ‘culprit’, we do have a 
reason to suspend all the value judgements inconsistent with that 
preference. But if we agree with that, then conservatism is violated 
the agent removes both his preferences, even though he could have 
remedied the inconsistency by removing only one. To be more ex­
act, conservatism is violated in relation to those preferences which 
are potential inconsistency makers. In the broader picture, for all 
other of the agent’s preferences, conservatism remains intact. I will 
call this the principle of weak conservatism.
In the following section, I will discuss an example of preference 
change and illustrate the applications of the four principles discussed 
here.
4.3 Three Illustrations of Input-Driven Collat­
eral Preference Change
Hubert, a culinary greenhorn, moves to Cuisineville with its three 
restaurants (Thai, Italian and Chinese). At his arrival, he prefers 
Thai to Italian, but he hasn’t made up his mind about the other 
cuisines. Thus Hubert holds the preference t y  i, which is depicted 
as the directed arrow in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1
Then, after repeated visits to both the Italian and the Chinese 
restaurant, he comes to prefer Italian over Chinese. Thus Hubert 
now holds the preferences t y  i and i y  c, and the preference 
between Italian and Chinese is depicted in figure 4.2.
But given that he holds both of these preferences, transitivity 
now requires him to hold a third -  he is forced upon the threat 
of inconsistency to prefer Thai over Chinese. Thus the moment he 
obtains his second preferences, the principles of success and consis­
tency require that he has to accommodate a third preference such 
that he holds t y  i,i y  c and t y  c, as illustrated in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.3
Hubert has now acquired a complete preference ordering over 
t, i , c. Some Lo Mein later, Hubert realises that he now certainly 
prefers Chinese over Thai. If this new input is simply integrated into 
the existing ordering, it results in a preference cycle as illustrated 
in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4
The ensuing preferences t >- i , i  >- c and c >■ t violate tran­
sitivity. To honour consistency and success, the whole preference 
ordering has to be transformed. Three different options are open:
(i) the other preference pairs are removed. This cannot be done 
individually, as removing either t y  i or i y  c would leave the re­
sulting ordering still violating transitivity. Thus both t y  i and 
i y  c need to be removed to accommodate c y  t. This in turn vio­
lates conservatism. Instead (i) t y  i is changed to i y 1 or (iii) i y  c 
is changed to c y  i. Both (ii) and (iii) satisfy conservatism, as the 
ensuing ordering retains one preference pair of the order depicted in 
figure 4.3 each. But conservatism provides equally good reasons for
(ii) or (iii). If one must not randomise, as I have argued, additional 
entrenchment information is needed to choose between (ii) and (iii).
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If such information is not forthcoming, then Hubert will revert to 
option (i) and remove both preferences that together contradict his 
new preference c y  t. Thus either Hubert holds only c y  t, or he 
holds c y  t , i  y  c and i y  t, or he holds t  y  i , c  y  i and c y  t. To 
continue with Hubert’s story, let’s assume he changes his preferences 
to t y  i, c y  i and c y  t. That is, Hubert’s preference for t over i is 
more entrenched than his preference for i over c; he held the former 
for longer and has made many more comparisons between t and i 
than between i and c. His preference ordering is then illustrated in 
figure 4.5
Figure 4.5
After further explorations of the local culinary scene, and after 
the exposure to some rather exotic Chinese fish eye and jellyfish 
dishes, Hubert loses confidence in his preference for Chinese over 
Italian cuisine. This preference retraction leads to the problematic 
preference constellation depicted in figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6
But this ordering again violates transitivity. To honour success 
and consistency, the whole preference order needs to be transformed.
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Hubert has three options to do so: he can remove either of the pref­
erence pairs or both. Again, this choice will depend on the available 
entrenchment information. As we know from before, Hubert’s pref­
erence over t and i are most deeply entrenched, hence the collateral 
change results in the removal of c > - 1 and Hubert’s final order con­
sists only of t >- i, depicted in figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7
4.4 The M odel
4.4.1 General Considerations
The model presented here consists of a representation of an agent’s 
diachronic preferences, and three operations of preference change de­
fined over this representation, which are contingent on a preference 
input. Before I will present the formal model itself in section 4.4.2, 
I will discuss some general features of the preference representation, 
as well as some postulates for the operators that connect it to the 
four principle of preference change theory.
An agent’s preferences are represented as a set of binary rela­
tions over a set of mutual exclusive alternatives. The assumption of 
mutual exclusivity is made here for reasons of simplicity. In an envi­
ronment where some alternatives imply other alternatives or where 
alternatives are probabilistically correlated, instrumental dependen­
cies arise which have to be reflected in the preference structure. 
These dependencies complicate the model and prohibit a clear focus 
on the mechanism of collateral change. I have discussed the different 
kinds of preferences and their relation to each other in section 3.2. 
With the principle of equivalence provided there, the framework
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used here could be expanded; but now I just want to provide the 
basics of any such model.
The preferences of the agent are assumed to be reflexive and 
transitive, but not complete. Completeness means that any two 
alternatives are connected. The assumption that an agent’s prefer­
ences are complete is very unrealistic. First, to establish and to store 
preference information of this magnitude is very costly, and is not 
always justified by the benefits derived from a complete preference 
ordering. For example, a preference for a over b and for a over c in a 
three-alternatives environment gives the agent a full recipe what to 
choose; the preference comparison between b and c is irrelevant as 
long as a is available. The agent can now consider the probability 
with which a might become unavailable -  contrary to her earlier 
assessment of the situation -  and then compare the expected loss of 
having to choose between b and c without preference guidance with 
the costs of establishing a preference between b and c. Second, it 
might be categorically impossible to form a reasonable preference 
between two alternatives -  e.g. whether one prefers the destruction 
of Mars to that of Venus -  because not enough information about 
the alternatives is available to form any judgement, or because one 
has good reasons to refuse a judgment. 7  Third, completeness re­
stricts the scope of preference change. As I will argue, there are 
three important types of preference changes: expansion, contraction 
and revision. If preference orderings were complete, non preference 
could be added to it, and none could be removed. As the examples 
of section 4.3 showed, a model that only deals with revision does 
not capture the full width of preference change.
On the other hand, a complete ordering is technically easier to 
handle. In particular, it can be represented by a utility function, and 
allows -  with the addition of a probability measure -  to construct 
an expected utility index. To combine the technical advantages 
of completeness with the argument against completeness presented 
above, an agent’s preferences will be modelled by the intersection 
of a set of total orders. The intuitive idea behind this is that the
7Bernhard Williams gives an example of a moral dilemma, and proposes that in a situation 
like this, a reasonable reaction is to withhold judgment. A traveler in remote and dangerous 
territory stumbles across a guerrilla group, whose leader promptly offers the unexpected guest 
a delicate choice: if he chooses one of their ten hostages to be executed in the traveler’s 
honour, the other nine will go free. If he prefers not to choose, the guerrilla will murder all 
ten. Compare Williams(1981).
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incomplete order is represented by all those total orders which are 
possible ways to ‘fill in’ the incomplete order. 8
I will think of preference change as induced by an input command 
of the following sort: (i) ‘Add a y  b , . .. ,y  y  z  to the preference 
order of the agent’; (ii) ‘Eliminate a y  b, . . .  , y  y  z  from the pref­
erence order of the agent’; (iii) ‘Revise the agent’s preference order 
by a y  b, . . .  , y  y  z \  An input command thus consists of a change 
command and a string of preference sentences. There are only three 
commands: expansion, contraction and revision. They correspond 
to the three cases illustrated in Hubert’s example.
The input to each of the three operators is a set of total or­
ders itself. The intersection of this set represents the preference by 
which the preference ordering is to be expanded, contracted or re­
vised. This way, the model easily deals with multiple changes, and 
singleton changes as a special case of them.
The change operators are generally restricted by the principles 
of consistency, success, conservatism and entrenchment. The first 
requirement is that the result of applying a change operator to a 
preference ordering must be a preference ordering itself -  it must 
satisfy reflexivity and transitivity. This closure property is a spec­
ification of the consistency requirement for theories of preference 
change. In the model presented here, its satisfaction is greatly facil­
itated through the mode of representation. The preference ordering 
is modelled as the intersection of total orders. As each total order 
satisfies the consistency axioms -  otherwise it would not be an order 
-  their intersection similarly has to satisfy these axioms.
When changing a preference ordering, the new preference order­
ing has to incorporate the commanded change. If expanded or re­
vised by a number of preferences, then each of these preference must 
be represented in the new set; if contracted by a number of prefer­
ences, then none of these preferences must be represented in the new 
set. This way, the change operators satisfy the Success postulate.
Further, change operators should change preference orderings 
only to a minimal degree. I have discussed this principle of conser­
vatism in section 4.2.2. Applied to change operators, four postulates
8Beyond the technical convenience exploited here, this representation has the further ad­
vantage that an incomplete ordering can be represented by a set of utility functions. This idea 
has been developed in Aumann (1962) and Seidenfeld, Schervish, Kadane (1995); existence 
and uniqueness proofs for such a representation are given in Dubra, Maccheroni, Ok (2004).
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can be distinguished, although some of them apply only to specific 
operators. First, an expanded preference ordering should include the 
prior non-expanded ordering; while a contracted preference order­
ing should be the subset of the prior non-contracted ordering. This 
is captured in the postulate of Inclusion for expansion and con­
traction respectively. Second, under specific conditions, a change 
command should be vacuous. To expand or revise an ordering by 
a preference that is already in it should not change the ordering at 
all; neither should the contraction of an ordering by a preference 
that is not in it. These commands should leave the prior ordering 
completely unaltered. The Vacuity postulate determines that under 
these conditions, the new preference ordering is the same as the old 
one. Third, if a preference ordering and its subset are expanded by 
the same preferences, and none of these input preferences make any 
of the two sets inconsistent, then the expanded preference order­
ing must still include its prior subset. This Monotonicity postulate 
only applies to expansion. It will be shown with an example that 
monotonicity does not hold for contraction. Last, changes induced 
by identical inputs should result in the same changed preference or­
derings. This Extensionality postulate applies to all three change 
operators.
To prove the satisfaction of these postulates for the constructed 
model is a first step on the way to a representation result. The 
proof that the model satisfies the postulates is a form of existence 
result: given that the postulates are well chosen, it is shown that the 
structure constructed here represents and models preference change.
However, this is possibly not the only structure available. To prove 
that, we have to show that if an operator satisfies the postulates, 
then it must have the structure presented here. Last, it is desirable 
to show that all possible forms of preference change - all possible 
forms of preference model permutations can be obtained through 
the change operators constructed here. This chapter will only prove 
the existence results. 1 ^
4.4.2 T he Formal Structure
Let A  be the finite set of mutually exclusive alternatives a, 
Further, let §(>4 x A) be the superset of the Cartesian produ 
with A. Then the set of all total orders, PaxA, is defined as:
,f tv*-
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D efin ition  7 PaxA is the set of all X  £ §(A x A) \  0 such that
1. for all a £ A, (a, a) G X .
2. for all a ,b ,c  G A if (a, b) G X  and {b, c) G X  then (a, c) € X .
3. for all a,b  G A either (a, b) £ X  or (b, a) £ X
P^xA is thus defined as the set of all those members of S (A x A) 
which are reflexive, transitive and complete. Each of these R £  PaxA 
is complete in the sense that all elements of the alternative set A  
appear in a binary tuple (a, b) £ R  at least once. However, the 
number of tuples differs between different R  because some tuples 
might be symmetric -  for every pair a, b, R  might contain (a, b) but 
not (6 , a); or it might contain (a, b) and (6 , a) .
An agent’s (incomplete) preferences are represented by a set R G 
PaxA, whose intersection f)  R is the set of all the binary comparisons 
endorsed by the agent. An agent strictly prefers a to 6 iff (a, b) £ 
P)R but not (b, a) £ p|R; she is indifferent between A  and B  iff 
(a, b) £  p) R and (b, a) £  f)  R.
The relation between the Rs in R and f) R is as follows. The agent 
holds an incomplete preference ordering p| R, which is represented as 
the intersection of a set of total orders, R. One might think of these 
total orders as the orders compatible with the agent’s preferences, 
as the agent’s potential complete preference orderings. The more 
potential preference orderings the agent has, the less specific are his 
preferences, and vice versa. Thus the more total orders are members 
of R, the less specific the preference ordering P|R, as shown in the 
following corollary.
C orollary 1 Q C R = ^ p | R C p | Q
P ro o f Case 1: Q =  R = ^ p | Q  =  p|R . Case 2: Q c R .  Then 
every member of Q is in R but there is at least one member of R 
which is not in Q: Q =  { Qi , . . . ,  Qm}, R =  { Qi , . . . ,  Qm, R i . . . ,  i^ } ,  
with Qi ^  Rj for all i , j .  Thus f |R  =  f |{Q i • • •»Qm, Ri  • • •, Bn} =  
Q 1n . . . n Q m n R 1n . . . n R n c  f |Q  =  f l W i . - • • . 0™} =  Q i n . . . n  
O m -O
However, one and the same f)R  can be obtained from different 
R ’s . 9  In order to avoid ambiguities here, it is stipulated that R is
9 This is because a total order consisting of some indifference relations always contains at 
least one total order consisting of strict preferences only. Either of these orders combined
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maximal, i.e. all total orders that can represent P| R are actually in 
R.
Definition 8 1 C  PaxA is maximal iff for all R  £ Paxa : if R £  R 
then there is a tuple (a, b) such that: (a,b) £ p| R A (a, b) ^ p|(R U
m )
Maximality requires that the addition of any further total order to 
R will exclude a tuple from p|R . With maximality, the following 
corollary can be shown.
Corollary 2 p| R C R Q and R; Q are maximal = ^ Q C R
P roof Let’s assume that f ]R  C f]Q , R and Q are maximal and 
Q ^  R. Without loss of generality let the difference between Q 
and R be the total order X . By maximality of R, there is a tuple 
{a, b) which is a member of f )R  but not of Q(R fl {A-}). But by 
assumption R fl {X }  =  Q, and thus p|(R fl {X }) =  p|Q . Hence 
P|R  ^  P|Q, which contradicts the antecedent. □
Corollary 2 clarifies the significance of the maximality require­
ment. If R and Q are maximal, and p| R =  f] then ^ follows 
from corollary 2 that R =  Q. To obtain a unique representation 
of incomplete preference orderings, we represent the agent’s prefer­
ences by maximal subsets R £ PaxA-
The following corollary shows that p| R indeed represents an (in­
complete) preference ordering.
Corollary 3 f) R is reflexive and transitive.
P roof Part 1, reflexivity: Let’s assume f )R  is not reflexive.
Then there is a tuple (a, a) ^ P|R  =  {R i fl ... D Rn}. By defi­
nition of fl follows that for some i , {a, a) £ R i, which contradicts 
Definition 7.1.
Part 2, transitivity: Let’s assume f )R  is not transitive. Then
there are some alternatives a, 6 , c £ A  such that (a, b), (b,c) G f ) ^  
and (a, c) £  f)  R. Then there must be some member Ri of p| R for 
which (a, &),{&, c) £ Ri and (a,c) ^ Ri, which contradicts Defini­
tion 7.2. □
with a third might represent the same preference ordering, but obviously they constitute 
different R. Take for example following. Ri =  {{(a, b), (a, c), (6, c)}, {(a, b), {a, c), (c, b ) } }  
and R2 =  {{(o. b), (a, c), (b, c)}, {(a, b), (a, c), (c, b)},  {(a, 6), (a, c), (b, c) (c, 6)}}. Then R i  =  
{(a, b), (a, c), (b, c)} is both in Ri and R2, as is R 2 =  {(a, b), (a, c), (c, 6)}. But R i ,  f?2 C R 3  =  
{(a, b), (a, c), (b, c) (c, b)}  which is a member only of R2. Hence Ri ^  R2, but H =  D ®2-
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Hence p |  R  is a representation of an incomplete preference order­
ing. In exactly the same way, the input set I  is a set of total orders 
whose intersection represents an incomplete preference ordering. In 
the following subsections, three kinds of collateral change operators 
are constructed, and relevant postulates of these change operators 
are proven.
E xpansion  introduces one or more new preferences represented in 
P |  I to the preference ordering P|R, thus changing it to P ) R n i -  The 
expansion operator -n removes certain sets from R  and hence makes 
R  more specific such that p |  R n i  now also represents the preferences 
in P| I .  Four cases can be distinguished. The trivial case is where 
R C I  Here R  is already more specific than I  and no actual expan­
sion takes place. Second, I C R ,  where I  is more or equally specific 
than R  concerning every possible preference sentence. Hence R  is 
replaced by I  in the expansion. Third, R  and I  shares some mem­
bers in common, without one including the other. Then I  is more 
specific about some preferences than R ,  but less so for others. Hence 
those members which make R  less specific than I  are excluded in the 
expansion. Fourth, if R  and I  do not share any members at all, no 
expansion can take place. The expansion operator -n is thus defined 
as follows:
r> « a m> /  R n I  » / /  ® n l ^ 0D efin it ion  9 RnI =  |  R ,f f  R n I  =  0
The expanded set is maximal just as the prior set was.
C orollary 4 R n i  is maximal.
P ro o f If R  fl I  =  0, R n i  is trivially maximal. Otherwise, R  and 
I  are maximal, hence for all ft* G Paxa if ft* £  R then there is a 
tuple (a, b) such that (a, 6 ) G P | R  A (a, b) £ P ) ( R  U {-ft*}). Thus 
there is no f t  G PaxA which is a subset of a member of R  but not 
in R  itself. And similarly for I :  if I  is maximal, there must be no 
total order I  which is a subset of any ft in I  but not in I  itself. Now 
R n i  is the intersection of R  and I .  Thus R n i  contains only elements 
that are members both of R  and I .  By maximality, if Ri G R ,  then 
all f t j  C  f t j  are members of R ,  too (and similarly for I ) .  Hence 
if Ri G R n i ,  all total orders which are subsets of ift are in R n i -
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But then it is impossible to add another total order to Rni without 
removing at least one tuple (a, b) from p |R ni.D
The thus defined operator *n fulfills the following postulates. 
Theorem  3 1. P)Rni is a preference ordering (Closure)
2. / /  R fl I 7  ^ 0, f l  I C p) Rm (Success)
3. P)R ^  n ^ m  (Inclusion)
4. / / P |I  C P |R  then p |R  =  P |R ni (Vacuity)
5. 7/P)R  C p|M fln d H fll 7  ^ 0, then P|Rni Q P)Hni (Monotonic­
ity)
6. If for two input sets p |I  =  P|J, then p|Rm =  P|Rnj (Exten- 
sionality)
P roof Part 1, Closure: It needs to be shown that p)Rnn is
reflexive and transitive. Proof proceeds analogous to Corollary 3.
Part 2, Success: R fl I C I. Thus, if R n  I 7  ^ 0, Rni Q I. Then, 
by corollary 1, P]I C P |R ni.
Part 3, Inclusion: R n I C R. Thus, if (i) R n I 7  ^ 0, Rni Q R. 
Then by corollary 1 , p| R C P| RnI. If (ii) R fl I =  0, by definition 9 
Rni =  R.
Part 4, Vacuity: From p| I C P) R follows by corollary 2 R C I .  
Then as well ( R n i )  =  R and from that P)(R n  I) =  p|R . As by 
assumption R H I 7  ^ 0, p| Rni =  P| R.
Part 5, Monotonicity: From p| R C P| M by corollary 2 HI C R, 
and from that and H n I 7  ^ 0 it follows that HI H I C R n i  and 
R n I 7  ^ 0. Thus Hni C RnI, and by corollary 1 p|(Rni) C P|(IIni).
Part 6, Extensionality: From p| I =  p) J by corollary 2 I =  J. If 
R n I =  0, then R ni =  Rnj =  R- If R n I 7  ^ 0, Rni =  Rnj, and thus 
by corollary 1  p |R ni =  P |R nj-
C ontraction  Contraction removes all the preferences in p |I  from 
the preference ordering p|R . Such a move has any effect only if 
P|R  n p| I 7  ^ 0. The contraction operator -y adds certain sets to R 
and hence makes P| R less specific. The addition should take stock 
from those total orders which do not represent any preference in p| I; 
the inverse of I, 1?axA \  I offers itself here. But only some members
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of PaxA \  I should be added: we only want to remove from p |R  
those preferences which are in p |I. If all members of Fs inverse 
were added, H ^ui would be empty as long a s f j R n p |I l 7^ 0 . Take 
the following example to illustrate this point.
Let the agent have preferences over A =  {a, 6 , c} of the following 
sort: {a  y  b, b y  c, a y  c,e tc}. Now she wants to contract b y e  
from those preferences. The respective sets R and I and the inverse 
of I then look like follows:
R =  {{(a, b), (b, c), (a, c) , . . . . }
I =  {{(a, b), (b, c), (a, c ) , . . . } ,  {(b, a),  (a, c), {b, c ) , . . . } ,  { (b, c), (c, a), (b, a),
P a x a \ I =  {{(fl) c)> (c , b), (a, 6 ) , . . .} ,  {(c, 6), (b, a), (c, a ) , . . . } ,  {(c, a), (a, 6), (c, 6),
If all members of P^xA \  I were included in the contracted set Eyi? 
the resulting P|Rui would be empty. This is undesirable, as the 
contraction in no way concerns the relation between a and b. Such 
a change is too radical: just because an agent contracts some pref­
erences, she does not necessarily have to give up her whole ordering. 
Finding the right scope of change is subject to the principles of 
conservatism and entrenchment, as discussed in section 4.2. The 
principle of conservatism tells us to retain the relation a y  b. Both 
the first and the third member of P^xa share the tuple (a, b) with 
fj R, while the second member does not share any tuple with fj  R. 
On its basis, the selection function C(-) picks out only the first and 
the third member of PaxA \  I-
More generally, a selection function C(-) over the inverse of I 
is constructed to comply with weak conservatism. C(-) determines 
those elements of Pax^i \  I which are most similar to p |R . The 
similarity comparison makes sure that as many preferences of the 
old system as possible survive the contraction. Because multiple 
contraction is allowed (i. e. with more than one tuple in P|I), we 
have to make sure that not only those members of PaxA \  I which 
are different from P|R  in one instance are picked out. To avoid 
such a corruption of the similarity measure, members of PaxA \  I 
are compared with the set p)R of which all the tuples of Q I are 
removed. As both the members of Paxa \  I and f ]R  are sets of 
binary tuples a similarity metric is defined as the cardinality of the 
intersection between the two.
D efin ition  10 C (Paxa \  =  {X \X  G PaxA \  I and for all Y  G
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vAxA \ i : w  n [n« \ d id  > # (x n in® \ ni])>
As I discussed above, weak conservatism has to be supplemented 
by entrenchment information. This is because of the following prob­
lem. Due to the transitivity requirements, an alternative a\ that 
is connected to n- 1  other alternatives through a preference chain 
fli h  0*2 h  ■ • • O'n is not just (weakly) preferred to its neighbour but 
to all other alternatives in the chain. This is reflected in p) R ,  which 
represents the ordering over a i , . . . ,  an: P )  R  not only includes tuples 
(ai, U2 ),(a 3 , 0 4 ), etc., but also (ai, <2 3 ) ,(ai, 0 4 ), etc. Contraction of a 
preference ordering by a\ >z an then necessitates the removal of at 
least one further ‘link’ of the chain. That is, if (a i,a n), is removed 
from p| R  then so at least one (a*, a^+i), i <  n, has to be excluded as 
well. This extra exclusion is automatically done by C(-), for there 
is no total ordering over a i , . . . ,  an for which a\ )/- an if not at least 
for one i < n : a* ^ di+\. The problem is that all total orders 
which represent a\ an and a; )/- a i + 1 for exactly one i < n are 
equally similar to P )  R  and hence are all included in C(-).  If R u i  was 
constructed on the basis of C(-), it would eliminate all members of 
the chain between ai and an, when contracting by ai >z an. This 
again is too radical a step to built it as a necessary mechanism into 
contraction.
Instead, the contraction in such a case can be weakened if ex- 
tralogical entrenchment information is available. An entrenchment 
relation is a partial order of preference orderings. I have discussed 
the basis of entrenchment in section 4.2.2. The entrenchment rela­
tion orders preferences according to how good a reason an agent has 
to hold them. Eventually I hope to develop a more precise measure 
of entrenchment on the basis of the criteria given in section 4.2.2: 
unanimity of the relevant aspectual preferences, number of aspectual 
preferences that support it and saliency of the underlying partitions. 
At this point, however, I cannot provide a formalised account of it. 
Instead I will simply assume that there is such a partial entrench­
ment order available.
An entrenchment relation >-e is defined over subsets of PaxA 
such that each P) E* represents a single preference comparison and 
Ei is maximal. >-e is irreflexive and transitive, but not necessarily 
complete. The entrenchment-regarding selection function C^E(') is 
then defined as:
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D efin ition  1 1  CVe(Paxa \  I) =  C(FaxA \  I) fl E< for those E» for  
which P|E» C P| C(PaxA \  I) and not E* >-e % for any j
The selection function is thus refined by the entrenchment rela­
tion: those total preference orders that satisfy the similarity crite­
rion are chosen by CyE which either do not appear in the entrench­
ment ranking at all, or which rank lowest in that ranking.
With the help of the entrenchment-regarding selection function, 
the contraction operator -u is defined as:
D efin ition  12 Rui =  CVe(Paxa \ I ) U R
The definition of contraction fulfills the following postulates. 
T heorem  4 1. P|Rui is a preference ordering (Closure)
2. 0 ^  i  D ^ u i (Success)
3. HMui ^ f l®  (Inclusion)
4. / / n i n f l R  =  0 then f |R m  =  P l^  (Vacuity)
5. If I =  J, then p|Rui — Pl^cupi (Extensionality)
P ro o f Part 1, Closure: It needs to be shown that P|Rui is
reflexive and transitive. Proof proceeds analogous to Corollary 3.
Part 2, Success: For all X  : X  E PaxA \  I ^  X  £ I. As
CyE by definitions 1 0  and 1 1  is not empty, it follows that for all 
X  : X  E C^e(PaxA \  I) => X  f  I. Hence for some X  : X  £  
(CVe(PAxa \ I ) U l ) 4 X  ^ I, and thus (CVe(Paxa \  I) U R) $£ I  
Then by corollary 2  and maximality P|I ^  P|(CVe(Paxa \  I) U R) 
and thus by definition 1 2  p |I  ^  p|Rui-
Part 3, Inclusion: For all X : R C MuX. Then by corollary 1 for 
all X : p|(R U X) C f)R , and in particular U C>»e(PaxA \  I)) £  
P) R. FYom this and definition 12 follows that P| Rni ^  P)
Part 4, Vacuity: If P|E PI® then hy corollary 1 R $£ I.
This is equivalent to the claim that there is a non-empty set HJ : 
U C E & U C P^xa \  I. Then there is one such U that is the 
largest subset which R and P^xa \ I  have in common. The selection 
function C yE will pick out only those orders which are in that U, 
because they all maximise the similarity with R: U C R Sz U C 
P a x a \ I  & (P A x A \I \U )n R  =  0 ^ C ^ E cu. But if a E c u e
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R, then P|(CVe(PaxA \  I) U 1 )  =  p |R , and hence by definition 12 
P |  R u i  =  P |  R .
Part 5, Extensionality: Analogous to proof of theorem 1.6.D 1 0
R evision  Revision changes a preference existing in the order into 
a new preference. Such a move is different from expansion only if 
the input preference cannot be accommodated without changing the 
original preference ordering. The revision operator •* replaces the 
members of R with the members of I which are closest to P| R. For 
this similarity measure, the entrenchment-regarding selection func­
tion is employed that was defined in definition 11 Unlike standard 
accounts in belief revision, the revision operator here is not defined 
in terms of contraction and expansion.
D efin ition  13 R „ =  {
The revision operators satisfies the following postulates. 
T heorem  5 1. P|R*i is a preference ordering (Closure)
2. P |I C p|R*i (Success)
3. / / R  fl I 7  ^ 0 then p|R*i =  P|Rni (Vacuity)
4 . / / p | I  =  P |J then p)R*i =  P|R*j (Extensionality)
P ro o f Part 1, Closure: As in corollary 3.
Part 2, Success: CVE selects at least one member of I according 
to definition 13. Thus R*i C I and then by corollary 1 P |I C P|R*j. 
Part 3, Vacuity: By definition 13.
Part 5, Extensionality: Analogous to 1.6.
4.5 Com parison
While a broad discussion of belief change exists since the works of 
Quine (1970) and Levi (1974), the related topic of preference change
10Contraction does not satisfy monotonicity. Counterexample: An agent holds preferences 
a y  b,a y c and hypothetically also holds a y  b,b y  c, a y  c. Then a when he contracts 
his actual preferences by b y e ,  according to 2.4 (vacuity) he retains his original preferences. 
But if he contracts his hypothetical preferences by b y  c, he will either be left with a y b or 
a y e ,  depending on the entrenchment of his preferences. Hence in both cases the contracted 
hypothetical preference ordering, which originally contained his actual preferences, is now 
smaller than his contracted actual preferences.
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remains largely unexplored. The only exception from this are the 
writings of Sven Ove Hansson. In this section, I will compare his 
model (1995, 2001) with the one I have proposed in this chapter. 1 1
Hansson’s model, I will argue, differs in five central aspects from 
the model proposed here. It represents an agent’s motivation as a 
sentential preference set, which is closed under propositional logic; 
while my model represents them as a preference base. Hansson 
further models change operators on the basis of a priority index, a 
device that does not capture as many aspects of preference change 
as the entrenchment ordering does, but which is computationally far 
more cumbersome. Thirdly, it will turn out that the sentential model 
of contraction has a problem to handle multiple contraction that the 
model proposed here does not have. Fourth, due to the closure of the 
preference set, Hansson’s contraction operator satisfies the recovery 
postulate, which it should not, as I will argue. Last, Hansson’s model 
has an advantage over mine, in that it can represent preference 
sentence disjuncts without having to validate one of the disjuncts. 
This allows to represent e.g. ‘A is at least as preferred as B ’, without 
necessarily specifying this either to ‘A is strictly preferred to B ’ or 
‘A is indifferent to B ’.
Hansson represents an agent’s motivation as a mix of relational 
and sentential set. On the basic level, he defines a set R , whose 
members are reflexive preference relations over a common domain 
of alternatives U. For example,
R  = { R 1, R2} =  { { ( AtA) , ( B, B) , ( A, B) } 1{ ( A, A) , { B, B) , ( A, B) , ( B, A) } }
with U =  {A , B }. In contrast to my model, the underlying prefer­
ence relations R £  R  are not complete; they are therefore not as 
compatible with a utility representation as my account.
Each preference relation Ri in R  then defines a set of prefer­
ence sentences [Ri]. That set consists of sentences corresponding 
to each preference comparison in Ri, and sentences from a theory 
T. T  is formulated in the preference language itself, and consists of 
sentences restricting any preference sentence set, e.g. T  =  {(AT >-
n It could be argued that Nayak et al. (1996)’s discussion of a model of change of belief 
entrenchment is relevant here too. The relation, however, is largely formal, and the model not 
sufficiently developed to merit a separate discussion here.
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Y) A (Y y  Z) —► (X A Z)}.  On top of that, [Ri] is truth-functionally 
closed under propositional logic. For example, the preference rela­
tion Ri =  {(A , A ) , (B, B) , (A, B)}  has as its sentential represen­
tation the set [Ri] =  { A y  A, A y  B, B y  B ,- i(B  y  A), (A y  
B) V (B y  A ), (A>z B) A -.(B y  A ), (B y  A) (A y  B ) . . .}.
The agent’s motivations are then represented as the intersections 
of all of those sentential representations of the preference relations 
in R: [R] =  p|{[R]|R E R}. While this framework looks like a sen­
tential representation, Hansson uses [R] only as a semantic output 
device; the real work -  in particular the change operators -  is done 
with the relational preference model R .12
Hansson starts the construction of the change operators with 
the revision operator and develops the contraction operator out of 
that. To construct the revision operator, he develops the notion of a 
priority index assigned to the input sentence of the change operator. 
When a preference set is to be revised, say, by a sentence A y  B,  the 
index identifies whether the set R  should be revised by changing the 
position of A or by changing the position of B.  I think the intuitive 
idea behind this priority index is that all preference changes are 
determined by a change in the underlying reasons for desiring an 
option. Take for example Mr. Myers’ ordering of four newspapers, 
A to D,  in the following way:
A y  B y C y D
an order expressed by preference sentence set ftl (see below). Now 
Mr. Myers finds that newspaper B hired a right-wing commenta­
tor, who annoys him greatly, and thus he now prefers paper D to 
paper B.  His new ordering can take two different forms. According 
to Hansson, he either changes it by moving D up in the ranking, 
obtaining:
A y  D y B y C
an order expressed by preference sentence set j}2. Or he changes it 
by moving B down:
A y  C y  D y  B
12To increase the confusion even more, he then uses sentential inputs -  such that the op­
erators are defined as accommodating a sentential input to a relational set. Hansson briefly 
discusses this problem and concludes: ‘[a purely relational treatment] seems to be less directly 
related to intuitive notions of preference change. Therefore, single sentence input, and the 
notation RjgO: [for the revision operator] will be used here’ (Hansson 2001, 48).
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an order expressed by preference sentence set (J3. For reasons of 
clarity, I have put all three sentential representation (or rather their 
salient parts) in one place:
#1 : {A y  B, A y  C, A y  D, B y  C, B y  D, C >- D , . . . }
U2 : {A y  B, A y  C, A y  D, B y  C, D y  B, D y  C, . . . }
#3 : {A y  B, A y  C, A >- D, C >■ B, D y  B, C y  D , . . . }
Note that the difference between jjl and JJ2 and between fll and {13 is
two binary preferences each: D >- B,  of course, and then one further 
preference each. What differs between Hansson’s priority index and 
the entrenchment relation is the justification of determining this 
second binary preference.
Hansson claims that the information that determines which of the 
binary preferences to change comes attached to the input sentence:
. . . the primary input that we wish to mirror in the 
formal model provides us with information about which 
of these to choose: You get tired of brand A and start to 
like it less than brand £ ,  which was your previous second 
choice. You learn that the political party X  has changed 
its policies on unemployment insurance and start to like 
it more than party Y, and so on. (Hansson 2001, 47)
I interpret Hansson to say here that the reason that makes one 
change the preference also determines how, in the sense clarified 
above, one should change it. If Mr. Myers changes his preference 
between B and D, because of a change in the properties of B , then 
that reason also makes him drop B in the ranking, and keep D 
where it is. Thus the priority index, according to Hansson, should 
determine B as the one whose position is changed, resulting in the 
ordering J{3.
I think this framework is too narrow. Remember the notion of 
entrenchment I developed in section 4.2.2. Preferences over exclu­
sionary states have their reasons in the preferences over the aspects 
that these states realise. For example, Mr. Myers prefers newspa­
per A to B because it has better book reviews; B to C because 
it reports more international news and C to D because it is more 
amusing to read. The aspects identified for each newspaper depend 
on the comparison: when compared to C, B’s salient feature is its
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amusement value; when compared to A, B ’s salient feature is its 
lack of good book reviews. When a new aspect is discovered or 
a assumed aspect found wanting, and therefore a particular exclu­
sionary preference changed, this does not mean that this aspectual 
change is decisive for all other preference comparisons. But this is 
exactly what Hansson claims: because B  has the negative aspect of 
a right-wing commentator, which makes Mr. Myers prefer D  to it 
now, it also has to drop below C. In contrast to this, my model asks: 
which of the preferences are more deeply entrenched? And it makes 
the answer dependent on the number of aspectual preferences, on 
their unanimity, and on the importance of the partition according 
to which the two aspect-realizing states are compared. Under that 
framework, Mr. Myers might well decide that it is not so important 
for the newspaper he reads to be amusing as it is for it to report 
international news; and consequently change the preference between 
D  and C  rather than B  and C  -  resulting in the ordering {J2.
Given the priority index and a similarity measure (which is com­
plicated through the incorporation of the index), Hansson constructs 
the revision operator R^o: as changing all elements R* of R  in such a 
way that (i) they all include a; (ii) they all are close to some R  E R; 
and (iii) they all are consistent. Comparing it with the one of my 
model, Hansson’s operator is computationally more extensive: every 
member of R  has to be changed to include cm, and they all have to be 
re-shaped as closely as possible to some member of R. In contrast 
to this, my model only requires that those R  G P axA which validate 
a  and are closest to are included in R; and consecutively all 
those R  £ R which do not validate a  are excluded from R.
Hansson next constructs the contraction operator on the basis of 
revision. To contract a  from R, Hansson forms the union of the 
set R  and the set Rg-ia. Thus, Hansson’s contraction operator is 
narrowed down by the priority index, against which I have argued 
above. Further, the change operators take their input to be a single 
sentence, not a set of sentences. While in the case of revision, Hans­
son showed that a revision by a set of sentences can be modelled 
equivalently as a revision by a conjunction of all the set’s members, 
this cannot be done for contraction.
There is no truth-functional combination /  of two sen­
tences such that it holds in general that {au, a 2]  fl [R-i-©
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{ a i ,a 2}] =  0 if and only if f ( a i , a 2) [R t®  { a i ,a 2}-
(2001, p. 52)
In contrast, my model does not define the input as single sentences 
and hence is not in need for a truth-functional operator that would 
allow one to convert a set of sentences into a single sentence. It 
can therefore handle multiple contraction, while Hansson’s model 
cannot.
Hansson’s contraction operator further satisfies the recovery pos­
tulate. This is a postulate that it should not satisfy, however. The 
recovery postulate states that any preference order contracted by 
some preferences and then expanded by the same preferences al­
ways restores the original set. The controversial character of the 
recovery postulate is revealed in the following example. An agent 
prefers A  over B  and B  over C. Hence by transitivity, she prefers 
A  over C. Now she drops her preference A > C. In order to comply 
with transitivity, at least one of the other two preferences has to be 
removed from her overall evaluation (and it might well be possible, 
for lack of a specifying criterion, that she removes both). In any of 
the three resulting versions, a subsequent revision by A > C  will 
not restore the original preference model.
Original preference model: { A  > B,  B  > C,  A  > C}
Contraction by A  >  C:  (i) { A  > B }  (ii) { B  >  C} (iii) 0
Expansion by A  > C:  (i) { A  > B,  A  >  C} (ii) { A >  C , B  > C}  (iii) { A  > C}
Models of preference change should allow for such cases, as they play 
an important role in preference dynamics. The recovery postulate 
is therefore overly restrictive. My model does not satisfy it, and I 
think this is right.
These advantages, I think, weigh heavily enough against the ca­
pacity of Hansson’s model due to the closure property of the 
preference sentence sets -  to represent preference sentence disjuncts 
without having to validate one of the disjuncts. Overall, I there­
fore think the model presented here is a more adequate model of 
preference change than Hansson’s.
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have argued for a particular understanding of the no­
tion of preference used in the social sciences. The scientific context 
in which I have investigated this notion dictated two premises: first, 
that the concept of preferences must help in the scientific practices 
of explanation and prediction, and second, that it must adhere to 
certain standards of empirical adequancy.
Because the social sciences predict and explain, any notion of 
preference employed by them must live up to the standards of these 
practices. The most fundamental of these standards is that the 
explanans be a cause of the explanandum. I therefore argued in 
chapter 1  that preferences are necessary components of a sufficient 
cause of a particular behaviour. Beyond that, they are particular 
kinds of causes. They are properties, and thus their instantiations 
are facts, not events. As such, they can be ascribed to a behaving 
system, and particularly to human agents.
Further, by causing an agent to behave, preferences cause physi­
cal properties to change. I have argued that this relation is unprob­
lematic once one agrees that preferences are programming prop­
erties: that their specific realisations are physical property reali­
sations. However, because preferences can be realised in multiple 
ways, they cannot be reduced to their realisers. Instead, prefer­
ences group together under their ‘realisation span’ those physical 
properties which are necessary components of a sufficient cause of a 
particular behaviour; this crucial role of theirs cannot be performed 
by any lower-level properties. The social sciences that employ the 
preference concept are thus not just a transitory science that awaits
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its end by successful concept reduction; rather, they are autonomous 
disciplines with a separate conceptual basis.
This conceptual basis, however, is ontologically compatible with 
those of the natural sciences. I have argued for this claim by refut­
ing the anti-naturalist argument that preferences -  or other moti­
vational properties -  are different from properties employed in the 
natural sciences qua their intentional nature. To the contrary, I 
have argued that preferences are not intentional properties in the 
sense that they essentially incorporate a semantic component. The 
semantic component is only a construct: a construct of the process 
of measuring mental properties. It is not essential for preferences, 
nor for any other mental states. With this argument, I have re­
jected two popular but incompatible positions. First, I have rejected 
those who claim that the semantic component is essential for mental 
properties, and that mental properties are compatible with natural 
science properties because wide semantic content still supervenes on 
physical properties. Second, I have rejected those who claim that 
the semantic component is essential for mental properties, and that 
therefore the social sciences dealing with these properties have to 
employ practices fundamentally distinct from explanation or pre­
diction. Instead, I have argued that the social sciences do explain 
on the basis of preferences (and other mental properties), that these 
concepts are compatible with natural science properties, and are not 
threatened by eliminativists ambitions.
Preferences ontologically characterized in such a way can perform 
as explanans, if their attribution is sufficiently empirically justified. 
In chapter 2, I have demonstrated that introspection understood as 
sensing one’s own motivation is not a reliable method to assign pref­
erences: it is incomplete and fallible. But the failure of this kind 
of introspection does not lead to the conclusion that preferences 
and other mental properties should be given up altogether in the 
social sciences. To the contrary, a methodology that attempts to 
eschew mental properties and establish lawlike generalizations be­
tween observable stimuli and behaviour is prone to incompleteness 
and infinite regress.
Instead, I have argued that preference assignment rests exclu­
sively on behavioural data (ideally construed in a wide way to in­
clude verbal behaviour) , and that in order to explain this data, social
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scientists need to employ cognitive concepts. These cognitive con­
cepts, however, are not the same as those of introspective psychol­
ogy; rather, they are non-observable, theoretical terms, determined 
by a theory that sufficiently fits the data. As I showed in examples 
from chemistry and biology, the social sciences are in good company 
when using theoretical concepts whose employment cannot be jus­
tified from singular observations alone. The employment of mental 
properties, therefore, does not make social sciences less well founded 
than many natural sciences.
The nature of a theory ascribing mental properties, I have further 
set forth, is conjectural: one cannot hope to derive and justify it from 
our common sense intuitions. The ‘method a priori’, as it has been 
defended in economics by Mill, Robbins and v. Mises, therefore has 
to be rejected where it claims a solid intuitive justification of its 
first principles. Further, the construction of decision theory as a 
‘collection of platitudes’ cannot be more than a metaphor; it does 
not suffice for an operational methodology for the decision sciences.
Instead, theorists must choose from a large set of plausible the­
ories available. Their choice, I stated, should be ultimately deter­
mined by simplicity considerations on the one hand and best-fit 
criteria on the other. As I pointed out, this methodological con­
sideration leads one to admit the ultimate indeterminateness of the 
true theory. However, given the data available, the use of theories 
more complex than those that rely on the simple belief-desire dis­
tinction is unwarranted. The choice is therefore between the number 
of theories that are based on the dual belief-desire distinction. Be­
yond simplicity and versatility considerations, their correctness is 
an empirical question.
Without relying on any specific theory, in the following two chap­
ters I have pointed out two central problems for all preferences as­
cribed in this fashion. The first problem is the modularisation of 
preferences. Only the most specific preferences can be empirically 
justified, but only sufficiently abstract preferences are useful for ex­
plaining or predicting new situations. In chapter 3 I narrowed my 
focus to the simplest form of preferences: most specific descriptions 
of certain events. I showed how these ‘simplest’ preferences could be 
derived from choices, and investigated how a more abstract kind of 
preference could be derived from the specific ones while maintaining
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the latter’s empirical justification. This framework is based on the 
notion of a causal structure that represents an agent’s beliefs. It 
presents a way to ascribe preferences on the basis of observed be­
haviour, and then to individuate and recombine them, explaining or 
predicting different behaviour under different circumstances.
The second problem is the change of preferences over time. Most 
theories in the social sciences have so far avoided tackling this prob­
lem and have instead relied on ad hoc justifications. The attempts 
that have been made often rely on introspection and aim at identi­
fying the causes of preference change. But, as I argued, the employ­
ment of introspection is dubious and none of the causes of preference 
change are either necessary or sufficient.
I therefore proposed a different approach that starts from those 
cases where observed behaviour was inconsistent with the ascribed 
preferences. Upon such a phenomenon, the scientist should choose 
from a menu of possible interpretations, basing her choice on sec­
ondary evidence like potential causes of preference change. If the 
evidence speaks for the preference change interpretation, the change 
itself is modelled as the transformation the agent has to perform on 
her preferences~given that she is committed to a small number of 
nationality principles. By modelling this transformation, the social 
scientist is able to explain and predict further changes in preferences 
that have not been manifested in her behaviour yet.
This model is the first step to ‘dynamise’ cognitive theories of 
behaviour. With its help, behaviour observed at different times can 
be incorporated into the preference ordering without making strong 
assumptions about the stability of preferences; and the resulting 
preference ordering can be employed at different times for explaining 
or predicting behaviour without question-begging assumptions.
In this thesis I have argued that preferences are precise and ac­
countable concepts, even though they are attributed in the process 
of interpreting an agent’s behaviour. Explanation and prediction of 
behaviour on the basis of preferences is empirically justifiable and 
ontologically sound; by developing the conception further in the di­
rection of modularisation and intertemporality, the social sciences 
will find in preferences a rich concept that is able to do a lot of work.
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5.0.1 Outlook
In the course of this discussion and the ensuing development of new 
models that expand the applicability of preferences, a few further 
problems became apparent. These problems require further research 
work, and I will give a brief outlook to further work I intend to do 
on this basis.
First, the discussion in section 2.2.1 made clear that a new method 
was needed to incorporate verbal reports into preference ascriptions 
without committing the fallacies associated with introspection. As 
I have indicated in that chapter^T think- that we can use verbal 
reports as data once we realise that they are governed by similar 
deliberation mechanisms as other behaviour is. Not only do people 
decide with full awareness what to tell, what to omit or how to de­
ceive; the experiments in section 2.2.1 show that they also decide 
what and how to tell on the basis of parameters they are not aware 
of. To incorporate verbal data into decision theory thus requires 
the development of a model that takes into account this delibera­
tive mechanism; which in the end amounts to developing a unified 
theory of thought and action.
Second, the principle of equivalence needs to be extended to pref­
erences over uncertain and risky prospects. For this, a probability 
measure needs to be introduced, and the preferences are to be repre­
sented as an expected utility index. I intend to develop such a theory 
of expected utility on the basis of a Bayesian Network; and hope to 
show how such an index is similar, or differs, to other accounts of 
causal decision theory.
Third, in section 3.4.2 I mentioned the problem surrounding the 
specifications of world and prospect partitions. This connects di­
rectly to one element of reasons for holding preferences, as discussed 
in section 4.2.2. Here I intend to discuss Broome’s suggestion to in­
clude the so far extratheoretically determined relata specification 
into the theory more seriously, possibly backed up by the recent 
findings in neurophysiology.
Fourth, the concept of reasons for holding preferences was cru­
cially determined by a weighing process of the prospect preferences 
involved. This was also mentioned in section 3.4.3, where the ref­
erences to the social choice literature showed that on the basis of 
preference information only, no general aggregation procedure can 
be found. The question that needs to be answered, then, is how
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much more information is needed for such an aggregation procedure 
to work, and whether one can reasonably assume that this informa­
tion is available in intrapersonal deliberation processes.
Last, the discussion of the last two points leads to a better un­
derstanding of preference entrenchment. With a good account of 
what it means to have a reason for holding a preference, it will be 
possible to quantify the criteria for such a reason and construct an 
entrenchment pre-order over preferences on that basis.
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